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The attraction effect (asymmetrically dominated decoy effect) is a widely documented choice 
phenomenon of preference reversal that holds high relevance for marketers and academics alike.  
A review of prior research and current experimental results suggest methodological artifacts may 
have exaggerated the strength and extensibility of the effect in the current literature. 
Experimentation under more conservative methodologies show the attraction effect exists, but 
the methodological factors involved in its creation remain elusive. A subsequent quantitative 
meta-analysis shows the average effect size in the literature to be an approximate 14.7% share 
gain for a dominating Target option. The effect appears to be weaker as the Target captures more 
share in the control condition. No other choice option or methodological characteristics were 
found to be related to the creation or magnitude of the attraction effect. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Decoys are choice options offered with the sole intent of affecting the choice dynamic 
between all other options. From a practitioner perspective, a decoy is choice fodder offered to 
increase the choice likelihood of another product. Overall, decoys share two features. First, a 
decoy is never meant to take choice share for itself. For example, a decoy’s attributes are usually 
positioned to look inferior or undesirable relative to a Target option or relative to both a Target 
and a Competitor option. Since the decoy’s attributes are inferior to at least one other option, a 
rational decision maker should never choose the decoy itself. Alternatively, a decoy with clearly 
superior attributes can be declared to be unavailable once (if) it is chosen. Akin to a bait-and-
switch tactic, this superior decoy is never truly an available option. Second, the presence of a 
decoy in a choice set affects the choice made between all other options. Since a decoy is never 
actually meant to be the chosen option, its existence in a choice set can be thought of as merely a 
means to shift market share between the other options, never truly taking share for itself.  
The combination of these two features necessarily implies an effective violation of regularity. 
Regularity is a classic choice modeling condition where, given a choice set ‘A’ where A is a 
subset of choice set ‘B,’ the probability of choosing option x from B cannot be greater than the 
probability of choosing x from A: 
 
Given A B , then ( ; ) ( ; )P x A P x B  (1) 
 
In other words, based on the principle of regularity (Luce, 1959), the addition of a decoy into a 
choice set should not increase the choice share of any of the already existing options. 
Furthermore, if a decoy is similar to the items in the existing choice set (consider a classic 
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wooden duck decoy used in hunting), then the decoy would cannibalize market share from the 
option it is most similar to. Here, the similarity hypothesis assumes a fixed utility for a single 
type of option. If choice set A is comprised of a duck and a goose, and B includes a decoy 
wooden duck, the similarity hypothesis assumes that the utility of hunting ducks (as measured by 
the proportion who would choose the duck from choice set A) is fixed and must now be split 
between the duck and decoy duck in choice set B. Because the duck hunting utility ‘pie’ is now 
divided between a duck and a duck decoy, the probability of choosing a duck from B cannot be 
greater than choosing a duck from A. According to similarity, when given a decoy that is more 
similar to a target option x, Equation (1) should hold true. 
Figure 1. Decoy Map 
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Yet, starting with Hubert, Payne and Puto’s (HPP) study on “asymmetrically dominated 
alternatives” (1982), it has become clear that many forms of decoy choice options can be 
designed so the principles of regularity and similarity are routinely violated. Although HPP 
posited several explanations for what they termed to be the ‘Asymmetrically Dominated 
Alternative,’ ‘Decoy,’ or ‘Attraction Effect,’ they ultimately declared that “A unique explanation 
for the effect found, is missing” (1982). Following HPP’s paper was a flurry of experiments that 
tested boundary conditions for the effect, which, in the process, developed into sub streams of 
research on different types of decoys: inferior, superior, symmetrically dominated, and phantom 
decoys. A summary of the most often cited types of decoy are shown in Figure 1. Decoys have 
also been studied under the auspices of context effects under the premise that the presence of a 
decoy changes the context in which a decision is made. In short, a decoy is a rationally irrelevant 
option that changes the choice context such that the probability of choosing a given option 
changes with the presence of the decoy.  
 
Types of Decoys and the Decoy Landscape 
Thus far, published research concerning decoys has focused on the decision made 
between a core choice set of two options: a Target and a Competitor {Target, Competitor}, and 
how the decision changes when the choice set is expanded to include a Decoy {Target, 
Competitor, Decoy}. Furthermore, the majority of research conducted on the topic has 
experimented with options evaluated on only two attribute dimensions1.  As such, a major 
dynamic in the choice process between options involves a trade-off evaluation between attributes: 
                                                 
1 Ariely & Wallstein (1995), presented choice sets on three dimensions as a means to prevent decision makers from making 
choices strictly by calculating and comparing ratios. Choplin & Hummel (2005) used a one-dimensional analogue of physical 
distance to measure attribute evaluation in the presence of a decoy. 
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how much of Attribute 1 am I willing to give up for a better level of Attribute 2? All other things 
equal, whether the Target or Competitor is chosen presumably speaks to a trade-off between the 
two attributes that the decision maker has considered and found palatable. The slope of the line 
drawn between the Target and the Competitor on these two dimensions represents the exchange 
rate accepted or trade-off made between the attributes when deciding between the two options. 
Visually, each option in a choice set can be plotted along its two attribute dimensions as shown 
in Figure 1. The Target and the Competitor each dominate the other on one attribute. In this case, 
the Target is inferior to the Competition on Attribute 1 but superior on Attribute 2. That being 
said, attributes do not necessarily have to be comparable on continuous or ordinal dimensions. 
Use of categorical attribute variations such as brand name, country of origin (Chuang & Yen, 
2007), and feature availability, as well as non-traditional attributes variations such as differing 
shapes and sizes, distances and line lengths have resulted in decoy effects (Choplin & Hummel, 
2002 & 2005).  
In general, the option closest in proximity to, and is most similar to the Decoy is 
considered the Target. Notice that the graphic in Figure 1 is reflective across a line drawn 
perpendicular to the trade-off line; the Competitor would become the Target if decoys were 
placed closest to the Competitor. For simplicity, Figure 1 depicts only decoys closest to the 
Target and only shows the Competitor as a reference point. Unless otherwise noted, the present 
article refers to the Target, Competitor and Decoy positions in Figure 1 to graphically clarify 
attribute ratings and relative choice position descriptions within the text.  
The type of decoy created depends on how the decoy’s attributes are positioned relative 
to the attributes of both the Target and Competitor. Figure 1 illustrates the decoy landscape as 
understood based on the current literature. A general categorization of decoy types can be made 
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based on whether a decoy is dominated by none, one, or both choice options of the core decision 
set. Note that within each decoy type, the level of inferiority or dominance can vary. Decoys 
which are dominated by both options are symmetrically dominated, or inferior decoys, and to 
date have garnered little attention by researchers. Decoys dominated only by the Target are 
asymmetrically dominated decoys, and are the original decoys examined by HPP. Decoys that 
are not dominated by any choice option are considered viable decoys, and are usually included as 
phantom or unselectable options. Each of these decoy types affect consumer decision processes 
differently and as a result, produce different effects. The present article examines studies relevant 
to asymmetrically dominated decoys, and in the process touches on the literature of various other 
decoy types and attempts to organize current findings and hypotheses in a manner that will 
facilitate future research and theory building on the subject.   
 
THE ASYMMETRICALLY DOMINATED DECOY 
Asymmetrically Dominated (AD) decoys are options which are completely dominated by 
the Target on one or two attributes. Asymmetrically dominated decoys represent a steeper 
attribute trade-off to the Competition relative to the Target. The decoy itself does not possess an 
attribute that is superior to the Target. Theoretically, given the presence of the Target in the 
choice set, no rational decision maker (by an economic definition) should choose the decoy over 
the Target. However, experimental results have shown time and again that an asymmetrically 
dominated decoy may occasionally garner some share for itself, though it remains unclear why 
some consumers opt for a sub-optimal option. The overall effect though is that including an 
asymmetrically dominated decoy generally results in an apparent shift of choice share from the 
Competition to the Target. This share gain by the Target in the presence of the Decoy (and at the 
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expense of the Competitor) is necessarily a violation of the similarity hypothesis (Tversky, 1972) 
which implies that the option most similar to the decoy should be cannibalized, not helped by the 
presence of the decoy. The light green shaded area in Figure 1 shows the domain of 
asymmetrically dominated decoys and includes decoy placements A1-4, D1-4, F1, and G2.  
The asymmetrically dominated decoy effect was found to be robust across multiple 
product classes (i.e. Doyle et al., 1999; Dhar & Glazer, 1996; Sivakumar & Cherian 1995; see 
Heath & Chatterjee, 1995 for a review of literature prior to 1995; also see Figure 3 for a list of 
product classes studied), hiring and employee selection (Slaughter, Sinar, & Highhouse, 1999; 
Highhouse, 1996), choice of political candidates (Hedgecock et al., 2009; Herne, 1997; Pan et al., 
1995), gambles (Herne, 1999;  Tversky, & Simonson, 1993), and even with shapes and lines 
(Choplin & Hummel, 2005). The effect has also been found within- and between-subjects, as 
tested with various quality measures and price attributes. The effect has also been observed in the 
animal world where asymmetrically dominated decoys have a significant target-share increasing 
effect on honeybees and gray jays (Shafir, Waite & Smith, 2002), and hummingbird foraging 
behavior (Bateson, Healy, & Hurly, 2002)2. Despite the wide-spread effects demonstrated across 
many product classes and decision contexts, the effect was not observed with just as many other 
products within multi-product experiments including theatre tickets and appliances (Munro & 
Popov, 2009),  travel packages (Josiam & Hobson, 1995), cars (Heath & Chatterjee, 1995), and 
restaurants (Lehmann & Pan, 1994). 
 
 
                                                 
2 Although the attraction effect was observed with honeybees, grey jays and hummingbirds, individual green swordtail (fish) 
exhibited a reverse attraction effect where the presence of an asymmetrically dominated decoy increased competitor share on 
mate choices (Royle, Lindström, & Metcalfe, 2008). Another attraction effect study from the animal kingdom was of 
Temnothorax Curvispinosus ants. Individual ants exhibited the attraction effect with nest location selection options, but ant 
colonies with a collective, decentralized decision making mechanism did not exhibit the effect (Edwards & Pratt, 2009). 
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What is Being Measured? 
So far, this paper has described the asymmetrically dominated decoy effect in terms of a 
choice share shift. While accurate, the term is perhaps overly generalized to encompass the 
various metrics and methods used to measure the effect. There are two aspects to describing how 
the effect has been measured in the literature: First, what measure of choice or preference is used, 
and second, how changes in that choice share are analyzed. In the sense that the asymmetrically 
dominated effect describes how market share for a target increases in the presence of a decoy, 
many metrics have been used to measure share change. For example, HPP first compared 
probabilities, derived from nominal choice proportions to measure the effect.  The use of choice 
proportions as a basis for choice probability has been the most popular measure of choice in the 
asymmetrically dominated effect literature (i.e. Mourali et al., 2007; Park & Kim, 2005; Choplin 
& Hummel, 2005). However, because the choice measurement is nominal (either an item is 
chosen or it is not), it has received criticism for inaccurately representing consumer preference, 
as choice measurement arguably operates on a continuous scale (Mishra, 1990). As such, many 
decoy studies also measure market share according to a preference scale where subjects use point 
allocations to indicate the attractiveness of an option (e.g. Yoon & Simonson, 2008; Wedell & 
Pettibone, 1996; Ariely & Wallsten, 1995; Mishra et al., 1993). While there is inconsistency in 
the share metric used (choice or preference), both metrics have yielded consistent results with 
regard to the attraction effect in experimental settings (Yoon & Simonson, 2007; Ariely & 
Wallsten, 1995). 
Similar to how share is measured, there is also inconsistency in the way share change is 
measured and analyzed. Specifically, change necessarily implies a comparison of two 
measurements – and the two measurements being compared have differed across experimental 
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settings. Figure 2 lists general treatment groups, and the analytical methods used to detect an 
asymmetrically dominated decoy effect. To quantitatively define the dependent variables 
measured, let us denote “T” as Target, “C” as Competitor, and “D” as Decoy, and: 
 Choice Set A, without a decoy is {T, C} 
 Choice Set B, with a decoy is {T, C, D} 
 Proportion (choice or points) of T from Set A would be written as: ܶ ∝ ܣ, and  
 The probability that T is chosen from Set A would be written as: p(T,A). 
Based on the above notation, popular quantitative measures used to detect the presence and 
magnitude of the attraction effect broadly fall into three categories: 1) Changes in relative market 
shares, 2) Share shifts which violate expectations under a rational choice model, and 3) 
Preference switching. Most studies define the attraction effect as a measured difference in choice 
share between conditions with and without a decoy present. A relative market share metric (share 
with a decoy relative to without a decoy) can be further complicated by the experiment design 
used. Within subject differences show true preference reversals, whereas between subject 
differences only imply the existence of preference reversals and must rely on defined share 
differences compared against some expected share measure. An example of market share 
differences from rational choice expectations was used in HPP’s 1982 study where the effect was 
defined as a deviation from share expectations under regularity; it was similarly defined as a 
deviation from expectations under a fixed utility model (Huber & Puto, 1983) as well as 
similarity and equal share capture models (Mishra, 1990). Operationally, most mean differences 
tested are comparisons of choice proportions. HPP first presented the AD decoy effect as a 
change in relative market share, demonstrated as: 
( )  > ( )    or    1T BT B T A
T A
    (2) 
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In other words, Target market share proportion is greater in the Decoy choice set than in the 
Non-decoy set. A viable variation on this market share measure can also include the Decoy’s 
share, especially if the Decoy was introduced as a product line extension by the Target to be a 
favorable decoy (Mishra, 1990). Whereas before an asymmetrically dominated decoy effect 
would exist only if the Target share increased, under the such a product-line extension definition, 
a share increase to the Target’s entire product line (T+D), would also qualify: 
( )[( ) ]     >    ( )    or    1T D BT D B T A
T A
      (3) 
Definition (3) is highly applicable in true marketing applications, specifically when a company 
uses “versioning” (Shapiro & Varian, 1998) to create a different and likely inferior version of a 
high-end product, usually with the intent to take share away from a competitor. However, 
academic literature has focused on the stricter definition (2) of the attraction effect and, typically, 
only compares Target versus Competitor shares. 
Effect Measurement Methods 
Whether a significant market share difference exists has been measured with different 
statistical tests, including chi-squared tests, various regression types (multi-nominal logit, log-
linear, protected and ordinary least squares) which measure the significance of the coefficient on 
a ‘Decoy x Choice’ interaction, and t-Tests. This review highlights the primary advantages and 
disadvantages of the most popular statistical test for the effect. A more comprehensive discussion 
of each method is presented by Mishra (1990).  
When first introduced, HPP used the McNemar test to detect the existence of the 
attraction effect. The null hypothesis in the McNemar test assumes homogeneity of marginal 
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probabilities which, in essence assumes the switching populations are not independent of each 
other, and uses these assumptions to compare the proportion of persons who switched from 
Target to Competitor versus from Competitor to Target. Thus the null hypothesis under a 
McNemar test for the attraction effect assumes the proportion of people who switch from their 
original choice are the same: 
( , | , ) ( , | , )p T B C A p C B T A  (4) 
A chi-squared test is preferred to the McNemar test when measuring the attraction effect for 
several reasons. Most notably, if a between-subjects experiment is used, the McNemar test is 
inappropriate because randomly chosen individual subjects should be independent of each other. 
However the McNemar test assumes a constant level of loyalty, where a fixed portion of 
choosers will not switch at all. In addition, appropriate use of the McNemar test requires the 
marginal probabilities for choosing either the Target or the Competitor to remain the same 
between non-decoyed and decoyed scenarios. If the initial brand share distribution is highly 
skewed and the likelihood of switching is fixed, then marginal probabilities will not remain the 
same, and the McNemar test cannot be used. Finally, if the Decoy gains share for itself, a 
traditional McNemar test can no longer be used as there are no comparable switching 
probabilities to contrast the Decoy’s share against. A chi-squared test on the other hand, does not 
make an assumption about homogenous marginal probabilities, and operates with independent 
populations: it can distinguish between whether the observed switching behavior is independent 
of the non-decoyed choice made.  
 Another popular method used to test for the attraction effect is to run a regression and 
then evaluate the significance of the coefficient on a Target Choice x Decoy Availability 
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interaction term. While this method allows for flexibility in terms of ability to test simultaneous 
interactions with multiple moderators, its efficacy, in some cases, depends on potentially 
erroneous assumptions. For example, proper use of a multinomial logit and log-linear models 
requires the independence of irrational alternatives (IIA). At its core, IIA assumes a person’s 
evaluation of a choice should not change when the choice set has been altered to include or 
exclude an irrelevant option. However, as mentioned previously, explanations of the attraction 
effect attempt to explain an instance where IIA does not hold – the decoy, an inferior choice, and 
thus an irrational alternative, has been shown to reliably affect choice behavior. In addition, 
when using a regression method to analyze within-subject data, interpretations come at a 
disadvantage compared to that from a chi-squared test since a regression output would lose 
specific details about switching behavior. Specifically, a regression could only provide 
information about choice proportions with and without the decoy. However if the decoy were to 
gain share for itself, a regression would be unable to identify whether the decoy’s share gain was 
at the expense of the competitor or the target. This source distinction is subtle, but important. In a 
line-extension application of the attraction effect, decoy share captured at the expense of the 
competitor should be considered switching behavior in support of preference change, and the 
attraction effect. However, switching from the Target to the Decoy which it dominates is 
switching behavior indicative of cannibalization at best, sub-optimal decision making at worst, 
and is not necessarily preference change away from the Competitor.  Despite these limitations, 
using a form of regression enables testing for moderating influences on the effect. 
 To the extent that the existence of the attraction effect can be measured as a departure 
from expectations, the next consideration is what benchmark the observation is tested against? 
What expectations should the observations be tested against? Whereas Equation (2) 
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operationalizes a descriptive comparison between decoyed and non-decoyed share proportions, 
normative comparisons have also been made between the observed share proportions and share 
change proportions expected under regularity (constant utility), similarity and fixed utility, and 
naïve models.  Figure 2 summarizes the normative metrics that have been used to detect the 
attraction effect. For the most part, the metrics in Figure 2 should lead the researcher to the same 
conclusion about whether the attraction effect exists. However, testing against expectations 
under regularity or the similarity model is more advantageous for two reasons. First, if the decoy 
captures an extremely large portion of the market, fixed utility and naïve models would presume 
the Target to have negative market share in choice set B. Second, regularity and similarity 
metrics can be expressed as ratios that describe the relationship between the Target and 
Competitor. The use of a ratio does eliminate details on whether decoy share was gained at the 
expense of the Target or Competitor. However, this opacity is arguably a lesser evil than the 
overt assumptions in the fixed utility and naïve models about where the decoy’s market share 
came from.  
14 
 
Figure 2. Attraction Effect Hypothesis Tests 
Normative Model Null Hypothesis Attraction Effect Caveats, Details & Limitations 
Regularity, 
Constant Utility 
T B T A    
 
T B T A    
 
Null holds true if regularity model 
explains behavior. 
 
The decoy would have to take equal 
proportional share from both the target 
and the competitor. 
  
Similarity T B C B
T A C A
    
T B C B
T A C A
    
Null holds true if similarity model 
explains behavior. The decoy is 
expected to take more share away from 
the most similar choice. 
 
The decoy can take share, but takes 
disproportionately more share from the 
most similar Target. 
 
Fixed Utility ( )T D B T A     
or 
( ) ( )T B T A D B      
 
 
( ) ( )T B T A D B      
An extreme version of the similarity 
model where the Decoy is expected to 
take share away from only the Target. 
Naïve Model ( , ) ( , )p T B p T A  & 
( , ) ( , )p C B p C A  
Or 
( , )( , ) ( , )
2
p D Bp T B p T A 
 & 
( , )( , ) ( , )
2
p D Bp C B p C A 
 
( , ) ( , )p T B p T A  & 
( , ) ( , )p C B p C A  
Or 
( , )( , ) ( , )
2
p D Bp T B p T A 
 & 
( , )( , ) ( , )
2
p D Bp C B p C A 
 
Null holds true if a naïve model explains 
behavior.  
 
The decoy takes no share for itself, and 
preferences do not change. 
Alternatively, the Decoy takes equal 
share away from both the Target and 
Competitor. 
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Figure 3. Experiment Group & Analytical Methods Summary 
 
 
Study Year Products
w/in or Btwn
Subjects
Share
Measurement
Share Measurements Other Than:
A: {T,C}  &  B: {T,C,D} Metric Tested
Analysis
Method
Result
(AD Sig?)
1982 With-in Choice - % Share A vs B McNemar Test p≤0.10
Between Choice Expected share under Regularity % Share A vs B
B vs Regularity
Fisher Exact
Fisher Exact
p≤0.05
p≤0.05
Huber, Puto 1983 Within Choice - % Share A vs B McNemar Test p<0.05
Within Choice - % Share A vs B McNemar Test p<0.05
Within Choice Expected share under Regularity B vs Regularity χ2 p<0.01
Expected Share Under Fixed Utility Model B vs Fixed Utility χ2 p<0.01
1987 Between Choice - Log Likelihood Ratio,
Brand x Decoy Interaction
Log-Linear Regression NA
Between Favorability (Ordinal) - % Share A vs B p<0.05
Simonson 1989 Cars, Beer, TV, Calculator, Battery,
Mouthwash, Apartments
Between Choice - % Share A vs B Multinominal Logit
Regression
p<0.001
Mishra 1990 Within Preference (Continuous) - % Share A vs B Paired T Varies by product
Preference (Ordinal) Expected Under Fixed Utility Model B vs Fixed Utility Paired T p<0.05
Choice Expected Under Similarity Model B vs Similarity Paired T p<0.05
Expected Under Equal Share Capture B vs ESC Paired T Varies by Product
Wedell 1991 Gambles Within Choice - Arcsin Transform of  proportion ANOVA p<0.001
Simonson &Tversky 1992 Paper Towels. Cameras, PCs, Gifts,  Microwaves, 
Gasoline, Tissue
Between Choice - % Share A vs B t-Test p<0.05
1993 Cars, TVs, Beer Within Preference (Continuous) % Share A vs B p<0.001
Choice % Share A vs B
Ariely & Wallsten 1995 Bikes, Microwaves, Shoes, PCs, TVs Between % Preference Share A vs B F - Test Varies by product
Expected Under Attribute weights in A %  Share B vs Model Fisher's PLSD Model Can't Explain
Sivakumar & Cherian 1995 Beer, Restaurants, Cars, Apartments Within Preference (Continuous) - % Share A vs B t-Test p<0.05
Wedell & Pettibone 1996 PCs, Microwaves, Restaurant, Hiring Between Preference - % Share A vs B ANOVA p<0.001
Dhar & Glazer 1996 Cars, Stereos, Apartments, 
Managers, Grad School Applicants
Between Preference - % Share A vs B Significance test p<0.01
Zhou, Kim, Laroche 1996 Cars, Caluclators, Orange Juice Within Preference Expected Share under Regularity B vs Regularity Not Specified Not Specified
Herne 1997 Policy Proposals Between Choice - % Share A vs B χ2 p<0.01
Sen 1998 Restaurants Between Choice - % Preference Share A vs B MANOVA p<0.05
Preference (Continuous)
Value Setting
-
-
ANOVA  
1999 Between Choice - Log Linear Regression p<0.001
Sedikiedes, Ariely, Olden 1999 Partner Selection Between Choice - % Share A vs B F- Test p<0.0001
Slaughter, Sinar, Highhouse 1999 Hiring Between Choice {T,C,Dc} % Share A vs B χ2 p<0.001
Tentori, Osherson, Hasher, May 2001 Gift Cards / Coupon Between Choice - % Share A vs B χ2 p=0.005
Dhar & Simonson 2003 Microwave, Cassette Player, Binoculars Between Choice - Absolute Share A vs B χ2 Varies by Condition
Kim & Hasher 2003 Shopping, 
Extra credit
Between Choice - % Share A vs B χ2 p<0.01
Kivetz , Netzer & Srinivasan 2004 The Economist  Subscription, Xerox Machines Between Choice - % Share A vs B t-Test p<0.05
Choplin & Hummel 2005 Circles, Ovals, Lines Between Choice - % Share A vs B χ2 p<0.05
Park & Kim 2005 Restaurants Between Choice - % Share A vs B Significance test p<0.05
Chuang & Yen 2007 Luggage, Watches, Sneakers Between Choice - % Share A vs B χ2 p<0.05
Mourali, Böckenholt, Laroche 2007 Toothpaste, Printers, Restaurants Between Choice % Share A vs B χ2 Varies by Interaction
2007 Between Choice - % Share A vs B χ2 p<0.05
{T,C1,D,C2,C3} % Share B vs {T,C1,D,C2,C3} χ2 Reversal of AD Effect
Yoon & Simonson 2008 Within Peference - % Share A vs B w/in same time χ2 p<0.05
% Share A vs B across time Significance test p<0.01
Bateman, Munro, Poe 2008 Environmental Policy Between Choice - % Share A vs B
Choice x Decoy
χ2
Tobit Regression
p<0.01
p<0.05
Pocheptsova, Amir, 
Dhar, Baumeister
2009 Apartments, 
Gift Cards
Between
Between
Choice
Choice
-
-
% Share A vs B
Interaction: Choice x Decoy
χ2
Regression
p<0.002
p<0.001
Hedgcock & Rao 2009 Cars, Education,  Apartments, Hotels,
Cruises, Repair, Health Care, Careers
Within Value Setting - % Share A vs B
Arcsine Transformed Proportion
Pearson χ2
t-Test
p<0.001
p<0.05
Microwaves,Phone, Cars
Tapes,  Batteries, 
Orange Juice, Baked Beans
Preference (Continuous)
Value Setting
Doyle, O'Conner,
Reynolds, Bottomley
Maximum Likelihood,
Structural Modeling
Mishra, Umesh, Stem Jr.
Hamilton, Hong, Chernev Sunglasses, Sofa, MP3 Platers, Phone
Cars, Beer, Restaurants,
Lottery, TVs, Film
Huber, Payne,Puto
Cars, Beer,
Restaurants,
Batteries, TVs, Film
Interaction: Choice x Decoy
Ratneshwar,
Shocker, Stewart
Cars, Beer, TV,
Orange Juice, 
Gas Grills, Bulbs
Cars, TVs, Beer
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ASYMMETRICALLY DOMINATED DECOY MODERATORS 
Two commonly reported types of moderators impact the strength of the attraction effect: 
those that create descriptive variance and those that create procedural variance. Moderators that 
create descriptive variance do so by changing the value, meaning, and/or weighting of the 
information provided. Moderators that create procedural variance do so by affecting how and in 
what way the decision is made – the decision making processes, strategies, and goals may all 
change. Figure 4 diagrams and categorizes the moderating relationships discussed in the 
literature. Figure 5 details notable empirical studies into the effect moderators.  
Figure 4. Asymmetrically Dominated Decoy Moderators 
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Descriptive Variance Moderators 
Descriptive variance moderators include variables pertinent to permutations on the 
quality and quantity of knowledge, expertise, and familiarity, on attribute specifications. These 
permutations may be created by or given to the decision maker regarding either the specific 
product choices or general product classes represented in the choice set. The amount, type, 
format, quality, and applicability of the information available leads to descriptive variance 
between choice options and affects the perception of the attributes and options in the choice set. 
Overall, the literature suggests that the availability of better, more objective, and easily evaluable 
information attenuates the attraction effect. 
Figure 5. Asymmetrically Dominated Decoy Moderator Studies 
 
 
In general, information elaboration in the form of individual-specific knowledge and 
experience with brands, attributes, products or product categories, has been shown to reduce (or 
completely mitigate) the attraction effect (Ratneshwar et al., 1987; Mishra et al., 1993). Several 
Attenuates the Attraction Effect Study Accentuates the Attraction Effect No Effect
Information Elaboration (except with Beer) Ratneshwar, etal. (1987) Product Familiarity
Information Meaningfulness
Simonson, (1989) Expectation to be Evaluated by Others
Increased Information Relevance Mishra, etal. (1993) Increased Target & Decoy Similarity* *No Moderation with TVs
Increased Product/Category Knowledge** Increased Percieved Popularity of Decoy* *No Moderation with TVs
Stronger Brand Preference ** No Moderation with TVs or Cars
Low Target Quality   x   High SES † Heath & Chatterjee, (1995) High Target Quality  x  High  SES† †No Moderation with Beer 
High Target Quality   x  Low SES † Low Target Quality   x  Low SES†
Low Target Quality † High Target Quality †
Knowledge   x   Numerically Presented  Information Sen. (1998) Knowledge   x   Verbally Presented  Information
Greater Age (Seniors vs College Students) Tentori, etal. (2001)
Dhar & Simonson, (2003) Availability of a Choose Not to Choose Option
Greater Age (Regardless of Expertise) Kim & Hasher, (2005) Younger Age   x   Less Domain Specific Expertise
Target has a Negative Country of Origin Chuang & Yen (2007) Target has a Positive Country of Origin 
Consumer is Prevention Focused Mourali, etal. (2007) Consumer is Promotion Focused
Prevention Effect Greater with Forced Justification Promotion Effect Greater with Forced Justification
Prevention Oriented Products Promotion  Oriented Products
Use of Analytical Mode of Processing Hamilton, etal. (2007) Use of Perceptual Mode of Processing
Deliberate Thought, Forced Justification
Graphical Represenation of Probability Attributes Frederick & Lee (2008) Numerical Representation of Probability Attributes
Negatively Valenced Attribtue Malkoc, etal. (2008)
Pocheptsova, etal. (2009) Executive Control
Resource Depletion
Mao & Oppewal, (2009) Faith in Intuition Need For Cognition
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proxies for the quantity and quality of individuals’ information level have been reported to 
attenuate the effect:  
 Age (Kim & Hasher, 2005; Tentori et al., 2001) 
 More years of education (Kim & Hasher, 2005) 
 Higher vocabulary test scores (Kim & Hasher, 2005) 
 Greater familiarity with product or product class (Ratneshwar et al., 1987)  
 Greater product usage and purchase frequency (Mishra et al., 1993). 
Experimental factors which improve information evaluablity and objectivity also tend to 
dampen the attraction effect. Those that encourage subjectivity or otherwise inhibit straight-
forward comparisons tend to enhance the attraction effect.  For example, increased attribute 
analyzability (Yeung & Soman, 2005), relevance, and meaningfulness (Mishra et al., 1993; 
Raneshwar et al., 1987) all reduce the strength of the attraction effect. On the other hand, the 
effect can be intensified through use of subjective modes of information presentation, including: 
 Pictorial and tactile forms (Simonson & Tversky, 1992)  
 Video demonstrations (Slaughter et al., 1999) 
 Abstract graphical representations (Choplin & Hummel, 2002 & 2005) 
 Smiley-face icons (Hamilton et al., 2007). 
While greater subject expertise generally reduces the attraction effect, and greater 
information subjectivity strengthens the attraction effect, their additive effects of these 
characteristics are puzzling. Choice experts with more relevant product knowledge and 
experience exhibited stronger attraction effects than product novices, when presented with 
subjective information than with objective information (Sen, 1998). For experts, when choice 
information is presented in a subjective manner, the resulting situation does not help make a 
more informed decision, but rather accentuates the mechanisms that cause the attraction effect.  
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Procedural Variance Moderators 
Procedure-based moderators influence how much effort and what type of information 
processing mechanism is used to decide. Procedural moderators operate by encouraging either 
effortful or superficial information processing methods. In general, the literature suggests that 
procedural changes which encourage more deliberate, conscientious processing tend to attenuate 
the attraction effect. Procedural changes that encourage superficial processing accentuate the 
attraction effect.  
Experimental procedures likely to produce conscientious decision making generally do so 
by increasing subjects’ involvement level with the task.  For example, the following factors have 
been found to encourage more deliberate, conscientious processing, and also attenuate the 
attraction effect:  
 Forced deliberation and use of analytical processes (Hamilton et al., 2007) 
 High levels of product relevance, (Mishra et al., 1993). 
Consistent with an inverse relationship between more conscientious processing and the 
attraction effect, research had shown that superficial decision making generally results in a 
stronger attraction effect. Notable sources of superficial information processing that accentuate 
the attraction effect include:   
 Greater individual faith in intuition (Mao & Oppewal, 2012) 
 Limited cognitive resources or diminished executive control (Pocheptsova, Amir, 
Dhar, & Baumeister, 2009) 
 A reliance on brand loyalty, perceived popularity, and other heuristic cues (Mishra et 
al., 1993) 
 A greater risk-seeking disposition (Khan, Zhu & Kalra, 2011; Mourali et al., 2007). 
However, there is one notable scenario where seemingly more deliberative decision 
making strengthens, rather than reduces, the attraction effect. Greater need for justification 
intensifies the attraction effect (Hamilton et al., 2007; Park & Kim, 2005; Simonson, 1989; 
 20 
Wedell & Pettibone, 1996). Though justification may seem to rely on more conscientious 
processing, forced justification in an experimental setting may not provide sufficient motivation 
to go beyond superficial deliberation. The decision process may merely seem to be more 
deliberative because reasoning (justification) is provided. That is to say, experiment participants 
with little motivation to conscientiously process may simply provide superficial reasons (such as 
subjective dominance) as justification. In this sense, it would be worthwhile to examine the 
effects of justification on the attraction effect, while controlling for elements of decision 
motivation or involvement. 
Finally, which strategies and processes are used seems to be affected by specific 
combinations of decision-maker motives and attribute presentation. Heath & Chatterjee (1995) 
found that lower SES decision makers were susceptible to the attraction effect when the 
dominating target was of low quality, but not when it was of high quality. High SES decision 
makers were susceptible to the attraction effect only when the dominating target was of high 
quality, but not when it was of low quality. This finding implies that an elimination-by-aspect 
decision process (Tversky, 1972) is employed where options that do not meet a certain 
desirability threshold (in this case quality) are summarily eliminated. Thus, given the right 
combination of decision maker values and attribute dimensions, an attraction effect can be 
moderated by encouraging a bulk, choice elimination strategy. 
Overall, the literature suggests that when decision makers make cursory or unengaged 
evaluations, the dominating relationship between target and decoy facilitates justification for 
choosing the target. However, when there is enough involvement in the decision, and a more 
deliberative decision process is used, the decoy’s presence is seen as irrelevant. Consequently, a 
decoy effect fails to occur. It is also notable that various combinations of decision maker values 
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and attribute dimensions can (in addition to cursory/deliberative process changes) encourage 
changes in the choice strategy and criteria, such as the use of elimination-by-aspects.  
 
ASYMMETRICALLY DOMINATED DECOY EFFECT EXPLANATIONS 
Current research has uncovered a variety of moderators and partial explanations for the 
attraction effect. The current literature takes a predominately rational processing perspective to 
the effect’s theoretical underpinnings. This section begins with rational processing explanations 
for the effect and ends with a discussion of more recent explanations that focus on less effortful, 
more automatic, less effortful cognitive processes. 
Attribute-Weighting 
The earliest proposed explanations sought to attribute the effect to perceptual differences 
or disparate weightings of attribute dimensions. In particular, many researchers applied 
Parducci’s (1965) range-frequency theory as an explanation for how decision makers weigh 
attribute dimensions. The range principle states that value is judged based on relative position 
between endpoints of a given range.  The frequency principle states value is judged according to 
its percentile rank.  The two principles conflict when stimuli from different parts of the range are 
presented with unequal frequencies.  When a conflict between the two theories exists (e.g. 
inclusion of an asymmetrically dominated decoy) a compromise is thought to be made where the 
new value is an average of the range- and frequency-based values.  
Frequency Theory 
Attribute importance weights are influenced by the number of levels available to define 
that attribute (Currim, Weinberg & Wittink, 1981). The higher the frequency, the more 
differentiating levels are available, and the more heavily the attribute is weighted. HPP (1982) 
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proposed a frequency-based explanation when they suggested that asymmetrically dominated 
decoys might work by creating perceptual biases on the frequency of observations of the Target’s 
superior attribute. HPP found no significant effects for frequency increasing decoys. However, 
Wedell (1991) used a metric based on a three-option control condition and, ultimately, detected 
strong preference reversals in the presence of frequency increasing decoys. Ariely & Wallsten 
(1995) observed similar attraction effects and also reasoned that attribute weightings change 
because frequency decoys create greater differentiation along the Target’s superior attribute. It is 
the increased ability to differentiate that leads the decision maker to place more weight on an 
attribute. In other words, a frequency decoy (e.g.  Figure 1: A3 or D2) creates three levels of 
differentiation on Attribute 2 whereas there are still only two levels of differentiation on 
Attribute 1. Given that a finer distinction can be made on Attribute 2, the decision maker is 
presumed to place more emphasis on Attribute 2.  
Range Theory 
Based on the range principle, the perceive value of an object is determined by 
comparison against a set of endpoints. What is considered an endpoint will vary by context. For 
example, a 30 year-old may seem old when presented with two teenagers, but may not seem old 
when presented with a teenager and an octogenarian. Wider attribute ranges narrow the 
perceived distance between options within the range. Though early experiments found initial 
support for range theory explanation (HPP, 1982; Huber & Puto, 1983), the overall evidence 
suggests range effects do not play a major role in creating the attraction effect.   
HPP initially suggested that the combined effects of range extensions and attribute 
weightings are responsible for a decoy effect. A range-increasing asymmetrically dominated 
decoy would extend the range of the Target’s inferior attribute (for example Figure 1 decoys A1-2, 
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D1, G2, H1-2, I1 and J1) thereby narrowing the perceived difference in the Target’s weak attribute. 
A wider range created by the decoy (for example, A2 creates a wider range on Attribute 1 than 
does A1) reduces the contrast between options. The result is that less weight is placed on the 
Target’s inferior attribute.  
Though range and frequency theories can account for many instances of the attraction 
effect, they cannot account for observed attraction effects observed under many experimental 
conditions. In the following instances, frequency- and range-only explanations either cannot 
make a prediction on effect, or predicts erroneously:  
 
Decoys positioned to increase range and/or frequency on both attributes, or positioned to create 
competing range and frequency effects still reliably produce an effect for the Target. Note in 
Figure 1 that decoys A1-2, D1,4, G2, H1,2,5, I1 and J1,5 all increase the frequency of differentiable 
observations across the attribute where the Competitor dominates, and should thus encourage 
share gain for the Competitor. Yet these decoys all still produce reliable decoy effects for the 
Target (HPP, 1982; Wedell, 1991; Highhouse, 1996; Dhar & Glazer, 1996; Pettibone & Wedell, 
2000 & 2007). Similarly, decoys positioned at A4 (HPP, 1982), D3 (Wedell, 1991), and F1 
(Shafir et al., 1993) all increase the number of points of differentiation along both Attributes 1 
and 2, yet have still produced reliable asymmetrically dominated decoy effects which favor the 
Target.  
 
Attribute-weighting theory cannot predict in choice scenarios with only a single, subjective 
attribute dimension. Choplin & Hummel (2005) produced an attraction effect with line and circle 
size variations, and Ariely, (2008) produced the effect with photographs of date prospects of 
varying degrees of attractiveness. With only a single attribute to choose on, and no objective 
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measure of superiority, range and frequency-based explanation cannot begin to explain why 
preference would shift to the target. 
 
Range effects do not scale into stronger attraction effects. Under range theory expectations, more 
extreme decoys should produce stronger attraction effects as the Target’s weak attributes would 
be particularly salient. However, extreme-range creating decoys have not consistently product 
larger attraction effects. (Huber & Puto, 1983; Mishra et al., 1993). 
 
Frequency and range theories are inconsistent with attribute weight outcomes observed for 
negative-valanced choice scenarios. When choosing between options on two unfavorable 
attributes, decision makers tend to more heavily weigh the functionally superior attribute, 
regardless of  which attribute has greater frequency (Malkoc et al., 2008).   
 
It is also difficult for range and frequency theories to explain why many moderators are able to 
accentuate or attenuate the effect. For example, attribute weight-shift theories cannot explain 
why: 
 Increased justifiability strengthens the effect.  (Wedell & Pettibone, 1996), 
 The effect is stronger and more prevalent in individuals with high faith in intuition 
(Mao & Oppewal, 2012), or  
 A risk-seeking disposition would strengthen the effect (Mourali et al., 2007). 
 
In summary, while manipulations of attribute range or frequency have been able to 
produce the attraction effect, they have not been able to do so consistently. Nor have they been 
able to produce expected additive effects when a decoy is positioned appropriately. While there 
may be yet unexplored perceptual or analytical boundaries of a combined range and frequency 
effect, such pursuits may not contribute much to the explanation of the attraction effect. Too 
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much empirical evidence suggests that attribute weighting methods are flawed, and cannot 
satisfactorily account for observed outcomes. 
Risk-Aversion 
While how attribute dimensions are valued or weighted in the presence of a decoy are 
still under debate. Even more controversy exists regarding what decision criteria and processes 
are used, and how they are used, to arrive at a final choice. One explanation for how decision 
makers use attribute information stems from prospect theory and loss aversion. Loss aversion 
assumes decision makers will try to void losses while prospect theory predicts decision makers 
would prefer to minimize loses over risking for gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1991). As applied to the attraction effect, the decision maker is thought to use 
background knowledge and/or the local context (which includes the decoy’s attribute values) to 
create an anchor to evaluate both the Target and Competitor’s attributes. The Decoy’s attributes 
define a reference point and frames the Target’s superior attribute as a moderate gain, coupled 
with no gain or loss on the weaker attribute (versus a large gain and large loss relative to the 
Competitor’s attribute rankings) (Highhouse, 1996). For example, relative to a decoy such as A4 
in Figure 1, choosing the Target would be perceived as gaining modest amounts of both 
Attributes 1 and 2. Choosing the Competitor would be perceived as a large loss on Attribute 2 for 
a large gain on Attribute 1. Prospect theory in this case would predict an attraction effect and 
share gain for the Target.  
The effect of risk-related moderators seems to support a loss aversion and prospect theory 
based explanation. For example, prevention-minded, risk-averse decision makers tend to be less 
susceptible to the attraction effect than promotion-minded decision makers (Mourali et al., 2007; 
Schley, 2005). Though risk aversion and prospect theories accurately predict attraction effects in 
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these instances, they are unable to account for an effect in several other instances. For example, 
attraction effects have been shown to exist in scenarios where loss aversion and prospect theory 
cannot predict an outcome: 
When options are presented in a manner where no clear anchor is suggested. Strong attraction 
effects existed when decision makers were first shown {T,C,D} and then asked to choose from 
{T,C}3 (Sivakumar & Cherian, 1995), and when decision makers were asked to make a choice 
from {T,C} after having evaluated a five-option set which included {T,C,D} (Simonson & 
Tversky, 1992).  
When no attribute trade-off dynamic exists. Risk aversion and prospect theories rely upon a 
trade-off relationship between two attributes. However, as mentioned earlier with attribute-
weighting explanations, attraction effects exist even under one-attribute dimension scenarios 
(Ariely, 2008; Choplin & Hummel, 2005). Attraction effects can also be seen when the Target 
and Competitor are presented along different, non-comparable attribute dimension, disallowing 
direct trade-off comparisons (Park & Kim, 2005). 
When attribute characteristics do not correspond to measures of risk. Risk aversion and prospect 
theories assume the attributes being evaluated carry with them an inherent measure of risk; for 
example price puts money as risk and quality can put convenience, usability, and image at risk. 
                                                 
3 With priming and other forms of anchor-triggering mechanisms, it is assumed the decision maker anchors to the 
option presented to them first sequentially, then within-subject preference reversals should not be observed when 
choice sets shrink from {T,C,D} to {T,C} since decision makers should already be primed or anchored to either T, C 
or D. T should already be recorded as a moderate gain (relative to the decoy) and C should be recorded as a large 
gain and loss. In this presentation sequence, the subject has equivalent knowledge about the decoy option in both 
cases, so the probability of choosing the Target from {T,C} and {T,C,D} should be the same if priming or anchoring 
effects are involved. 
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However, the attraction effect has been shown to persist even with attributes that have no 
identifiable risk associable metrics (Choplin & Hummel, 2005). 
In summary, risk aversion and prospect theories have been offered as possible 
explanations for the attraction effect. However, subsequent risk-related moderator findings show 
the effect can still exist in contexts that have no relevant risk measures. Evaluation of gains and 
losses cannot be the reason behind the attraction effects observed for portraits (Ariely, 2008), and 
lines and circles (Choplin & Hummel, 2005). Finally, a prospect theory explanation hinges on 
gain and loss evaluations relative from the decoy’s attribute values, and thus far there is no 
empirical support that the decoy is ever considered as a reference point. Overall, it is difficult to 
believe the attraction effect is the result of a risk-averse calculation. 
Justification-Based 
Another class of rational processing explanation relies on decision justifiability. In 
particular, rank order criteria or a subjective, dominance relationship between options makes 
choosing an asymmetrically dominating target highly justifiable. These explanations include a 
series of value creation or emergent value created theories - the creation of an identifiable rank 
order between options creates value by creating another way to justify and defend a difficult 
decision – through an artificially created subjective dominance. Easy choice justification has 
been used to explain the attraction effect (Simonson, 1989; Wedell, 1991; Shafir et al., 1993; 
Wedell & Pettibone, 1996; Pettibone & Wedell, 2000), especially in the face of greater attribute 
ambiguity or subjectivity (Zhou et al., 1996). Range increasing decoys have also been thought to 
operate through increased justifiability by reframing the Target’s weak attribute (Ratneshwar et 
al., 1987). In this context, the decoy’s influence is not from altering the perceived value of the 
Target’s attributes (as with range theory); rather, the decoy influence is from repositioning the 
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Target as either the high, medium, or low rank on a set of attributes. Rank-based emergent value 
gives the Target strengthened appeal by protecting the Target from being the worst option on its 
weak attribute, thus making it a more justifiable option than without a decoy (Amaldoss, 
Bettman, & Payne, 2005; Schley, 2005; Wedell & Pettibone, 1996; Wedell 1991; Ratneshwer et 
al., 1987; Huber & Puto, 1983). 
While justification through subjective dominance may explain part of the process behind 
the attraction effect, its application to negatively-valenced attributes yields results that challenge 
it as a stand-alone explanation. In particular, decoyed choice sets presented on negatively 
valenced attributes have been shown to shift share to the strongest option on a functionally 
superior attribute, regardless of whether that option was the target of the decoy or not (Malkoc, 
Hoeffer & Hedgecock, 2008). If decision makers choose purely based on justifiability of 
subjective dominance, then attribute valence should not moderate the attraction effect since the 
Target is dominant no matter what form the attribute scale is presented in. Malkoc, et al.’s 
finding suggests that the process of choosing or weighing an attribute likely precedes the final 
choice between options, and that attribute weighting can often overshadow the justifiability of a 
dominant relationship. 
In addition, justification cannot be a stand-alone explanation for the attraction effect 
because it is unable to account for the effect’s persistence with abstract, affect-based stimuli. The 
concept of justification necessitates the ability to articulate identifiable reasons for preference. 
However, statistically significant attraction effects have been observed in choice sets of abstract 
figures such as lines and circles (Choplin & Hummel, 2005). No objective justification can be 
given for preferring one line or circle over another. And the use of subjective, affect-based 
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justification goes back to the central issue that affectual preference has been created for the 
Target, and that increased preference exists outside of the decision maker’s ability to justify. 
Finally, the existence of the attraction effect with animal and insect populations does not 
support a justification explanation. Indeed, individual insects and birds, that presumably do not 
(or fundamentally cannot), provide justification for their choices still exhibit the effect (Bateson, 
Healy & Hurly, 2002; Shafir, Waite & Smith, 2002). Even more inconsistent with a justification 
explanation is with ant colony behavior. Individual ants exhibit the attraction effect yet colonies 
(which presumably have more potential need for inter-ant justification of choice) fail to exhibit 
the effect (Edwards & Pratt, 2009). 
Decisional Relief 
Decisional relief explanations operate under the premise that decision makers are 
cognitive misers. The addition of an asymmetrically dominated decoy works by providing an 
easy comparison: a form of ‘decisional relief’ for the resource constrained or cognitively tasked 
decision maker. Instead of struggling through the difficult task of combining attributes, analyzing 
tradeoffs or somehow evaluating each option as a composition of its attributes; choosing based 
on a subjective dominance relationship becomes a simplification process that is less effortful and 
perhaps more appealing to the inherent cognitive miser in all of us.  
The trade-off decision that is made between {T,C} has been shown to be tasking (Luce, 
Bettman & Payne, 2001) as the decision maker must deliberate to arrive at an attribute 
preference, “do I want more of Attribute 1 or 2?,” an acceptable tradeoff rate, “am I giving up 
too much of Attribute 1 for too little gain in Attribute 2?,” and finally a decision, “did I make a 
good choice?”  Cognitive studies, including brain imaging, show the presence of a tradeoff 
aversion in {T,C} choice sets. fMRI results support that decision makers exhibit increased 
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negative emotion (as measured by increased activation in the amygdala and medial prefrontal 
cortex) when trade-offs must be made, and then relatively lower levels of negative emotion when 
a decoy added to the choice set (Hedgecock & Rao, 2009). Based on these finding, Hedgecock & 
Rao (2009) have suggested that asymmetrically dominated decoys operate by providing choice 
strategies that avoid negative emotions. The authors conjecture that decision makers would 
choose based on dominance rather than a trade-off process because the former provides 
decisional relief from negative emotion. 
How the decoy’s presence provides decisional relief is still unclear. Introducing more 
options into the decision scenario would likely result in more comparisons that must be made, 
making the decision even more difficult. Most researchers that have proposed a decisional ‘ease’ 
explanation have simply implied that the decoy operates by shifting the focus of the choice set to 
{T,D} instead of {T,C} without explaining why {T,D} should be the key comparison carved out 
from {T,C,D}.  Decisional relief also does not address how the decoy’s presence increases the 
relative desirability of the Target over the Competitor. 
A final issue with decisional relief explanations is that the attraction effect has been 
shown to strengthen in the presence of an option not to choose (Chuang & Yen, 2007; Dhar & 
Simonson, 2003). Arguably a decision maker can most effectively avoid the negative emotion 
associated with making tradeoffs by simply opting not to choose. Dhar & Simonson showed that 
offering an option not to choose created decisional relief in a {T,C, NotChoose} control set, but 
failed to do so in the presence of a decoy. The researchers conjectured that an asymmetric decoy 
only persuades indecisive decision makers to choose the Target, and is not always used as an 
easy decisional-way-out.  
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It is certainly a viable theory that the Decoy helps to provide decisional relief, but what 
decision mechanism(s) actually provide the relief, or why a dominance relationship might induce 
preference for the Target remains unaddressed. 
Conclusion of Explanatory Theories 
In general, there appears to be agreement that choosing between tradeoffs in a {T,C}set is 
effortful, and that the presence of a decoy helps create preference for the Target. Unfortunately, 
agreement in the literature ends there. There is compelling evidence that preference is not created 
through just one process of attribute weighing, justifiability, loss aversion, or increased 
decisional ease, but rather may stem from a combination of these, and perhaps other affect-
creating processes.  While many studies purport to have found a simple explanation for the effect, 
the inability of these explanations to account for effect variations across different moderating 
conditions suggests that a more complex explanation is required. 
 
AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Thus far, explanations for the attraction effect assume the decision maker approaches the 
choice process from a rational and reasoned perspective: attributes are weighed, implications are 
considered, and information is conscientiously combined and analyzed. In particular, researchers 
have predominantly assumed the decision maker arrives at a reasoned judgment and decision by 
actively processing information in the decision context and incorporating it with information 
purposefully retrieved from experience, familiarity, and knowledge. Unfortunately, this line of 
reasoning leaves little room for the more passive, automatic, and intuitive thought processes that 
generally affect judgment and decision making. This section begins with the argument that more 
explanatory success might be found through an exploration of System 1 processes, and concludes 
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with the specific suggestion that asymmetrically dominated decoys might be better understood 
through a path of decision fluency.  
Figure 6. Summary of Attributes Associated with Dual Systems of Thinking ǂ 
System 1 
 
System 2 
 
Unconscious / Preconscious 
Implicit 
Automatic 
Low Effort 
Rapid 
High Capacity 
The Default Process 
Holistic, Perceptual 
Non-Verbal 
Modular Cognition 
Associative 
Domain Specific 
Contextualized 
Pragmatic 
Parallel 
Stereotypical 
Independent of General Intelligence 
Independent of Working Memory 
 
Conscious 
Explicit 
Controlled 
High Effort 
Slow 
Low Capacity 
An Intervening Process 
Analytic, Reflective 
Linked to Language 
Fluid Intelligence 
Rule-Based 
Domain-General 
Abstract 
Logical 
Sequential 
Egalitarian 
Linked to General Intelligence 
Limited by Working Memory Capacity 
 
ǂ Summarized from (Evans, 2008) 
 
Figure 6 lists common information processing characteristics referenced from social and 
cognitive psychology, behavioral economics, and philosophy literatures, and categorizes them 
under two information processing routes, generically referred to as Systems 1 and 2 (for a review, 
see Evans, 2008).  Standard dual-process theory suggests that System 1 and 2 processes operate 
with a default-interventionist relationship. Less effortful, System 1 processes are activated first, 
and are intervened upon by System 2 processes under certain conditions. If we consider 
consumer choice as a generic form of individual choice, then there is a substantial body of 
literature on non-effortful, System 1 effects on judgment and choice that are potential influences 
on the attraction effect. Indeed, results from the moderators discussed thus far suggest that less 
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effortful, more automatic, processes are involved in the creation of the attraction effect. For 
example, stronger attraction effects are observed with decision makers who are: 
 More likely to use in intuition (Mao & Oppewal, 2009, 2012) 
 Cognitively depleted or resource constrained (Pocheptsova et al., 2009) 
 Forced to use a perceptual mode of stimulus processing (Hamilton et al., 2007) 
 Reliant on brand loyalty and popularity (Mishra et al., 1993), and country of origin 
(Chuang & Yen, 2007) as heuristic cues. 
In addition, we would expect an attenuated attraction effect when decision makers use more 
conscientious, deliberate, System 2 process. And indeed prior research supports that the 
attraction effect is substantially reduced or mitigated when decision makers: 
 Operate under a more cautious, conservative, prevention mode of decision making 
(Mourali et al., 2007; Malkoc et al., 2008) 
 Are forced to deliberate their decision (Hamilton et al., 2007) 
 Exhibit high levels of task involvement, (Mishra et al., 1993). 
Based on the premise that System 1 processes tend to accentuate, and System 2 processes 
mitigate the attraction effect, future research can do well to identify new moderators in context 
manipulations that trigger shifts from one system of thinking to another.  
If the attraction effect does stem from a System 1 process, we must then ask ourselves 
what processes and mechanisms could the decoy trigger to create increased preference for the 
Target. A potentially fruitful avenue to explore is how increased processing fluency, driven by 
the presence of the decoy, can impart positive affect onto the Target.  
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Fluency 
Fluency refers to a general ease or difficulty that accompanies the reaction to a stimulus. 
(Dis)fluency has been shown to trigger changes in judgment and decision making, and has been 
shown to fully explain the strength of other decision context effects, such as the compromise 
effect (Novemsky, Dhar, Schwarz, & Simonson, 2007). As applied to the attraction effect, 
fluency may be the vehicle through which positive affect is created and then imparted on to the 
Target. Theoretically, the presence of the decoy can increase processing fluency through 
similarity and subjective dominance. A subjective dominance relationship creates a salient, 
readily available easy justification between options (Novemsky et al., 2007). Similarity (between 
T and D) may operate as repeated exposure of a singular option type, facilitating conceptual 
processing of both T and D (Zajonc, 1968). In addition, similarity between T and D may also 
make the Target more cognitively accessible and easier to recall from memory. From an 
empirical standpoint, there is already physiologically evidence of decision fluency in the 
presence of a decoy (Hedgecock & Rao, 2009).  
Increased processing fluency could then be translated into various forms of positive affect 
thereby increasing preference for the target. For example, increased processing fluency has been 
shown to: 
 Increase general liking (Bornstein, 1989; Schwarz, 2004; Zajonc, 1968) 
 Improve judgments of truth and trustworthiness (for a review, see Schwarz, 2004) 
 Increase feelings of familiarity (e.g. Whittlesea et al., 1990) 
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 Be interpreted as increased prevalence or popularity4   
Any one of these fluency-induced positive affects can help increase preference. But why would 
this positive affect be associated with the Target and not the Competitor?   
First, in the context of {T,C,D}, fluency would be created through similarity and 
subjective dominance only when evaluating {T,D}, but not {T,C} or {C,D}. In fact, evaluations 
of {T,C} and {C,D} are physiologically (Hedgecock & Rao, 2009) and cognitively (Luce, 
Bettman & Payne, 2001) disfluent. Second, attribution of positive affect generally occurs 
through simultaneous activation. If positive affect is experienced while evaluating the Target, 
consumers will, by default, assume the Target to be the source of that positive affect. This 
‘aboutness principle’ of inference asserts consumers naturally assume the thoughts that come to 
mind while thinking about a concept are relevant to that concept (Higgins, 1998; for a review see 
Schwarz, 2004).  
Thus, the positive sense of ease that comes with fluency is likely attributed to and 
interpreted as liking or preference for the Target. Under this framework, there is no range- or 
frequency-based valuation or analysis to arrive at a preference. Of the existing explanations, 
affect-as-information is most similar to subjective dominance explanations. However the major 
difference between the two types of explanations is that affect-as-information is reliant upon 
experienced positive affect, not justification, as the source of preference. 
The affect-as-information explanation can be tested by manipulating processing fluency 
and then measuring preference for the Target. Decreasing Target fluency is expected to decrease 
liking, familiarity, and/or trustworthiness, and should decrease preference for the Target and 
                                                 
4 This belief operates through the availability heuristic where the more fluently content is processed, the more 
prevalent it is assumed to be in the real world (outside of the decision context) (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). 
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dampen or neutralize the attraction effect. Increasing the relative fluency of the Competitor 
should also weaken the attraction effect. Empirically, Competitor fluency can be increased by 
subconsciously priming decision makers with a stimulus that is closely related, but not 
comparable, to the Competitor. Target processing can be made more disfluent by presenting the 
Target and Decoy pair in a more difficult to interpret font, color or scale. Neither of these 
manipulations should affect the thought content of the decision set, but should impact processing 
fluency to reduce the attraction effect. 
Summary 
Research on the attraction effect can benefit from the application to a generic dual-
processing framework such as those found in cognitive and social psychology, philosophy, and 
behavioral economics. Current attraction effect research primarily operates under the premise 
that the decision maker uses only conscientious, deliberate, System 2 thought processes. Sparse 
consideration is given to the role that unconscious, rapid, automatic, System 1 thought processes 
may play in the formation of the attraction effect. Normatively perfect choices are rarely made 
because consumers are routinely, subconsciously, influenced by the decision context and the 
information, associations, and emotions that the choice context may activate.  
There is still much research to be conducted on the attraction effect. If consumer 
preference is indeed constructed and not revealed, a diverse pool of metacognitive influences 
must also be considered. Moods, emotions, affect states, fluency, and individual differences 
should all be examined as potential explanatory variables of the attraction effect. Context effects 
such as the compromise and deferral effects have been shown to be mediated through processes 
chosen based on changes in decision fluency, and there is little reason to believe attraction effect 
processes are not mediated through similar paths. As discussed in this review, the processing 
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implications of fluency states maps well to current findings on the attraction effect, and hold 
great potential in helping to explain the automatic and affectual components of the attraction 
effect. 
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CHAPTER II: EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS & EFFECT FRAGILITY 
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INTRODUCTION 
Decoys are choice options that are purposefully designed to affect the choice share of 
other options without the intention of actually being chosen (e.g. Choplin & Hummel, 2005; 
Dhar & Glazer, 1996; Pettibone & Wedell, 2000; Simonson, 1989). One of the most commonly 
researched types of decoy is the asymmetrically dominated decoy, introduced in 1982 by Huber, 
Payne and Puto (HPP). In a three option choice set, an asymmetrically dominated decoy is a 
choice option that is wholly dominated by a target option, but not by a competitor option (HPP, 
1982). HPP demonstrated that in the presence of an asymmetrically dominated decoy, choice 
share could be shifted from a competitor option to the asymmetrically dominating target. This 
share shift was referred to as the asymmetrically dominated decoy effect, and is now more 
commonly referred to as the attraction effect.  
From a marketer perspective, the attraction effect has been touted as a potentially 
powerful marketing tactic that can be used to increase market share at the expense of a given 
competitor.  Textbooks and business best-sellers have widely offered the attraction effect as a 
readily implementable marketing tool. For example: 
 
“Here’s a real-world example….How did buyer befuddlement turn into larger-than-
expected purchase so quickly? The answer: decoy marketing. In this case, the decoy was 
unintentional but there are lots of ways that marketers can use the technique to steer 
customers toward a decision….Sometimes…customers have difficulty deciding between 
alternatives. To get the product they need, they require a nudge in one direction or 
another. [The] decoys nudged me toward the jumbo can at the same price, and the deal 
was closed.” (Dooley, 2011). 
 
 and… 
 
“Changing the alternatives in the consideration set can have a major impact on the 
consumer’s decision. For example, a good brand can look even better when an inferior 
brand is added to the consideration set. This attraction effect occurs because the inferior 
brands increase the attractiveness of the dominant brand, making the decision easier.” 
(Hoyer & MacInnis, 2010). 
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Given the theoretical and practical potential of the attraction effect, the original purpose of this 
study was two-fold: to demonstrate the effect’s applicability to hospitality choice scenarios, and 
to examine the robustness of the attraction effect across differences in cognitive dispositions. 
Based on prior research that suggests the attraction effect to be the result of low-effort, automatic, 
cognitive processes (Mao & Oppewal, 2012; Pocheptsova, Amir, Dhar, & Baumeister, 2009), it 
was expected that individuals more inclined to process intuitively (as opposed to cognitively) 
would be more likely to exhibit the attraction effect. In the process of creating and testing 
stimulus material for the original study, it became apparent that reliably reproducing an attraction 
effect is a more difficult, and tenuous process than is suggested by the existing literature. 
This study tested a total of 23 product classes under 74 different product scenarios. 
Overall, an attraction effect could be created at a better than chance level, but could not be 
consistently created, or even re-created from new or previously successful stimulus. Even after 
parsing experiment results by measures of intuitive and cognitive tendencies, still no consistent 
attraction effect was exhibited at statistically significant levels. The repeated failure to reproduce 
the attraction effect casts doubt on the robustness of the effect, and brings into question the 
practical applicability of asymmetrically dominated decoys as an effective, real-world marketing 
tool. As such, the renewed purpose of this study is to add new null results to the body of 
attraction effect literature, and to discuss practical limitations of the effect for future researchers 
and marketers.  
 
EXPERIMENT METHODS 
The current study is comprised of eleven separate experiments, each of which is 
comprised of multiple attraction effect choice scenarios. An explanation of study methods begins 
with an overview of the stimuli, participants, and procedures used across all experiments. It is 
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then followed by details on experiment-specific stimulus and design. The section concludes with 
a discussion on the metrics and measures used to determine the size and existence of an 
attraction effect. 
 
Overview of Choice Scenarios 
The stimuli used in each successive study was refined to include choice scenarios that more 
closely mirrored that of past, successful experiments. Overall, the experiments tested 86 
individual choice scenarios and covered 17 product as well as six service categories. Full 
reproductions of stimuli have been included in Appendix 1. All experiments were executed as 
between-subject designs to avoid within-subject memory-based response biases and other 
external influences that might have occurred between test-retest periods.  
Each choice scenario had at least two test conditions: a two-option control condition, and a 
three-option decoy-condition where one control-condition option was positioned as an 
asymmetrically dominating target option. Most choice scenarios also administered a third test 
condition where the remaining control-condition option was positioned as the asymmetrically 
dominating target option. At a minimum, two pieces of data were collected for each subject-
choice scenario combination: 
 Choice Scenario Treatment Condition: Whether the subject was given the control 
condition (two-options), or decoy A or decoy B conditions (three-option choice sets 
where either A was positioned as the dominating target, or B was positioned as the 
dominating target, respectively) 
 Choice: The option the subject chose from the provided alternatives.  
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Other data collected varied by experiment, but generally included participant demographics and 
performance on traditional psychographic scales. A more detailed description of these data is 
provided in subsequent sections specific to each experiment.  
For each experiment, the order in which options were listed for each choice set was 
randomized. Similarly, subject assignments to treatment conditions were randomized for each 
choice scenario. For example, subjects could be asked to choose between a two item control set 
for some items, and a decoyed choice set for others. This randomization scheme is a departure 
from prior attraction effect survey methods, but should provide stronger internal validity, as each 
subject is not assigned specifically to either a control or decoy condition for all choice scenarios5.  
Product Choices 
Each product within a choice set was described on two attributes (such as price and quality). 
To subtly emphasize the dominance relationship between the target options and their respective 
decoys, several choice sets used a third, qualitative attribute dimension such as brand to make the 
target and decoy seem more similar to each other than to the competitor. For example, a control 
condition set of wines included the choice between two French wines: 
 Bottle of white, Bordeaux wine for $25.00 
 Bottle of red, Bordeaux wine for $45.00 
 
Here, the attribute dimensions to choose between were wine type (red or white Bordeaux) and 
price ($25 or $45). The decoy for the red Bordeaux was listed as: 
 Bottle of red, Finger Lakes, NY wine for $45.00 
 
                                                 
5 Given that most attraction effect research was conducted prior to the wide availability of computers and the Internet, the 
majority of reported studies were administered in a paper/pen format. The development of more sophisticated online survey 
administration tools have allowed for question order and choice option order randomization that was simply not practical with 
paper/pen survey methods. 
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The bottle of red Bordeaux, well known as a world-class wine, subjectively dominated the 
relatively unknown bottle of New York State red.6 In the three-item choice set, the two Bordeaux 
wines were not considered to be the dominating/dominated choice pair. Here, two attribute 
differences between the two Bordeaux options (price and color type) are available whereas only 
one attribute difference exists between the two red wines (region only). 
Products and services used for choice scenarios were selected according to consumption 
relevance to subjects, ability to be reasonably differentiated on two attribute dimensions, and 
either their comparability to past research stimulus or extensibility to practical applications. Thus, 
the products and services used incorporate modern-day attribute dimensions and relevant 
consumer products. For example, price and calorie counts for common fast food options 
(Experiments 2, 4, and 5), flights and checked luggage fees (Experiments 2 and 4), and laptop 
computers with hard disk capacity and battery life (Experiment 7).  
Scenarios drawn from past research were filtered and adjusted to maintain product and 
attribute relevance for modern consumers. For example, from HPP’s original stimulus, the beer 
scenario price range was adjusted from $1.80-$3.40 to $7.80-$9.00 per six-pack (Experiments 7 
and 8);  and photography film (developing time and color fidelity attributes) and CRT TV set 
(percent distortion and reliability rating attributes) were excluded due to product and attribute 
relevance issues. Exact duplicates of past choice scenarios were included in most experiments. In 
general, experiments in this study were conducted as constructive replications of the attraction 
effect. Further detail on the specific stimulus used for each experiment is provided in the 
Methods Section, and all choice scenarios are reprinted with explanatory annotations in 
Appendix 1. 
                                                 
6 The same subjective wine quality manipulation was tested a second time with a more obvious quality manipulation where the 
decoy wines were from Llano, TX. 
 44 
 
Experiment-Specific Stimuli Description 
This section details the survey stimulus and the execution format of each experiment within 
the study. Notable departures from prior attraction effect experiment methods include the 
repeated use of an online subject pool recruited through MTurk, and the randomization of 
within-subject choice scenario treatment condition. All but one experiment in this study 
(Experiment 4) was administered in an online format, and only Experiment 2 was conducted on a 
student subject pool. Figure 7 summarizes features of each experiment.  
 
Figure 7. Summary of Experiment Methods 
 
 
Experiment One used a web-based interface where each subject was presented with a total of 
18 questions (seven food-related consumer choice sets, and eleven personality-based questions) 
on a single, scrolling web page. The 90 participants in Experiment One were drawn from a 
convenience sample of the author’s acquaintances. The subjects were generally college educated, 
geographically dispersed throughout the United States, solicited through online, social media 
channels, and were naïve to the intent of the survey. 
Participants first made product choices, and were then given Need for Cognition (NFC) and 
Faith in Intuition (FI) questions from the shortened Rational Experiential Inventory (REI) 
(Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996). REI questions were presented as a series of scales 
Experiment 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 10
Format Online Online Online Paper/Pen Online Online Online Online
Subject Pool Convenience Undergrad Mturk Gen. Pop. Mturk Mturk Mturk Mturk
Personality  Scale REI (Short) REI (Long) None None CRT CRT CRT
# of Choice Scenarios 9 11 3 12 6 1 1 5 6 1 1 1 1 1
Presentation Order
    Scenarios Randomized Randomized Fixed Fixed Randomized Randomized Randomized Randomized
    Options Randomized Randomized Fixed Fixed Randomized Randomized Randomized Randomized
Sample Size Range per Scenario
    Control 26-30 67-84 60 56 69-78 53 23 58-69 77-107 102 98 74 143 66
    Decoy A 30-37 65-87 58 60 65-90 47 31 60-70 69-92 73 96 84 133 55
    Decoy B 26-34 65-95 NA NA 66-86 NA 46 57-68 75-100
Total Sample Size 90 232 118 116 227 192 263 175 194 158 276 121
Randomized
11
Online
Mturk
CRT
Randomized
Randomized
9
Online
Mturk
CRT
Randomized
6
Mturk
Online
CRT
100
Randomized
Randomized
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where participants were asked to move a slider from zero to ten corresponding to how well each 
statement represented their beliefs. Zero corresponded to “Completely False” and ten was 
“Completely True”). 
At the end of the REI, participants were asked whether they considered themselves well 
informed and conscientious about food. This question was posed because prior research has 
shown that knowledge, familiarity, and experience with stimulus product categories may 
attenuate the attraction effect (Sen, 1998), and each product choice sets used in Experiment One 
was food and beverage related. Subsequent statistical analysis between self-declared “foodies” 
and “non-foodies” revealed no statistical difference in the lack of attraction effect results. After 
completing the personality portion of the experiment, participants were shown a message 
acknowledging the completion of the survey. No compensation or remuneration was provided 
for participation. 
Experiment Two was administered in an online format. 257 Subjects were solicited from 
two introductory undergraduate marketing courses at a large, east-coast university, and were 
compensated with course credit for their time. Though solicited in class, participants were not 
required to complete the survey in the classroom setting. Participants were presented with ten 
choice scenarios which included food and beverage consumer products, and hospitality services 
such as hotel stays, cruise packages, and airline flights. Six of the ten choice sets were structured 
with three treatment conditions each (control, decoyed for one control option ‘A,’ and decoyed 
for the other control scenario ‘B’), similar to those in Experiment One. The remaining four 
choice sets were structured with seven treatment conditions each; the same three conditions as 
previously listed (control, asymmetric decoys for options A and B), and the remaining four 
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conditions tested relatively inferior decoy positions for options A and B, but were not used for 
the purposes of this study.  
After making selections from the eleven product choice sets, subjects were presented with 
Pacini & Epstein’s full, 40-question Rational Experiential Inventory (REI) test (Pacini, & 
Epstein, 1999). REI prompts were presented with the same sliders as in Experiment One. At the 
end of the REI, participants were directed to a message indicating completion of the survey.  
Experiment Three consisted of a three-question online survey. A total of 118 participants 
were solicited through Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) service, and compensated 
$0.50 for their time. Similar to the structure used in past attraction effect research, participants 
were randomly assigned to either a control (n=60) or decoy (n=58) treatment condition. 
Participants did not receive mixed-sets of scenarios. Each participant was given either all three-
option (decoyed) or all two-option (control) scenarios. In addition, the order in which options 
were presented within each choice scenario was fixed in a non-randomized manner. The 
procedures, though still executed online, more closely mimicked those used in prior off-line 
attraction effect studies. 
Experiment Four was a twelve-question, paper-based survey administered in-person at a 
public commons area in a moderate-sized, up-state New York town. A total of 116 participants 
were randomly assigned to receive either the control or decoy treatment condition. Participants in 
the control condition made selections from two-option choice sets. Decoy condition participants 
made selections from three-item choice sets where the third option was always an 
asymmetrically dominated decoy for either the first or second option. Each participant was 
compensated with $1 and a small candy bar for completing the survey. Six of the twelve choice 
sets were content replications of stimuli from Experiments One, Two or Three. 
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The Experiment Five survey was a single-page, eleven-question web-based survey 
administered through MTurk. The survey was comprised of (in order of appearance) the three-
question Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) (Frederick, 2005), six product choice scenarios, and 
two demographic questions (educational attainment and gender). The order in which the product 
choice scenario questions and treatment conditions were presented was randomized.  
Three of the six choice scenarios were presented pictorially with breakfast pastry, breakfast 
sandwich, and two-liter soda options shown in full color. Product pictures were not identified by 
name, and target/decoy relationships were implied by photographic similarity in product type. 
For example, the control set for breakfast pastries consisted of a wedge of coffee cake and a plain 
scone. The respective decoys were a square of coffee cake and a non-descript fruit scone. Other 
than pictorial differences, products were described only by their calorie counts and either fat or 
sugar content. 
The CRT is a series of three, relatively simple word problems designed to elicit an initial, 
incorrect, reflexive answer that upon even minimal deliberation, leads the subject to a 
cognitively simple, correct solution7. The test measures a subject’s propensity to make decisions 
in a deliberative (versus intuitive) manner. Starting with Experiment 5, the CRT replaced the REI 
as the cognitive measure of choice for two reasons: at three questions in length, the CRT was 
easier to administer than the REI, and as a behavioral, rather than self-report measure, the CRT 
was more likely to be an unbiased measure of subjects’ cognitive tendencies.  
Experiment Six was a single-page, seven-question, web-based survey. 100 subjects were 
recruited through MTurk, and each compensated $0.75 for their participation. The survey 
                                                 
7 The three questions of the CRT are: Q1: A bat and a ball cost $1.10. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the 
ball cost?  Q2: If it takes 5 minutes for 5 machines to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to make 100 widgets? 
Q3: In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire 
lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake? Correct (Incorrect intuitive) Answers: Q1: 5(10)cents; Q2: 
5(100)minutes; Q3:47(24)days. 
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consisted of the CRT, two demographic questions (gender and educational attainment), and two 
choice scenarios. The choice scenarios were exact replicas of successful attraction effect 
scenarios described by Ariely (2008), and included subscription options for The Economist, and 
pictures of dating prospects. Subjects were randomly assigned treatment conditions 
independently for each question. Ariely’s stimulus material for date prospects included only 
portraits of males; as such date prospect scenarios were analyzed using only the 54 responses 
from participants identified as female.  
Experiment Seven was a five-question web-based survey. Each question was presented on a 
new page. 192 Subjects were recruited through MTurk, and each compensated $0.75 for their 
participation. CRT and demographic questions were identical to those in Experiments Five and 
Six. Product choice scenarios for Experiment Seven were structured to maximize the likelihood 
of generating an attraction effect, with less concern for creating scenarios with a practical 
application. Based on the results of attribute placements from previous stimulus in this series of 
experiments, decoys were structured to be identical to their targets except on one attribute 
dimension8. In addition, choice scenarios used simplified, generic, vague product descriptions – 
evaluable on only the two attribute dimension provided to the participant. For example, the 
laptop choice scenario, modeled after a desktop computer scenario used by Wedell & Pettibone 
(1996), was described and evaluable only on processing capacity (RAM in gigabytes) and hours 
of battery life. Beer was evaluable only on six-pack price and a generic, numerical quality rating. 
Experiment Eight was conducted as a six-question web-based survey. The experiment 
format, implementation, and content were the same as that with Experiment Seven, except a 
sixth question, duplicating a soda choice scenario described by Ariely (2008) was added. The 
                                                 
8 Except for the last choice scenario on steaks, where the decoy differed on both cut and price attributes. However, the decoy 
options were of the same inferior cut (sirloin), but were offered at prices slightly below that of the Target in both cases.  
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purpose of the experiment was to reproduce the strongest attraction effect scenarios from 
Experiment Seven, with a larger sample size, and also to reproduce the soda attract effect 
described by Ariely. 263 Subjects completed the survey in full. 
Experiment Nine was a ten-question web-based survey administered to an MTurk-recruited 
subject pool. Subjects first completed the three-question Cognitive Reflection Test, followed by 
two attraction effect choice scenarios, two filler questions, two demographic questions (gender 
and years of education), and a final manipulation check. Of the two attraction effect choice 
scenarios tested, one was a replication of the bottle price/Wine Spectator score scenario used in 
Experiments 5, 7 and 8, and the second was an adaptation of the same scenario, using wine labels 
and the same prices as the bottle price/Wine Spectator score scenario. Target, competitor and 
decoy wine labels were pre-tested and selected based on their perceived quality differences (on a 
five-point scale where five was the highest quality level: μ=3.6, 2.2, 4.0; sd=0.06, 0.07, 0.06, 
respectively; F(2,744)=205.4, p<0.0001). 204 subjects completed the survey, and 175 (86%) 
passed a manipulation check.  
Experiment Ten tested a single choice scenario under two fluency conditions. The baseline 
choice scenario was a replication of stimulus used by Park & Kim (2005) for refrigerators as 
presented on freezing time and annual running cost attributes.  224 participants were recruited 
through Amazon.com’s MTurk online participant pool service to complete a dedicated survey for 
the purposes of this study. Participants were required to have a United States IP address to access 
the survey. Participants were compensated $0.75 for their participation, which averaged 2.35 
minutes. 109 participants received the low fluency (difficult to read font) condition, and 115 
received the normal, high fluency (regular-readability font) condition.  
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Experiment Eleven was comprised of two choice scenarios and a manipulation check. The 
first choice scenario was a replication of the high fluency refrigerator scenario tested in 
Experiment Ten. The second scenario was a choice between binoculars presented on 
magnification power and price dimensions. Both the refrigerator and binocular scenarios were 
reproduced from stimulus reported to have created successful attraction effects by Park & Kim 
(2005). Subjects were recruited from MTurk, and compensated $0.75 for their time. 205 subjects 
completed the survey, and 185 (90%) passed the manipulation check. 
Data Across Experiments 
Contrary to the methods used in many prior studies (e.g. Ha, Park, & Ahn, 2009; Mao & 
Oppewal, 2012; Mourali, Böckenholt & LaRoche, 2007) data were not combined across choice 
scenarios in the regressions nor the chi-squared analyses (e.g. HPP, 1982; Huber & Puto, 1983). 
The decision not to combine data across product scenarios is not without precedent (Mishra, 
1990), and was made for two reasons.  
First, because of the wide variety of products and product categories tested in this study, 
subject motives and reactions to choice scenarios would likely vary too widely to combine in a 
single data set. Prior research shows that consumers evaluate and judge products differently 
based on individual levels of involvement (Zaichkowsky, 1985 & 1988) and hedonic versus 
utilitarian beliefs (Crowley, Spangenberg & Hughes, 1992) about those products. And indeed, 
prior studies show that in general, the relative desirability of one option over another varies by 
attribute type (Bodalo, Gennaioli, & Chleifer, 2011), and attribute magnitude and salience 
(Tsetsos, Chater, & Usher, 2012). Different products and attributes can reasonably trigger 
different decoy affects, judgments and behaviors in different people. 
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Second, combining data across products would average out strong attraction effects and 
mask insignificant effects, making indistinguishable which choice scenarios are effective and 
which are not. A common practice described in the literature is to aggregate share change data 
across all product scenarios in a study, detect an aggregated attraction effect, and conclude that 
the effect is significant for all tested product classes. However, many multi-product studies 
which have reported aggregated and product-level results have often revealed product-level 
insignificance while aggregated results showed a significant attraction effect.  
Because practitioner application of the attraction effect would generally focus on affecting 
share change on single products or choice options at a time, all statistical analyses related to 
determining the existence of attraction effects were conducted on a per-choice-scenario, per-
experiment basis. Data were not aggregated across product types. 
Measure of Interest 
The existence and strength of an attraction effect for each choice scenario were measured 
as the difference between the (assumed normative) control-condition and decoyed-condition 
choice shares for target X and competitor Y. Chi-squared tests were performed on each decoy 
scenario to determine whether the difference between control and decoyed scenarios were 
statistically significant.  
The control condition (Set A), is comprised of choices X and Y, with the proportion of 
subjects choosing option X from A, and Y from A written, respectively, as: 
 ௑ಲ௑ಲା௒ಲ  =   (XA)   ≈   p(X,A) (5a) 
  and 
 ௒ಲ௑ಲା௒ಲ  =   (YA)   ≈   p(Y,A) (5b) 
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p(X,A) is assumed to be the proportion of subjects that chose X from set A, and is expressed as 
(XA). A treatment condition of choice Set B, where the decoy ZX is asymmetrically dominated 
by option X, is expressed as {X, Y, ZX}. The proportion of subjects that chose X and Y from the 
decoyed choice Set B, excluding any share that may have been captured by the decoy, are 
defined respectively as: 
 ௑ಳ௑ಳା௒ಳ  =   (XB)   ≈   p(X,B) (6a) 
  and 
 ௒ಳ௑ಳା௒ಳ  =   (YA)   ≈   p(Y,B) (6b) 
The significance test for share differences caused by the presence of an asymmetrically 
dominated decoy was a chi-square test conducted between the observed choice shares of options 
XB and YB, and the expected choice shares given a sample size (XB + YB). The expected choice 
share of X and Y are expressed as: 
 E(XB)  =  p(X,A) *  (XB + YB)  or   
௑ఽ
ଡ଼ఽାଢ଼ఽ * (XB + YB) (7a) 
  and 
 E(YB)  =  p(Y,A)  *  (XB + YB)  or  
ଢ଼ఽ
ଡ଼ఽାଢ଼ఽ * (XB + YB) (7b) 
The contingency table used for the chi-squared test in this series of studies is shown in Figure 8, 
and the chi-squared statistic used is thus expressed as: 
 ߯ଶ ൌ 	 ሺ௑ಳିாሺ௑ಳሻሻమாሺ௑ಳሻ 	൅ 		
ሺ௒ಳିாሺ௒ಳሻሻమ
ாሺ௒ಳሻ    with df = 1 (8) 
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Figure 8. Attraction Effect Contingency Table for Chi-Squared Test 
 
 Observed Share 
w/Decoy Present 
Expected Share 
Choice Count of X XB E(XB) = 
௒ಲ
௑ಲା௒ಲ * (XB + YB) 
Choice Count of Y YB E(YB) = 
௑ಲ
௑ಲା௒ಲ * (XB + YB) 
Total (XB + YB) (XB + YB) 
 
 
 
RESULTS 
General analyses and observation are first presented on the experimental data as a whole. 
Next, statistical results and analyses are presented on scenario-level data for each for the eleven 
experiments. Finally, data aggregated by similar or identical choice scenarios are analyzed for 
relevant scenario-specific traits.  
Chi-Squared Evaluation 
Chi-squared analyses were used to determine if decoyed choice shares differed from 
expected choice share. Consistent with prior studies, decoy shares were excluded from the chi-
squared analysis, leaving a two by two matrix of target and competitor shares in controlled 
versus decoyed conditions (df=1). Choice probability and chi-squared results from each 
experiment choice scenario are summarized in Figure 9, and presented in descending order of 
statistical significance. Overall, attraction effects were observed across scenarios at a proportion 
better than chance. Based on chi-squared analyses, 11 of the 91 (12.1%) choice scenarios 
produced statistically significant (at p<0.05) attraction effects for the Target. Compared to 
expectations based on chance, the number of observed positive attraction effects observed was 
moderately, statistically significant (χ2(1)=2.87; p=0.09), and no scenarios produced statistically 
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significant effects for the Competitor. However, 32 (35.2%) of the 91 scenarios did produce non-
significant, relative share decreases for the Target – a percentage that is statistically significantly 
less than the 50% that would be expected based on chance (χ2(1)=4.07; p<0.05).  
 Choice scenarios that involved bottles of wine were the most represented among 
statistically significant scenarios across this study. Four of the eleven statistically significant 
scenarios were of bottles of wine. However the four scenarios were observed out of a pool of 18 
bottle-wine scenarios conducted across this study, and of the 18 bottle of wine scenarios, five 
produced non-significant share shifts that favored the competitor. Overall, based on a chi-
squared analysis, the study was able to create the attraction effect at better-than-chance rates, but 
the effect was not consistently reproducible across scenarios.   
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Figure 9. Chi-Squared Summary Results by Choice Scenarios 
 
Choice scenarios are labels in the format: Experiment(E), Question(Q), and Decoy Version(D). For example, the decoy version 
targeting the first option, in the second question of the fifth survey is expressed as (E5Q2D1). 
ǂ   Signific
*  Signific
**   Significant at the p<0.01 level. 
*** Significant at the p<0.001 level. 
 
Scenario p- Effect
Exp# ID Number Product A B C T (n) C T D (n) C T C T value Direction
1 8 E8Q3D1 Wine (Bottle) Price Quality Score 47 45 92 14 68 0 82 51.1% 48.9% 17.1% 82.9% 22.03   0.000
2 8 E8Q1D1 Beer (Six-Pack) Price Quality Score 79 14 93 63 50 0 113 84.9% 15.1% 55.8% 44.2% 20.30   0.000
3 7 E7Q3D1 Wine (Bottle) Price Quality Score 33 31 64 12 46 0 58 51.6% 48.4% 20.7% 79.3% 12.46   0.000
4 2 E2Q2D2 Wine (Bottle) Price Quality Score 50 27 77 31 47 2 80 64.9% 35.1% 39.7% 60.3% 9.86     0.002
5 1 E1Q9D2 Steak Quality (Type) Price 14 16 30 2 19 5 26 46.7% 53.3% 9.5% 90.5% 7.92     0.005
6 7 E7Q4D1 Restaurant Distance Quality Score 28 32 60 16 53 1 70 46.7% 53.3% 23.2% 76.8% 7.87     0.005
7 5 E5Q1D2 Beer (Six-Pack) Price Quality Score 38 38 76 25 59 0 84 50.0% 50.0% 29.8% 70.2% 6.85     0.009
8 8 E8Q2D1 Laptop RAM Battery Life 33 85 118 10 68 3 81 28.0% 72.0% 12.8% 87.2% 6.29     0.012
9 2 E2Q34D1 Cruise Price Length 84 14 98 42 18 1 61 85.7% 14.3% 70.0% 30.0% 5.69     0.017
10 5 E5Q3D2 Restaurant Distance Quality Score 47 27 74 32 39 9 80 63.5% 36.5% 45.1% 54.9% 4.97     0.026
11 5 E5Q2D2 Wine (Bottle) Price Quality Score 25 48 73 13 55 2 70 34.2% 65.8% 19.1% 80.9% 4.09     0.043
12 8 E8Q4D1 Restaurant Distance Quality Score 63 31 94 55 47 3 105 67.0% 33.0% 53.9% 46.1% 3.50     0.061
13 4 E4Q5D1 Wine (Bottle) Price Quality Score 25 31 56 12 33 15 60 44.6% 55.4% 26.7% 73.3% 3.47     0.062
14 7 E7Q1D1 Beer (Six-Pack) Price Quality Score 53 16 69 41 25 0 66 76.8% 23.2% 62.1% 37.9% 3.44     0.064
15 2 E2Q8D2 Hotel Distance Price 25 43 68 16 55 6 77 36.8% 63.2% 22.5% 77.5% 3.38     0.066
16 7 E7Q1D2 Beer (Six-Pack) Price Quality Score 16 53 69 6 47 0 53 23.2% 76.8% 11.3% 88.7% 2.86     0.091
17 6 E6Q1D1 Date Prospect Facials A Facials B 11 2 13 9 7 0 16 84.6% 15.4% 56.3% 43.8% 2.70     0.101
18 2 E2Q6D2 Flight Stops Price 42 40 82 29 46 4 79 51.2% 48.8% 38.7% 61.3% 2.49     0.114
19 7 E7Q2D1 Laptop RAM Battery Life 15 43 58 10 57 2 69 25.9% 74.1% 14.9% 85.1% 2.32     0.127
20 11 E11Q1D1 Binoculars Price Power 84 59 143 66 67 3 136 58.7% 41.3% 49.6% 50.4% 2.18     0.140
21 2 E2Q6D1 Flight Stops Price 40 42 82 41 27 3 71 48.8% 51.2% 60.3% 39.7% 1.98     0.159 Competitor
22 7 E7Q3D2 Wine (Bottle) Price Quality Score 31 33 64 24 42 2 68 48.4% 51.6% 36.4% 63.6% 1.94     0.164
23 8 E8Q5D2 Steak Cut Price 13 43 56 5 36 18 59 23.2% 76.8% 12.2% 87.8% 1.90     0.168
24 2 E2Q10D2 Frozen Entrée Type, Calories Price 53 34 87 22 23 6 51 60.9% 39.1% 48.9% 51.1% 1.75     0.186
25 4 E4Q3D2 Entrée Calories Price 31 25 56 19 26 15 60 55.4% 44.6% 42.2% 57.8% 1.72     0.189
26 5 E5Q3D1 Restaurant Distance Quality Score 27 47 74 20 55 21 96 36.5% 63.5% 26.7% 73.3% 1.66     0.197
27 9 E9Q2D1 Wine (Bottle) Labels Price Quality Score 35 67 102 32 41 29 102 34.3% 65.7% 43.8% 56.2% 1.63     0.201 Competitor
28 4 E4Q6D1 Chinese Takeout Protein Price 10 46 56 4 40 15 59 17.9% 82.1% 9.1% 90.9% 1.57     0.210
29 8 E8Q3D2 Wine (Bottle) Price Quality Score 45 47 92 48 71 1 120 48.9% 51.1% 40.3% 59.7% 1.55     0.213
30 8 E8Q6D2 Soda Brand NA 74 70 144 62 78 5 145 51.4% 48.6% 44.3% 55.7% 1.44     0.231
31 1 E1Q2D2 Sandwich Calories Price 8 18 26 10 11 5 26 30.8% 69.2% 47.6% 52.4% 1.40     0.237 Competitor
32 10 E10Q1D1 Refrigerators Operating Cost Freeze Time 36 38 74 48 35 0 83 48.6% 51.4% 57.8% 42.2% 1.37     0.243 Competitor
33 4 E4Q10D1 Hotel Distance Price 24 31 55 30 25 5 60 43.6% 56.4% 54.5% 45.5% 1.31     0.252 Competitor
34 8 E8Q1D2 Beer (Six-Pack) Price Quality Score 14 79 93 8 77 1 86 15.1% 84.9% 9.4% 90.6% 1.31     0.253
35 2 E2Q4D1 Entrée Type Price 53 14 67 41 17 7 65 79.1% 20.9% 70.7% 29.3% 1.18     0.277
36 1 E1Q2D1 Sandwich Calories Price 18 8 26 19 15 3 37 69.2% 30.8% 55.9% 44.1% 1.11     0.292
37 11 E11Q3D1 Refrigerators Operating Cost Freeze Time 30 36 66 20 35 21 76 45.5% 54.5% 36.4% 63.6% 0.94     0.332
38 2 E2Q10D1 Frozen Entrée Type, Calories Price 34 53 87 20 43 13 76 39.1% 60.9% 31.7% 68.3% 0.85     0.356
39 2 E2Q34D2 Cruise Price Length 14 84 98 13 53 5 71 14.3% 85.7% 19.7% 80.3% 0.84     0.359 Competitor
40 4 E4Q8D1 Flight Stops Price 25 31 56 26 23 10 59 44.6% 55.4% 53.1% 46.9% 0.74     0.389 Competitor
41 2 E2Q1D1 Wine (Bottle, Red) Quality Price 32 52 84 33 41 2 76 38.1% 61.9% 44.6% 55.4% 0.69     0.407 Competitor
42 5 E5Q5D2 Pastry Type Calories/Fat 52 17 69 56 13 2 71 75.4% 24.6% 81.2% 18.8% 0.68     0.409 Competitor
43 2 E2Q12D1 Chinese Takeout Fat Price 47 28 75 43 19 6 68 62.7% 37.3% 69.4% 30.6% 0.67     0.412 Competitor
44 8 E8Q6D1 Soda Brand NA 71 73 144 72 61 2 135 49.3% 50.7% 54.1% 45.9% 0.65     0.422 Competitor
45 4 E4Q1D1 Flight Price Fees 17 39 56 21 35 4 60 30.4% 69.6% 37.5% 62.5% 0.64     0.425 Competitor
46 7 E7Q5D1 Steak Cut Price 53 11 64 51 7 17 75 82.8% 17.2% 87.9% 12.1% 0.63     0.426 Competitor
47 3 E3Q3D1 Wine (Bottle) Price Quality Score 17 43 60 16 29 13 58 28.3% 71.7% 35.6% 64.4% 0.62     0.430 Competitor
48 9 E9Q1D1 Wine (Bottle) Price Quality Score 25 73 98 20 76 4 100 25.5% 74.5% 20.8% 79.2% 0.60     0.440
49 6 E6Q2D2 The Economist Price Features 47 6 53 36 7 4 47 88.7% 11.3% 83.7% 16.3% 0.50     0.480
50 1 E1Q6D1 Beer (Pint) Size Price 19 8 27 22 6 1 29 70.4% 29.6% 78.6% 21.4% 0.49     0.485 Competitor
51 5 E5Q6D2 Soda Calories Sugars 61 16 77 66 13 0 79 79.2% 20.8% 83.5% 16.5% 0.48     0.488 Competitor
52 1 E1Q8D2 Pizza Delivery Time Quality 23 7 30 15 7 4 26 76.7% 23.3% 68.2% 31.8% 0.46     0.496
53 8 E8Q2D2 Laptop RAM Battery Life 85 33 118 73 23 0 96 72.0% 28.0% 76.0% 24.0% 0.44     0.507 Competitor
54 1 E1Q8D1 Pizza Delivery Time Quality 7 23 30 10 23 1 34 23.3% 76.7% 30.3% 69.7% 0.39     0.534 Competitor
55 2 E2Q4D2 Entrée Type Price 14 53 67 18 53 24 95 20.9% 79.1% 25.4% 74.6% 0.38     0.535 Competitor
56 3 E3Q2D1 Pizza Delivery Time Quality 13 47 60 10 48 13 71 21.7% 78.3% 17.2% 82.8% 0.37     0.544
57 3 E3Q1D1 Steak Cut Price 13 47 60 12 33 13 58 21.7% 78.3% 26.7% 73.3% 0.35     0.552 Competitor
58 2 E2Q2D1 Wine (Bottle) Price Quality Score 27 50 77 21 48 3 72 35.1% 64.9% 30.4% 69.6% 0.35     0.552
59 4 E4Q12D2 Steak Cut Price 24 32 56 21 22 17 60 42.9% 57.1% 48.8% 51.2% 0.35     0.554 Competitor
60 7 E7Q2D2 Laptop RAM Battery Life 43 15 58 41 18 6 65 74.1% 25.9% 69.5% 30.5% 0.31     0.577
61 7 E7Q4D2 Restaurant Distance Quality Score 32 28 60 30 32 0 62 53.3% 46.7% 48.4% 51.6% 0.30     0.585
62 4 E4Q4D2 Beer Quality/Size Price 24 32 56 17 28 11 56 42.9% 57.1% 37.8% 62.2% 0.27     0.605
63 4 E4Q11D1 Fish Entrée Type & Quality Price 25 31 56 16 24 20 60 44.6% 55.4% 40.0% 60.0% 0.21     0.650
64 1 E1Q7D1 Entrée Salads Protein, Price Calories 5 20 25 8 24 2 34 20.0% 80.0% 25.0% 75.0% 0.20     0.655 Competitor
65 1 E1Q1D1 Wine (Bottle, Red) Quality (Region) Price 13 14 27 8 11 11 30 48.1% 51.9% 42.1% 57.9% 0.16     0.685
66 2 E2Q7D1 Vacation Package Length Features & Price 22 52 74 19 52 1 72 29.7% 70.3% 26.8% 73.2% 0.16     0.691
67 4 E4Q2D1 Pizza Delivery Time Quality 18 38 56 17 42 1 60 32.1% 67.9% 28.8% 71.2% 0.15     0.698
68 2 E2Q11D1 Flight Carrier, Stops Price 58 51 109 27 27 3 57 53.2% 46.8% 50.0% 50.0% 0.15     0.699
69 5 E5Q1D1 Beer (Six-Pack) Price Quality Score 38 38 76 29 33 0 62 50.0% 50.0% 46.8% 53.2% 0.14     0.706
70 2 E2Q8D1 Hotel Distance Price 43 25 68 50 33 4 87 63.2% 36.8% 60.2% 39.8% 0.14     0.707
71 8 E8Q4D2 Restaurant Distance Quality Score 31 63 94 29 66 0 95 33.0% 67.0% 30.5% 69.5% 0.13     0.717
72 6 E6Q1D2 Date Prospect Facials A Facials B 2 11 13 5 20 0 25 15.4% 84.6% 20.0% 80.0% 0.12     0.728 Competitor
73 5 E5Q6D1 Soda Calories Sugars 16 61 77 12 53 3 68 20.8% 79.2% 18.5% 81.5% 0.12     0.729
74 2 E2Q11D2 Flight Carrier, Stops Price 51 58 109 30 31 3 64 46.8% 53.2% 49.2% 50.8% 0.09     0.765 Competitor
75 1 E1Q7D2 Entrée Salads Protein, Price Calories 20 5 25 20 6 4 30 80.0% 20.0% 76.9% 23.1% 0.07     0.789
76 2 E2Q12D2 Chinese Takeout Fat Price 28 47 75 26 40 5 71 37.3% 62.7% 39.4% 60.6% 0.06     0.802 Competitor
77 5 E5Q5D1 Pastry Type Calories/Fat 17 52 69 13 44 5 62 24.6% 75.4% 22.8% 77.2% 0.06     0.810
78 2 E2Q7D2 Vacation Package Length Features & Price 52 22 74 50 23 5 78 70.3% 29.7% 68.5% 31.5% 0.05     0.815
79 1 E1Q6D2 Beer (Pint) Size Price 8 19 27 9 19 0 28 29.6% 70.4% 32.1% 67.9% 0.04     0.840 Competitor
80 5 E5Q4D2 Sandwich Calories Fat 46 25 71 38 22 5 65 64.8% 35.2% 63.3% 36.7% 0.03     0.863
81 2 E2Q1D2 Wine (Bottle, White ) Quality Price 52 32 84 39 23 3 65 61.9% 38.1% 62.9% 37.1% 0.02     0.902 Competitor
82 4 E4Q7D1 Soda Type Price 25 31 56 26 31 3 60 44.6% 55.4% 45.6% 54.4% 0.01     0.917 Competitor
83 1 E1Q9D1 Steak Quality (Type) Price 16 14 30 13 12 7 32 53.3% 46.7% 52.0% 48.0% 0.01     0.922
84 4 E4Q9D2 Phone Plan Minutes Price 8 48 56 6 38 16 60 14.3% 85.7% 13.6% 86.4% 0.01     0.926
85 5 E5Q4D1 Sandwich Calories Fat 25 46 71 29 52 6 87 35.2% 64.8% 35.8% 64.2% 0.01     0.939 Competitor
86 8 E8Q5D1 Steak Cut Price 43 13 56 41 12 31 84 76.8% 23.2% 77.4% 22.6% 0.01     0.943 Competitor
87 7 E7Q5D2 Steak Cut Price 11 53 64 7 33 11 51 17.2% 82.8% 17.5% 82.5% 0.00     0.967 Competitor
88 1 E1Q3D1 Wine (Bottle) Price Quality Score 25 2 27 24 2 0 26 92.6% 7.4% 92.3% 7.7% 0.00     0.969
89 1 E1Q3D2 Wine (Bottle) Price Quality Score 2 25 27 2 26 6 34 7.4% 92.6% 7.1% 92.9% 0.00     0.970
90 1 E1Q1D2 Wine (Bottle, White ) Quality (Region) Price 14 13 27 13 12 3 28 51.9% 48.1% 52.0% 48.0% 0.00     0.992
91 5 E5Q2D1 Wine (Bottle) Price Quality Score 48 25 73 52 27 3 82 65.8% 34.2% 65.8% 34.2% 0.00     0.992 Competitor
χ2
Observed Count Relative % Share
Attribute Dimension Control Decoyed Control Decoyed
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Regression Results 
As part of the original intent of this study, regression analyses were then conducted to 
control for subject’s intuitional tendencies based on either CRT scores (Experiments 5, 7, 8, and 
9) or FI scores (Experiments 1 and 2). 
An Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression was conducted for each choice scenario 
where information on individual differences in thinking preference was collected. Whether the 
participant chose the target option was the dependent variable. Experiments 1 and 2 included 
measures of Need for Cognition (NFC) and Faith in Intuition (FI), and Experiments 5 through 9 
included respondent scores on the Cognitive Reflection Test. Choices made in identical product 
scenarios, but across different experiments, were collapsed and analyzed as if executed in the 
same experiment. Forty-six separate regressions were conducted where Target Choice was 
regressed against decoy condition and thinking style. The baseline regression equation used for 
experiments with CRT data, can be expressed as: 
ܥ݄݋݅ܿ݁	݋݂	ܶܽݎ݃݁ݐ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܦ݁ܿ݋ݕܥ݋݊݀݅ݐ݅݋݊ ൅ ߚଶܫ݊ݐݑ݅ݐ݅݋݊ ൅ ߚଷܦ݁ܿ݋ݕ ∗ ܫ݊ݐݑ݅ݐ݅݋݊൅∈ (9) 
Where each variable is defined as: 
 Choice of Target – a binomial indicator of whether the Target option was chosen. A zero 
indicates the Target was not chosen, and ‘1’ indicates the Target option was chosen.  
 Decoy Condition – a dummy variable where ‘1’ indicates the decoyed condition where a 
Target-favoring decoy was present. Statistical significance on this variable would 
indicate the presence of an attraction effect. 
 Intuition – the subject’s CRT score from 0 to 3 where a higher number represents a more 
intuitive disposition.  
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For Experiments 1 and 2, where NFC and FI data were collected, the regression equation is 
expressed as: 
ܥ݄݋݅ܿ݁	݋݂	ܶܽݎ݃݁ݐ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܦ݁ܿ݋ݕܥ݋݊݀݅ݐ݅݋݊ ൅ ߚଶܫ݊ݐݑ݅ݐ݅݋݊ ൅ ߚଷܦ݁ܿ݋ݕ ∗ ܫ݊ݐݑ݅ݐ݅݋݊ ൅ ߚସܰܨܥ ൅ ߚଷܦ݁ܿ݋ݕ ∗
ܰܨܥ ൅ ߚହܰܨܥ ∗ ܫ݊ݐݑ݅ݐ݅݋݊ ൅ ߚ଺ܦ݁ܿ݋ݕ ∗ ܰܨܥ ∗ ܫ݊ݐݑ݅ݐ݅݋݊൅∈ (10) 
Where variables are the same as detailed in Equation (9), except: 
 Intuition – is represented as a continuous variable from 0 to 5 based on a Faith in 
Intuition score, where higher numbers represent a more intuitive disposition. 
 NFC – represents the subject’s Need For Cognition score from 0 to 5, where a higher 
number represents a greater disposition towards cognitive processes9.  
Summary regression results are presented in Figure 10, and are grouped by choice scenario. The 
interaction between the decoy’s presence and intuitive tendencies was relatively predictive of 
Target preference in three scenarios: one of two breakfast sandwich scenarios (t=-2.56; p=0.01), 
and two of five wine scenarios (t=-1.88; p=0.061 and t=-2.01; p=0.046) were statistically 
significant. However, all three scenarios produced coefficients counter to expectations. The 
results from these three scenarios suggest the presence of the decoy turned intuitive subjects 
away from the Target option, in a reverse attraction or ‘repulsion’ effect. Yet even within these 
product scenario types, a repulsion effect was also not consistently reproducible. 
Of the 26 scenarios that included a need for cognition measure, two scenarios (Steaks and 
Vacations) exhibited moderately significant repulsion (t=-1.35; p=0.09) and attraction effects 
(t=3.78; p=0.10), respectively. These sparse, inconsistent, and otherwise weak results suggest the 
                                                 
9 Note – The NFC and FI scales measure different processes that are not mutually exclusive to each other. A subject can exhibit a 
propensity for both thinking processes (Epstein et al., 1996).  
 58 
CRT, FI, and NFC do not measure cognitive tendencies that are relevant to the creation of an 
attraction effect. These lack of results are in direct contradiction to Mao & Oppewal’s (2012) 
finding that individuals with higher faith in intuition are more susceptible to the attraction effect. 
 59 
Figure 10. Regression Results: Choosing Target by Choice Scenario Attributes 
 
 
 
NOTES: For the sake of brevity, NFC x Intuition and NFC x Intuition x Decoy interactions (β5 and β6) are not shown, as neither interaction term produced statistically significant 
results. Intuition measures for Experiments 5, 7 & 8 were Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) scores (Frederick, 2005), and Faith in Intuition (FI) (Epstein et al., 1996) scores for 
Experiments 1 &2. Robust standard errors (RSEs) are reported to compensate for potential sources of heteroscedasticity. 
Product n R2 F p>F Coef. RSE t p Coef. RSE t p Coef. RSE t p Coef. RSE t p Coef. RSE t p Coef. RSE t p
D1 Beer 488    0.03 5.66 0.00      0.205 0.044 4.67 0.00 0.137 0.06        2.11 0.04 0.015 0.02        0.62 0.54 0.017 0.04        0.47 0.64
D2 Beer 446    0.02 3.91 0.01      0.796 0.044 18.06 0.00 0.107 0.06        1.91 0.06 -0.022 0.02        -0.88 0.38 -0.039 0.03        -1.15 0.25
D1 Bfast Sndwch 161    0.02 1.12 0.34       0.633 0.111 5.72 0.00 -0.161 0.14        -1.13 0.26 -0.007 0.05        -0.12 0.91 0.090 0.07        1.25 0.21
D2 Bfast Sndwch 139    0.06 3.46 0.02      0.283 0.105 2.70 0.01 0.325 0.16        2.07 0.04 0.032 0.05        0.61 0.55 -0.185 0.07        -2.56 0.011
D2 Economist 100    0.01 0.19 0.91       0.130 0.071 1.83 0.07 -0.009 0.10        -0.08 0.93 -0.013 0.04        -0.32 0.75 0.033 0.06        0.55 0.58
D1 Laptop 326    0.02 1.97 0.12       0.759 0.051 15.01 0.00 0.072 0.07        1.02 0.31 -0.023 0.03        -0.80 0.42 0.025 0.04        0.63 0.53
D2 Laptop 337    0.01 0.89 0.45       0.241 0.051 4.76 0.00 -0.032 0.07        -0.47 0.64 0.023 0.03        0.80 0.42 0.017 0.04        0.40 0.69
D1 Pastry 148    0.02 0.99 0.40       0.756 0.097 7.83 0.00 -0.158 0.14        -1.11 0.27 -0.071 0.05        -1.46 0.15 0.115 0.07        1.60 0.11
D2 Pastry 172    0.01 0.39 0.76       0.211 0.090 2.34 0.02 -0.076 0.11        -0.67 0.50 -0.002 0.05        -0.05 0.96 0.008 0.06        0.14 0.89
D1 Restaurant 484    0.02 3.35 0.02      0.509 0.051 9.98 0.00 0.069 0.07        0.97 0.33 -0.023 0.03        -0.79 0.43 0.046 0.04        1.16 0.25
D2 Restaurant 460    0.01 1.51 0.21       0.493 0.051 9.68 0.00 0.147 0.07        1.99 0.05 0.015 0.03        0.52 0.61 -0.045 0.04        -1.10 0.27
D1 Soda 337    0.00 0.28 0.84       0.731 0.054 13.53 0.00 -0.066 0.09        -0.75 0.45 -0.025 0.03        -0.81 0.42 0.034 0.05        0.73 0.47
D2 Soda 367    0.01 0.82 0.49       0.258 0.053 4.85 0.00 0.098 0.08        1.25 0.21 0.022 0.03        0.71 0.48 -0.062 0.04        -1.47 0.14
D1 Steak 333    0.01 0.97 0.41       0.181 0.048 3.73 0.00 -0.071 0.06        -1.19 0.23 0.005 0.03        0.17 0.87 0.006 0.04        0.16 0.87
D2 Steak 309    0.04 3.93 0.01      0.786 0.051 15.55 0.00 -0.166 0.08        -2.10 0.04 0.001 0.03        0.04 0.97 -0.008 0.05        -0.18 0.86
D1 Wine 440    0.06 11.73 -        0.484 0.051 9.42 0.00 0.328 0.07        4.82 0.00 0.002 0.03        0.07 0.95 -0.073 0.04        -1.88 0.061
D2 Wine 506    0.02 2.67 0.05      0.517 0.051 10.07 0.00 0.101 0.07        1.46 0.15 -0.009 0.03        -0.33 0.74 0.016 0.04        0.42 0.67
D1 Wine Labels 212    0.06 4.79 0.00      0.054 0.067 8.08 0.00 -0.072 0.10        -0.74 0.46 0.063 0.04        1.42 0.16 -0.120 0.06        -2.01 0.046
D1 Wine 212    0.01 0.40 0.76       0.760 0.063 12.16 0.00 -0.041 0.04        -1.05 0.30 -0.041 0.04        -1.05 0.30 0.035 0.06        0.62 0.53
D1 Beer 123    0.08 2.33 0.03      -3.058 3.419 -0.89 0.37 -1.063 3.73        -0.28 0.78 0.433 0.45        0.96 0.34 0.269 0.49        0.54 0.59 0.569 0.57   0.99 0.32       0.217 0.63   0.34 0.73       
D2 Beer 120    0.03 0.82 0.57       2.520 3.329 0.76 0.45 -0.157 4.29        -0.04 0.97 -0.252 0.44        -0.57 0.57 -0.005 0.56        -0.01 0.99 -0.387 0.55   -0.70 0.49       0.054 0.72   0.07 0.94       
D1 Coffee 165    0.09 2.83 0.01      0.881 8.526 0.10 0.92 9.797 10.88      0.90 0.37 -0.138 1.80        -0.08 0.94 -2.005 2.29        -0.88 0.38 -0.223 1.54   -0.15 0.89       -1.494 2.00   -0.75 0.46       
D2 Coffee 167    0.03 0.63 0.73       1.018 7.754 0.13 0.90 -3.571 12.08      -0.30 0.77 -0.057 1.63        -0.04 0.97 0.856 2.59        0.33 0.74 -0.002 1.40   0.00 1.00       0.413 2.19   0.19 0.85       
D1 Cruise 162    0.08 2.18 0.04      2.177 4.087 0.53 0.60 7.316 9.45        0.77 0.44 -0.605 0.90        -0.67 0.50 -1.302 2.00        -0.65 0.52 -0.453 0.77   -0.59 0.56       -1.462 1.76   -0.83 0.41       
D2 Cruise 172    0.05 1.73 0.10       2.248 5.072 0.44 0.66 9.860 9.47        1.04 0.30 -0.132 1.11        -0.12 0.91 -2.416 2.09        -1.15 0.25 -0.183 0.95   -0.19 0.85       -1.884 1.75   -1.08 0.28       
D1 Entrée 362    0.09 5.36 0.00 -0.916 1.184 -0.77 0.44 0.366 1.72        0.21 0.83 0.237 0.19        1.24 0.22 -0.157 0.26        -0.59 0.55 0.105 0.21   0.50 0.62       -0.017 0.30   -0.06 0.96       
D2 Entrée 390    0.03 1.86 0.08 2.340 1.361 1.72 0.09 0.984 2.43        0.41 0.69 -0.306 0.21        -1.46 0.15 -0.262 0.43        -0.60 0.55 -0.247 0.25   -1.00 0.32       -0.205 0.43   -0.48 0.64       
D1 Flight 323    0.02 1.05 0.40 -7.525 5.567 -1.35 0.18 14.333 9.01        1.59 0.11 1.582 1.20        1.32 0.19 -2.906 1.91        -1.52 0.13 1.551 1.02   1.51 0.13       -2.642 1.63   -1.62 0.11       
D2 Flight 338    0.02 1.21 0.29 10.442 5.563 1.88 0.06 -6.192 9.67        -0.64 0.52 -1.986 1.20        -1.65 0.10 1.099 2.08        0.53 0.60 -1.910 1.02   -1.87 0.06      1.167 1.79   0.65 0.52       
D1 Frozen Entrée 182    0.04 1.48 0.18 -2.664 8.856 -0.30 0.76 12.204 11.20      1.09 0.28 0.646 1.89        0.34 0.73 -2.200 2.41        -0.91 0.36 0.589 1.60   0.37 0.71       -2.205 2.05   -1.08 0.28       
D2 Frozen Entrée 157    0.05 1.57 0.15 7.546 8.090 0.93 0.35 3.979 12.48      0.32 0.75 -1.502 1.72        -0.87 0.38 -0.530 2.66        -0.20 0.84 -1.306 1.45   -0.90 0.37       -0.760 2.24   -0.34 0.74       
D1 Hotel 156    0.02 0.42 0.89 -10.175 8.064 -1.26 0.21 16.577 14.89      1.11 0.27 2.113 1.67        1.27 0.21 -3.492 3.14        -1.11 0.27 1.910 1.46   1.31 0.19       -2.962 2.75   -1.08 0.28       
D2 Hotel 146    0.03 0.54 0.80 10.120 8.081 1.25 0.21 -10.499 10.17      -1.03 0.30 -1.898 1.67        -1.14 0.26 2.253 2.15        1.05 0.30 -1.777 1.46   -1.22 0.22       1.949 1.85   1.05 0.30       
D1 Pizza 66      0.05 0.57 0.78 -0.982 3.679 -0.27 0.79 -1.843 4.58        -0.40 0.69 0.296 0.52        0.57 0.57 0.114 0.63        0.18 0.86 0.258 0.60   0.43 0.67       0.320 0.77   0.42 0.68       
D2 Pizza 57      0.09 1.44 0.21 0.736 3.182 0.23 0.82 -4.354 3.48        -1.25 0.22 -0.124 0.46        -0.27 0.79 0.552 0.49        1.12 0.27 -0.091 0.52   -0.18 0.86       0.921 0.59   1.56 0.13       
D1 Restaurant 65      0.12 2.25 0.04 -0.440 3.251 -0.14 0.89 3.604 3.92        0.92 0.36 0.105 0.39        0.27 0.79 -0.329 0.52        -0.63 0.53 0.091 0.55   0.17 0.87       -0.481 0.67   -0.72 0.47       
D2 Restaurant 55      0.07 0.87 0.53 3.094 3.092 1.00 0.32 -6.447 3.85        -1.67 0.10 -0.309 0.37        -0.83 0.41 0.799 0.49        1.65 0.11 -0.498 0.52   -0.95 0.35       1.038 0.64   1.63 0.11       
D1 Steak 66      0.10 1.40 0.22 -3.761 3.248 -1.16 0.25 8.136 4.67        1.74 0.09 0.411 0.44        0.94 0.35 -0.987 0.61        -1.63 0.11 0.676 0.56   1.22 0.23       -1.353 0.79   -1.70 0.09      
D2 Steak 58      0.09 0.82 0.57 3.408 4.094 0.83 0.41 -3.430 5.07        -0.68 0.50 -0.299 0.54        -0.55 0.59 0.378 0.69        0.54 0.59 -0.456 0.69   -0.66 0.51       0.589 0.83   0.71 0.48       
D1 Vacation 155    0.04 1.44 0.20 6.677 10.100 0.66 0.51 -21.729 12.59      -1.73 0.09 -1.290 2.18        -0.59 0.55 4.389 2.69        1.63 0.11 -1.060 1.82   -0.58 0.56       3.775 2.27   1.66 0.10      
D2 Vacation 161    0.03 0.66 0.71 -7.194 9.529 -0.75 0.45 8.025 13.33      0.60 0.55 1.702 2.04        0.83 0.41 -1.762 2.86        -0.62 0.54 1.375 1.70   0.81 0.42       -1.260 2.42   -0.52 0.60       
D1 Wine 411    0.06 5.47 0.00 2.102 1.027 2.05 0.04 0.152 1.57        0.10 0.92 -0.178 0.16        -1.15 0.25 -0.061 0.23        -0.26 0.79 -0.237 0.19   -1.27 0.20       0.021 0.28   0.08 0.94       
D2 Wine 466    0.06 4.70 0.00 -0.543 0.961 -0.56 0.57 2.509 1.68        1.50 0.14 0.072 0.15        0.48 0.63 -0.422 0.26        -1.60 0.11 0.111 0.17   0.65 0.52       -0.380 0.29   -1.29 0.20       
D1 Sandwich 66      0.04 0.82 0.58 -2.457 2.007 -1.22 0.23 1.910 4.00        0.48 0.64 0.389 0.29        1.36 0.18 -0.281 0.52        -0.54 0.59 0.480 0.35   1.38 0.17       -0.294 0.68   -0.43 0.67       
D2 Sandwich 55      0.21 6.48 0.00 -1.147 2.412 -0.48 0.64 1.965 4.23        0.46 0.64 0.176 0.31        0.56 0.58 -0.335 0.56        -0.60 0.55 0.206 0.40   0.51 0.61       -0.279 0.72   -0.38 0.70       
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The results from this study suggest that it is possible to create attraction effects at a rate 
greater than chance. However, it is difficult to create a consistent attraction effect across any one 
product or service class as no unifying theme(s) as to what might contribute to an attraction 
effect were identifiable from the data. After controlling for individual differences in intuitive and 
cognitive processing tendencies, still no consistent attraction effect could be identified. The lack 
of a consistently reproducible attraction effect across experiments is counter to the expectations 
implied and reported by prior research findings. This section explores why this study’s results 
differ from that of prior findings, and concludes with a discussion on how these null results 
impact the effect’s usability in real-world scenarios, and suggests avenues of future research. 
Differences in Methods 
Though useful insight was gained through this study, the inconsistency in producing an 
attraction effect is puzzling. The section begins with a discussion of the departures from 
traditional attraction effect methodologies, and how they may contribute to the study’s inability 
to consistently replicate the results found in the existing literature. 
Stimulus Materials 
 Initial experiment choice scenarios were designed to reflect consumer options prevalent 
in hospitality industry contexts. Products and services, and their corresponding attribute 
dimensions and values were chosen based on a balance between relevance to practical 
application and replication of prior, successful attraction effect stimulus. For example, true to 
previous stimulus, initial scenarios utilized numeric attributes such as price, rating scores, calorie 
and fat counts, and delivery times. Though it is possible that the failure of these hospitality 
scenarios stem from product- or attribute-specific idiosyncrasies, subsequent experiments which 
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incorporated products, attributes, and specific choice options reported to have created attraction 
effects in prior studies, also failed to create consistent attraction effects (See Appendix 1 
annotations for a list of product and attribute replications). 
Participants 
Prior research on the attraction effect has generally been conducted on student 
populations. In this study, only Experiment Two utilized a student population.  Experiment One 
and Four participants were non-student samples solicited through social media channels or from 
a town-commons area, respectively. For all other experiments, participants were recruited 
through Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk), Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs) service10. 
MTurk participant responses have been shown to be at least as reliable as those collected through 
other subject pools (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Horton, Rand & Zeckhauser, 2012), 
and potentially more demographically diverse than the typical American college sample pool 
(Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). Though MTurk participants behave much like 
traditional experiment subject pools, they have been shown to have slightly different 
demographics and personality traits than student and general populations. In general, MTurk 
subjects are (Goodman et al., 2012): 
 Less extroverted and have slightly lower self-esteem than other populations at large;  
 More geographically diverse, likely to be international, older, and have English as a 
second language than a typical community or student sample population; and  
 Slightly less likely than students (but just as likely as a general population) to process 
cognitively, but more likely than students to process intuitively. 
                                                 
10 Experiments 1, 2, and 4 were recruited from a convenience sample, undergraduate student population, and an in-person general 
population survey, respectively. All other participants were recruited through MTurk. 
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If anything, given a slight bias toward intuitive processing, MTurk participants were expected to 
exhibit stronger, more consistent attraction effects across product and service classes than with 
student populations. However, this study’s results do not conform with this expectation. 
Researchers have also been able to replicate many classic behavioral economic and social 
psychology effects through MTurk subject pools. For example MTurk subjects have also been 
shown to fall prey to framing effects and conjunction fallacies (Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 
2011), and their reaction to subliminal primes, and performance on prisoners’ dilemma tasks are 
also similar to that of off-line student participants (Horton, Rand & Zeckhauser, 2012).  
MTurk subject pools have also been criticized for their possibly skewed value of money. 
That participants are often willing to complete HITs for as little as $0.05 for 10 minutes of their 
time, has been cautioned as an indication for cheapness. In response to such criticism, recent 
research has shown MTurk participants to have spending behaviors and beliefs about money 
similar to that of traditional student populations, and to be only slightly thriftier than the general 
population (Goodman et al., 2012). Based on these similar monetary beliefs, MTurk subjects 
were expected to respond to choice scenarios in a manner not unlike in prior studies. 
 
Figure 11. Subject Profiles by Experiment: Means and Standard Errors 
 
 
 
Finally, the overall participant profile of this study was not out of the ordinary. Education 
level and gender information was collected for Experiments Five through Nine, and 
Experiment 1 2 5 7 8 9
Personality
* Need for Cognition 6.96(1.3) 6.46(1.1) -            -            -            -
* Faith in Intuition 7.03(1.5) 5.71(0.7) -            -            -            -
** Cognitive Reflection Test -         -         1.66(1.12) 1.22(1.17) 1.39(1.15) 1.13(1.12)
Demographic
Gender (% Female) -         -         57.8% 45.3% 40.8% 40.0%
Average Education (Yrs) -         -         15.12(1.95) 14.88(1.99) 14.94(1.80) 15.01(3.43)
* 10=Hi; 0=Lo;  ** 3=Hi Intuit ion; 0=Lo Intuition
Mean Values (Standard Error)
Personality and demographic data were not collected for experiments 3, 4, 10 or 11.
6
-          
-          
1.33(1.10)
-          
54.0%
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psychographic measures (either the REI or CRT) were gathered for all experiments except for 
Experiments Three, Four, Ten and Eleven. Summary statistics on subject demographics are 
presented in Figure 11. In general, the subject population did not exhibit extraordinary 
demographic or psychographic traits. Though a smaller portion of subjects in later experiments 
were female, the over-all proportion across the study was not atypical (48% female across 
Experiments Five through Nine; χ2(1)=0.684; p=.41; n=846). Subjects reported a slight inclination 
toward both cognitive processing (NFC μexp1=6.9; μexp2=6.9) and faith in intuition (FI μexp1=7.0; 
μexp2=5.7). Behaviorally, subjects in Experiments Six, Seven, Eight and Nine were slightly more 
inclined to suppress initial, intuitive reactions for more deliberative responses (CRT μexp6=1.33; 
μexp7=1.22; μexp8=1.39; μexp9=1.13). This level of deliberative processing is consistent with that 
observed through prior research (Goodman et al., 2012). Subjects from Experiment Five 
responded more intuitively (CRT μexp6=1.66) than expected. Average educational attainment was 
approximately three years of college (μ=15 years), and is comparable to studies conducted on 
student populations. 
Overall, there is little reason to believe that the participant pool used for the experiments 
in this study contributed to the inability to produce a consistent attraction effect.  
The Measure of Interest – Decoy Share 
 The operationalized measure for the attraction effect used in this study does not include 
share captured by the decoy. Arguably, the decoy share can be added to that of the dominating 
(Target) option under the assumption that a single entity reaps the benefit when either the target 
or decoy is chosen (for example the decoy may be a higher margin option developed as an 
extension to an existing product line). Inclusion of the decoy share would overstate the observed 
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difference between control and treatment conditions. As an independent, irrelevant alternative, 
the decoy share is expected to be zero, and if so, the following would be true: 
݌ሺܶ, ሼܶ, ܥ, ܦሽሻ ൌ ݌ሺܶ ൅ ܦ, ሼܶ, ܥ, ܦሽሻ      because      ݌ሺܦ, ሼܶ, ܥ, ܦሽሻ ൌ 0. (11) 
Yet in practice it is quite common for an asymmetrically dominated decoy to gain some share for 
itself11. Whenever the decoy share is greater than zero, then ݌ሺܶ ൅ ܦ, ሼܶ, ܥ, ܦሽሻ ൐ ݌ሺܶ, ሼܶ, ܥ, ܦሽሻ, and 
the Target share would be exaggerated. The resulting chi-squared measure would also be 
overstated and therefore erroneously report an attraction effect where one does not actually exist. 
A handful of prior studies have indeed combined Decoy and Target shares together (Appendix 3). 
Despite the prior precedent in combining share, the decoy and target shares were not combined 
for statistical analyses of this study for several reasons.  
 First, combining the Decoy and Target shares assumes the two options were designed to 
have a mutually beneficial relationship to each other. Excluding the decoy share from the target 
share eliminates such an assumption. For example, Ross Perot’s entry in the 1992 presidential 
election has been argued to have initiated an attraction effect boost for Bill Clinton (Pan, 
O’Curry, & Pitts, 1995); yet Perot’s votes clearly cannot be combined with Clinton’s, nor was 
Perot’s campaign designed specifically to benefit the Clinton campaign.  
 Second, if the decoy share were combined with that of the target, the resultant share 
would obscure the source of the share shift to the decoy. For example, whether the new target 
share was gained at the expense of the competitor, or if the target lost share to the decoy (but just 
happened to lose a smaller proportion to the decoy than the competitor) would be unclear. 
                                                 
11 Of the 53 attraction effect studies reviewed for this paper, 51 studies (96.2%) reported at least one choice scenario where the 
asymmetrically dominated decoy garnered share in the {T,C,D} condition.  
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Excluding the decoy from the share analysis provides for a clearer preference relationship 
between competitor and target options.  
Overall, combining the decoy and target shares makes it easier to create an attraction 
effect as share shifts to the target would seem larger and are therefore more likely to be 
statistically significant. This analytical difference, though only used in a handful of prior studies, 
likely still contributes to the perceive strength and prevalence of the effect in the existing 
literature. 
Effect Size Measurement & Choice of Control Condition 
The current study applies a more conservative standard by which to measure the size and 
existence of the attraction effect: the difference between the Target’s share in a two-option {T,C} 
control versus in a three-option Target-decoyed set {T,C,DT}. The two-option control-condition 
target share was used as a base to measure the attraction effect in HPP’s original study (also see a 
review by Mishra, 1993). However, many researchers have since used a more lenient metric 
where the Target-decoyed share (from set {T,C,DT}) is compared against the Target’s share in a 
Competitor-decoyed scenario (from set {T,C,DC}). Of the 53 attraction effect studies reviewed 
for this paper, 18 (34.0%) reported results based on target share differences between {T,C,DT} 
and {T,C,DC}conditions12. From a theoretical perspective, the use of a three-option control 
condition is not inappropriate as the share-base does appropriately signal the existence of an 
attraction effect when competitor share shifts to a target in the presence of a decoy. However, the 
three-option control was not used in this study for two reasons.   
First, using a three-option control condition to detect the existence of an attraction effect 
is liberal as it combines the creation of two attraction effects to define the existence of one 
                                                 
12 A full list of the 18 studies referred to are listed in Appendix Four.  
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attraction effect. Specifically, the method combines the share change from a target share-base 
that has been depressed by the presence of a potential attraction effect that favors the competitor, 
with a target share that has been augmented by a second attraction effect that favors the target. 
Calculating share change in this way potentially exaggerates the size of the attraction effect as it 
is actually the combination of two attraction effects.  
Second, from a practitioner point-of-view, a Target-decoyed versus Competitor-decoyed 
metric could only be effective if a marketer’s decoy successfully increased share to the intended 
Target while simultaneously, a competitor has also successfully increased share to the 
Competitor option in the presence of its own relevant decoy. A two-decoy, simultaneous share-
gain scenario is impossible under real market conditions since it necessitates concurrent share 
gain by both the Target and the Competitor in the presence of two asymmetrically dominated 
decoys. Thus, from a real-world application perspective, share change should be calculated based 
on the Target’s share in a two-option {T,C} choice scenario. 
The prevalent use of a three-option control condition could be one reason why significant 
attraction effects appear more often in the literature than this study’s findings would suggest.  
Though a {T,C,DT} versus {T,C,DC}metric does accurately detect the presence of an attraction 
effect, this study still employs the two-option control condition because the stricter baseline will 
likely be more meaningful in applied settings.  
Aggregation of Choice Scenarios & Statistical Power 
In this study, data were not aggregated across choice scenarios. The decision not to 
aggregate differs markedly from much of the existing literature as the practice is prevalent. Of 
the 53 attraction effect studies reviewed, 21 (39.6%) (Appendix Five lists these studies) reported 
significant attraction effects based on data that had been aggregated across at least two different 
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choice scenarios. Though aggregation helps to increase statistical power, and reduces the 
probability of encountering a Type-II error, the technique presents several methodological 
concerns. Aggregation obscures possible product- and attribute-specific moderators or mediators 
of the effect13, makes the effect seem more prevalent than perhaps it actually is, and makes 
statistical assumptions that potentially weaken analytical validity. 
Aggregating multiple choice scenarios into a single analysis increases overall statistical 
power. For example, in an experiment with 50 participants and two treatment conditions (a 
decoyed and a control condition), a single choice scenario would yield 25 participants per 
decoyed and control condition. If each participant was given four choice scenarios and the data 
were then aggregated across all scenarios, then each condition would have 25 x 4 or 100 
observations. Instead of reporting four choice scenarios with an n=25 per treatment condition; a 
typical aggregated analysis would report one overall experimental attraction effect with 
participant-choice as the unit of measure and an n=100 per treatment condition. 
Figure 12 plots the ratio of observations per participant for studies that reported 
aggregated data. The dotted line in the figure demarcates a 1:1 ratio, on and below which no data 
aggregation occurs. Of the 21 studies that reported aggregated data, 14 reported enough 
information on 22 separate experiments to determine that the average aggregated experiment 
combines the results of 3.23 choice scenarios per participant. All other factors being equal, this 
approximate three-fold increase in observation count effectively increases the null hypothesis 
rejection-region from  >1.64 to >0.921 at an =0.05, making it easier to reject a null 
                                                 
13 The practice of aggregating data across different products and attributes may also obfuscate the potential moderating effects of 
contextual factors such as product type, attribute dimension, and attribute value. Product-specific variability in attraction effect 
susceptibility has been well documented in prior research (e.g. Heath & Chatterjee, 1995; Mao & Oppewal, 2012; Mishra, 1990; 
Ratneshwar, Shocker & Stewart, 1987), but has yet to be explicitly examined in the literature. Attribute dimensions that reflect 
price, quality, and riskiness are routinely used in attraction effect studies, and are particularly influential in determining what 
choice processes are used. By its nature, aggregation prevents more specific examination into product and attributed related 
decision-making differences. 
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hypothesis of no significant target share change in the presence of a decoy, and easier to accept 
the alternative that an attraction effect exists. An analysis of statistical power across these 22 
experiments suggests that the increased observation count enables a test for an average effective 
share change of 1.7%, a much smaller share change than the 12.46% that was first reported by 
HPP and Huber & Puto (1983).  
Figure 12. Ratio of Participants to Observations Reported in Aggregated Studies 
 
Data points represent 22 experiments from the 14 studies that reported enough aggregated data to calculate statistical power. 
Ratios are based on particpant and observation counts reported for the decoy condition for each study. Studies that do not 
aggregate data across scenarios would have a ratio of 1:1, and would lie on the dotted line in the figure above.  
 
A full power analysis was then conducted to evaluate to the level of statistical power of 
the current study, and how it compares to that of prior studies. To facilitate the comparison of 
statistical power across groupings of choice scenarios, conservative assumptions were made to 
standardize the power calculation.  Calculation of statistical power includes the assumption that 
the mean effect size for the Attraction Effect is a 12.64% target share gain, the average effect 
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size observed by HPP and Huber & Puto (1983) in their seminal papers on the subject. To 
provide a comparable power estimate across scenarios, an assumption was made to standardize 
the effect size standard error to 0.5 instead of applying the pooled standard error for each 
scenario. Though using 0.5 as a fixed estimate for the standard error removes scenario-level 
information about each sample’s variability, its use also allows for easy comparison of statistical 
power across scenarios, and also provides a very conservative basis for detecting the effect size. 
Figure 13. Distribution of Statistical Power: Existing Literature & Current Study 
 
 
Statistical power for each scenario is calcuated 
based on a one-sided alpha=0.05 with 
Ha=0.1264, which is the average Target share 
increase observed in HPP’s original 1982 
introduction of the effect, and Huber & Puto’s 
follow-up study in 1983. An overall standard 
error of the effect of 0.5 was applied to 
standardize the power analysis across scenarios.  
On average, the choice scenarios tested in this study had lower statistical power than in 
aggregated studies (aggregated studies: 1-̅ߚ ൌ0.92; =0.115; n=22; current scenarios: 1-̅ߚ ൌ0.64; 
Scope of Literature n Mean Stdev
Existing Literature 53
Individual Scenarios 160 0.342 0.189
Aggregated Studies 14
   Aggregated Experiments 22 0.917 0.115
   Disaggregated Scenarios 48 0.304 0.236
Current Study-Indiv'l Scenarios 91 0.640 0.142
Power (1- )
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=0.142; n=91). However, once aggregated studies are examined on a per-scenario basis, the 
current study actually has greater statistical power. The average power of a disaggregated 
scenario from the existing literature (1-̅ߚ ൌ0.30; =0.236; n=48 scenarios), and of scenarios 
from the existing literature at large (1-̅ߚ ൌ0.34; =0.189; n=160 scenarios). Figure 13 compares 
the power distribution of:  
 Aggregated experiments (shown in horizontal stripes; n=22), 
 Scenarios once they have been disaggregated from those 22 experiments (dark grey 
overlay; n=48), 
 Scenarios from the current literature which were not aggregated (shown in vertical 
stripes; n=160)14, and  
 Individual scenarios from the current study (shown in a white overlay; n=91).  
Once aggregate studies were separated into their respective, individual scenarios, the resulting 
power distribution is skewed, with the majority of scenarios having a statistical power of less 
than 0.50. Overall, it appears that the increased statistical power associated with data aggregation 
has enabled the declaration of statistical significance. 
 
Aggregation of Choice Scenarios & Independence of Observation 
 Aggregating multiple observations for each participant may also violate statistical 
assumptions inherent in the chi-square and regression metrics used in most attraction effect 
studies. Specifically, the repeated measures design used in most aggregated studies violates 
independence of observations. 
                                                 
14 The 160 individual studies included in this analysis do not reflect many product scenarios which were said to have been tested, 
but were reported as a single, aggregated choice effect. Disaggregated product results could not be obtained from such studies, 
and could not be included in the analysis. 
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 Data aggregation, as reported in the existing literature, can violate independence of 
observations in two ways. First, when scenarios are presented in a static order across participants, 
potential sequence or carryover effects may exert an influence on how latter choices are made. 
Though participants may be randomly assigned to a treatment or control condition, the repeated 
measures made of those participants are not. What was assumed to be completely independent 
observations may unwittingly exhibit Markov sequence characteristics where each observation is 
affected by the previous scenario. The current study avoids such potential sequence effects by 
randomizing both presentation order and treatment condition for each choice scenario for each 
participant.  
Second, because each participant is responsible for multiple observations in the data 
aggregation, the responses for that participant would likely be correlated – collectively tinted by 
the attribute preferences, experiences, knowledge and decision making biases of that decision 
maker 15 . Repeated measures from a single source cannot be considered as a randomized 
observation, but should be considered as part of clustered samples with several scenarios per 
cluster (Cliff & Ord, 1981). Strong correlation within clusters and greater dispersion between 
clusters (as exhibited by differences in variance and means between clusters) increases the 
chance of Type-I errors caused by data aggregation. For example, if results are clustered by 
product scenario, the more consistently a decoy works for a given product, and the more 
variability there is in decoy effectiveness between products, the greater the chance of a Type-I 
error. Similarly, if clustered by participant, the more consistent each person is in their decision 
making (high correlation), and the less similarity there is between each person (greater dispersion 
                                                 
15 Individual differences in susceptibility to the attraction effect have been demonstrated in the literature. For example, participant 
susceptibility have been shown to stem from social strati (white vs. blue collar) (Heath & Chatterjee, 1995) and cognitive 
tendencies (Mao & Oppewal, 2012) 
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between participants), the greater the chance data aggregation will lead to a false positive result. 
Simulations from other fields of study show that, under certain correlation and dispersion 
conditions, conducting a chi-squared test on aggregated data can result in a 20% to 100% chance 
of a Type-I error (Garson & Moser, 1995). Without a better understanding of inter-product and 
subject-specific variability with decoy effects, the more conservative analytical option would be 
to not aggregate choice data across scenarios, and to randomize treatment condition between 
participants and scenarios. As such, the current study does not aggregate data across scenarios, 
and does randomize treatment condition between participants and scenarios; to do so invites a 
greater likelihood of Type-I errors.  
 Overall, several methodological differences exist between the current studies and those 
used in prior research. Some differences, such as participant type, stimulus materials, and 
exclusion of decoy share, are not likely reasons why this study failed to find a consistent 
attraction effect. However, two common practices used in prior research: the prevalent use of a 
three-option control condition, and the aggregation of multiple choice scenarios, makes it easier 
to create an attraction effect, and easier to detect smaller effect sizes, respectively. While the use 
of a three-option control condition is a valid and understandable methodological choice for 
theory building, its use potentially creates the illusion that the attraction effect is more robust and 
prevalent than is actually possible in real consumer environments. However, the practice of 
aggregating data across multiple choice scenarios does not contribute to theory-building, and 
arguably obscures potential product and attribute-specific moderating effects. Data aggregation 
potentially sacrifices insight into product and attribute affects at the altar of increased statistical 
power, and should be avoided when possible. The current study takes a conservative 
methodological approach and does not aggregate repeated measures, and bases goodness-of-fit 
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comparisons on a two-option control condition. Together, these methodological choices may 
have made it more difficult, though more ecologically valid, to create and detect an attraction 
effect. 
Implication for Practitioners 
The results from this study are not promising for practitioners who hope to employ 
asymmetric decoy tactics as a way to increase market share for a targeted product. Though 
attraction effects can be created with asymmetrically dominated decoys, the effect is inconsistent 
and not readily reproducible. Moreover, empirical guidance on what factors are necessary to 
create the effect, remains elusive. Without better insight into how the effect is created, 
practitioners would remain at a loss on how to design and position a decoy for effective 
implementation. Without an ability to purposefully create and control the effect, blind execution 
of an asymmetric decoy strategy may result in marketing resources wasted on an ineffective 
decoy, or even worse, result in a decoy that creates a repulsion effect (Hoeffler, Malkoc & 
Hedgcock, 2010) that encourages share shift from the target product to the competition.  
Implications for Future Research 
Prior research suggests the attraction effect is robust and easily reproducible with various 
products on various attribute dimensions. However, the findings from this study suggest the 
effect is actually quite fragile, and dependent upon factors that have yet to be fully explained. 
Differences in experiment design and analytical methods partially explain the difficulty 
experienced in reproducing the effect.  
Participant dispositions and stimulus materials (choice scenarios tested) should not have 
significantly affected results. However this study’s operationalized definition of the attraction 
effect (excluding the decoy share, and as compared to a two-option control condition) does set a 
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stricter benchmark by which to acknowledge the existence of an effect.  In addition, the decision 
not to aggregated data across choice scenarios creates a more detailed measure that is perhaps 
more informative for future theory-building on product- and attribute-related causes of the effect. 
Researchers who choose to aggregate multiple scenarios per participant should consider 
adjusting statistical tests to account for the effects of intra-cluster correlation. A Koehler-Wilson 
(1986) adjustment as described by Garson and Moser (1995) is just one way to adjust a chi-
squared analysis to significantly reduce the potential of Type-I errors. 
In the end, the difficulty creating consistent attraction effects under these stricter methods 
reveals a fragility that would preclude the effect from becoming a practical marketing tool. Until 
underlying contributing factors of the phenomenon are better understood, researchers would be 
unable to provide the specifications or guidance that is necessary to create an attraction effect in 
a non-academic environment. 
  
 75 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER III: A META-ANALYSIS 
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INTRODUCTION 
The asymmetrically dominated decoy effect, otherwise known as the attraction effect, is a 
widely studied consumer choice context effect. The attraction effect is said to occur when, in a 
two-option choice set, the added presence of an asymmetrically dominated decoy (an option that 
is dominated by only one of the two, non-decoy options), initiates preference share shift from the 
non-dominating option to the asymmetrically dominating option (Huber, Payne, & Puto, 1982). 
The attraction effect occurs counter to prevalent decision research assumptions such as the 
independence of irrational alternatives, and regularity – assumptions which imply that an 
irrelevant option should be ignored, and relevant new options should proportionally cannibalize 
share from existing options (Luce, 1959).   
That a choice scenario can be manipulated to generate an attraction effect should hold 
great appeal for both academics and practitioners. Insight into how an attraction effect is created 
can help academics better understand the processes and factors involved with how consumer 
preferences are constructed, and how they are affected by context. For practitioners, the 
attraction effect holds potential for when there is interest to advance a target option over that of a 
competitor. For example, sales and marketing professionals may want to shift market share from 
a lower margin item to a higher margin item; policy advocates may wish to increase the appeal 
of one form of legislation over another; and hiring managers may want to encourage recruitment 
of one candidate over another. 
Despite the academic and practical potential that comes with understanding the attraction 
effect, wholly satisfactory empirical and theoretical explanations of how the effect is created, 
still remain elusive. Many theories exist on the decision making processes which underlie the 
effect (e.g. Mao & Oppenwal, 2012; Pocheptsova et al., 2009; Simonson, 1989). However, 
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because of the relatively weak effect size (e.g. Chapter 2); the inconsistent reproducibility of the 
effect (e.g. Mishra, 1990; Simonson & Tversky, 1992; Tentori et al., 2001); and the pervasive 
use of different stimulus, experimental methods, and reporting metrics (see examples discussed 
in Chapter 2), it is difficult to reproduce prior work, test theoretical explanations, or extract 
conceptual trends across the literature. As such, the current study takes a condition-seeking 
strategy and asks under what conditions are attraction effects more likely to be observed 
(Greenwald et al., 1986). Instead of trying to explain whether or why the attraction effect occurs, 
this condition-seeking approach is designed to describe the circumstances that accompany the 
appearance of the attraction effect. This form of exploration is a useful paradigm for when a 
literature is potentially stymied by confirmation bias (Greenwald, 1986). In the end, the aim is to 
distill the necessary and sufficient conditions to create attraction effects so that researchers can 
design more effective and extensible experiments to more systematically test for the sources and 
moderators of the attraction effect. 
 
METHOD 
Study Retrieval 
A search for academic articles relevant to the attraction effect was conducted online 
through three electronic databases and channels: JSTOR, EBSCO, and Google Scholar. JSTOR 
searches were narrowed to the following journal databases: America Studies, Business, General 
Science, Health Policy, Health Sciences, Law, Psychology, Public Policy, Sociology, and 
Statistics. EBSCO searches were narrowed to include only “Scholarly (Peer Reviewed) Journals.” 
Google Scholar searches were conducted across the service’s entire accessible pool of listings. 
Across these sources, full text searches were conducted on broad terms that could be related to 
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the attraction effect such as: attraction effect, asymmetrically dominated decoy, and asymmetric 
decoy. A search was also conducted for articles that referenced or cited the original (Huber, 
Payne & Puto, 1982) work on the effect. The search was narrowed to articles produced after the 
publication date of Huber, Payne, & Puto’s seminal paper (June 1982), through August 2012. A 
list of the search terms used and the number of articles returned for each search are listed in 
Figure 14.  
Figure 14.  Literature Search Summary Results by Search Term and Database 
 
Database 
Attraction 
Effect 
Asymmetrically 
Dominated Decoy 
Asymmetric 
Decoy Huber, Payne, Puto 
Cites Original Work:  
HPP, 1982 
EBSCO 173 16 2 296 256 
JSTOR 15,486 48 127 179 70 
Google Scholar 764,000+ 1,410 2,960 844 873 
For results shown in italics, abstracts were read and manually filtered for relevance reference.  
 
In Figure 14, the article counts shown in italics were all read for applicability to the attraction 
effect. When a reading of the abstract did not readily reveal applicability, a reading of the full 
article was conducted until a determination could be made on the article’s relevance to the 
attraction effect.  
In addition to an online database search, manual reviews were conducted on the reference 
lists of recent studies and the table of contents of journals with the most attraction effect 
publications. Manually reviewed journal contents covered the publication period between June 
1982 and July 2012 for the following journals:  
 Advances in Consumer Research 
 Journal of Consumer Psychology 
 Journal of Consumer Research 
 Journal of Marketing Research 
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 Marketing Letters 
 Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 
Manual reference list and journal index checks did not result in articles that were not already 
identified through the online database search. 
Overall, the literature reviewed through August 2012 produced 75 articles. An additional, 
in-press article was received during the writing of this meta-analysis. Thus in total, 76 articles 
were read and evaluated for adherence to the inclusion and exclusion criteria. Citations and 
inclusion/exclusion notes for each of the 76 articles are listed in Appendix 6. For the remainder 
of this meta-analysis, studies will be referenced by their index number shown in Appendix 6, 
unless otherwise noted by their full citation.  
Inclusion Criteria 
Included studies were restricted to primary (original), controlled experiments of 
asymmetrically dominated decoy choice scenarios. As such, quantitative simulations 
(15,16,17,52), panel discussions (54), and other, non-asymmetrically dominated decoy 
experiments (73) were excluded as these methods do not provide experimental data on consumer 
choice in asymmetrically dominated decoy scenarios. Studies and articles were examined on a 
per-experiment and then on a per-choice scenario basis. That is, a single article that includes 
multiple studies or experiments may have one, a portion of, or all of its experiments included in 
the meta-analysis.  A choice scenario was included if attribute ratings, choice shares, and number 
of observations were provided for each option in each treatment condition. 
The share shift measure used in this study is the same that was described in HPP’s 
original work, and is the difference between the Target’s share in a two-option control choice set 
{T,C} and its share in a Target-favoring decoy choice set {T,C,DT}. Share shifts that were 
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reported as the difference between the Target’s share in a Target-favoring decoy choice set 
{T,C,DT}, and its share in a Competitor-favoring decoy choice set {T,C,DC}were excluded from 
this study. Experiments that provided only enough information to base share change on the 
difference between Target-decoyed and Competitor-decoyed conditions were excluded because 
such comparisons exaggerate the potential size of the effect relative to two-option and three-
option comparisons; it is also more likely to signal the existence of an effect where one would 
not exist if a more conservative {T,C} metric was used. As such, studies that utilized a decoy-
condition to decoy-condition comparison metric were excluded (7, 10, 20, 51, 68). 
 Only experiments where participants were required to make an actual choice between 
options, were included. Though preference-related dependent variables were recorded during the 
coding process, only actual choice data was included in the meta-analysis. Thus, experiments 
which used preferences scores, point allocations, or other form of numeric judgment as 
dependent variables were excluded (58, 59, 63.2, 70, 76). Choice share metrics were included 
over preference share metrics because the use of point allocations or preference scores measure a 
different construct than choice. Ultimately, actionable choice share is of more importance to 
marketers and practitioners than affective preference scores, so it behooves the researcher to 
measure and report a generally desired end-metric (choice) over a metric designed to infer choice 
through preference. Scenarios where attribute dimension valuation were the dependent variable, 
were also excluded (71.2, 71.3).  
In order for data to be aggregated across choice scenarios, the assumption must be made 
that consumer decision making processes are the same across products types, attribute formats 
and attribute dimension. However, it is not uncommon to find variable effect sizes and 
differences in significance levels for different product and attribute types and attribute values 
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reported in a single multi-scenario study (eg. Huber, Payne & Puto, 1982; Mao & Oppenwal, 
2009; Mourali, Böckenholt, Laroche, 2007). Studies that only reported aggregated choice data 
were excluded. However, studies that aggregated choice scenario data for statistical analyses, but 
that still provided disaggregated choice data that could be analyzed on a scenario-by-scenario 
basis were still included in the meta-analysis (eg. Huber, Payne & Puto, 1982).  
Finally, studies must have reported fundamental experimental data such as sample size and 
enough data to derive quantitative choice shares for both control and experimental conditions. 
Articles that did not report enough data to determine such data were also excluded (40, 62). The 
classification of articles (and their composite experiments) reviewed for this meta-analysis, is 
visually presented in Figure 15. Scenarios from the experiments listed in the bottom-left corner, 
and those straddling the bottom-left corner of the “Moderating Treatments” and bottom-right 
corner of the “Aggregated Observations” areas, were included in the final meta-analysis. 
Figure 15.  Included Studies – Venn Diagram of Major Experiment Feature 
 
 
 
Of the 76 articles read, 50 were fully coded for inclusion in this meta-analysis. The 50 
articles included 78 relevant attraction effect experiments, which in turn produced 257 unique 
attraction effect choice scenarios. In addition to the 76 articles examined from the existing 
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literature, eleven unpublished attraction effect experiments were conducted by the author, and 
were added to the meta-analysis data set. The eleven unpublished experiments are comprised of 
91 separate choice scenarios. Thus, in total, the current meta-analysis includes data from 89 
separate experiments, comprised of 348 choice scenarios. Ultimately, the unit of analysis in the 
current study is a single choice scenario. 
Data Extraction & Coding 
 A coder16 was recruited and compensated to provide verification and consistency on the 
information extraction from the literature. The author trained the coder, and three test studies 
(studies 23, 26, 42) were co-coded by the author and the coder as part of the training process. 
The remaining 73 studies were coded independently by both the author and the coder. 
Discrepancies between the coder and author were resolved through discussion. Overall, the 
agreement rate between the coder and the author was 84.1% across all criteria for the 76 studies.  
One objective of this meta-analysis is to quantitatively evaluate how traditional 
experiment factors are related to the existence of the attraction effect. General criteria on 
experimental design factors to include were derived from the meta-analysis guidelines put forth 
by the APA Publications and Communications Board.  The data compiled from each study used 
in this meta-analysis includes, at a minimum, the descriptive traits outlined by the APA 
(American Psychological Association, 2009). Beyond the general meta-analytic guidelines 
specified by the APA, study descriptors unique to the attraction effect literature were also coded 
and include aspects of experiment design, stimulus material, and analytical methods. Attraction 
effect-specific factors were chosen based on whether those elements were described in HPP’s 
                                                 
16 Prior to the coding assignment, the coder was not familiar with either the attraction effect. The coder’s educational background 
includes a Juris Doctorate from a major East Coast university.  
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seminal work on the subject, and whether those elements were commonly emphasized or 
reported on the attraction effect literature. In addition, factors deemed to potentially contribute to 
sample heteroskedasticity, data heterogeneity, analytical variation or other forms of effect size 
differences were also coded. Figure 16 summarizes the information components coded for the 
current meta-analysis.  
Attributes  
Choice attribute dimensions were recorded, and each attribute used to describe choice 
options was coded for unit of measurement (example units of measure include dollars, minutes, 
and rating score), maximum and minimum scale values (for example an attribute could be rated 
on a scale of 0 to 100 or 1 to 10), and maximum and minimum option values (for example, 
though the rating scale potentially ranges from 0 to 100, the highest rated option might only be 
75). Whether attribute values were presented as a positive or negative attribute to be maximize or 
minimize, was also recorded. For example, quality scores, car miles per gallon and discount 
percentages, would be expected to be maximized whereas price, grams of fat, and distance from 
destination would be expected to be minimized. Whether the attribute was presented or 
represented in a quantitative, qualitative or visual manner was also recorded. Result from the 
existing literature suggest that the attribute range (maximum and minimum levels) (HPP; Huber 
& Puto, 1983), mode of presentation (e.g. Choplin & Hummel, 2002 & 2005; Hamilton et al., 
2007; Simon & Tversky, 1992), valance (Malkoc et al., 2008 & 2012), and descriptiveness 
(Ratneshwar et al., 1987) may affect both the creation and the magnitude of the attraction effect. 
Overall, sixteen different attributes were recorded.  
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Figure 16.  Data Extraction – Coding Guidelines 
 
APA Journal Article & Meta-Analytic Reporting Standards 
  
Descriptive Information 
1. Study authors 
2. Year of publication 
3. Intended(starting), and actual sample size 
4. Whether stimulus material were presented in 
randomized order 
5. What format were choice scenarios presented 
(online or paper/pen) 
6. Which statistical test(s) were employed 
 
Study Descriptors - Participant Characteristics 
7. Recruitment country 
8. Student or adult participant population 
9. Compensation method 
 
 
 
Attraction Effect-Specific Study Descriptors 
  
Study Descriptors - Attributes 
1. Attribute dimensions 
2. What format was the attribute presented: 
quantitative/qualitative/or visually represented. 
3. The scale (max/min) of the attribute dimensions 
4. The scale units of the attribute dimensions 
 
Study Descriptors – Choice Options  
5. What product or service was the participant asked to 
make a choice on? 
6. What was the relative rank of the option’s value on 
each attribute? 
7. Target, Competitor, and Decoy attribute values 
 
Study Descriptors - Experimental & Analytical Methods 
8. Did the control condition have two or three options 
9. Number of scenarios tested per participant 
10. Were other manipulations tested/exerted on the 
experiment 
11. Were control and treatment conditions between or 
within subjects 
 
Effect Size and Dependent Variables 
12. Whether choice scenarios were reported in the 
aggregate or as individual scenarios 
13. What metric does the dependent measure (choice, 
point allocation or preference rating) 
14. Target, Competitor, and Decoy choice counts 
 
 
Meta-analysis independent variables derived from coded attributes 
1. Maximum and minimum attribute values shown 
2. Percent difference of Decoy attribute values from existing choice set 
3. Decoy type: range and/or frequency decoy 
Product/Scenario Attributes 
4. Hedonic and utilitarian value of product/service in choice scenario 
5. Durable or Non-Durable status of the product/service 
6. CPI major group and item strata classifications 
7. Positive or negative attribute desirability 
8. Was attribute value conveyed through a qualitative or quantitative presentation format 
 
 
Choice Options 
The product or service that was central to each scenario was recorded, as were the 
attribute values for each choice option. Overall, 79 product or service types were recorded, and 
the seven most prevalent products or services are (in descending order, number of scenarios in 
parentheses): beer(44), cars(33), restaurants(24), wine(14), televisions(13), apartments(10), and 
batteries(9). Findings from the existing literature demonstrate product-specific variations in the 
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existence and magnitude of the attraction effect (for examples, see: HPP, 1982; Mao & Oppewal, 
2012). As such, the current study also classifies each product/service along hedonic/utilitarian 
and durable/non-durable dimensions, and Consumer Price Index (CPI) major groups and item 
strata. Hedonic/Utilitarian (HED/UT) measurements were made based on the scales put forth by 
Voss, Spangenberg, & Grohmann (2003)17, and durable/non-durable classifications and CPI 
classifications were made based on guidelines put forth by the United States Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS, 1997).   
The absolute magnitude of each choice option was also coded. If an attribute was 
presented without a quantitative magnitude, a relative ranking (e.g. ‘High,’ ‘Medium,’ or ‘Low’) 
based on the options available in the choice set was assigned. Finally, based on either the 
quantitative or qualitative values coded, each option was also described as the dominating, 
compromise, or weakest option of an attribute dimension. 
Experiment Design 
Aspects of experiment design were examined to determine whether control condition 
choice sets were comprised of two or three options; designs were within- or between-subjects; 
and whether each participant was responsible for multiple choice scenarios responses. If subjects 
contributed to more than one choice scenario, then whether random assignment to treatment 
condition occurred on the scenario- or participant-level was also recorded.   
When data were reported by subsample, each subsample was coded separately in an 
effort to provide insight into potential moderating factors of the attraction effect. For example, 
student versus senior citizen (Kim & Hasher, 2005) and MBA versus undergraduate student 
                                                 
17 The full measurement scale and procedures used to determine the hedonic and utilitarian dimensions of each product and 
service type are detailed in Appendix 7. 
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populations (Heath & Chaterjee, 1995) were coded separately (so four population subsamples 
from two studies) to provide more detail on the effect across different subject pools. The most 
prevalent subsamples identified in the data set are students, adults, and general online (opposed 
to in-person) populations. 
To provide a common ground for comparisons, experiments were also evaluated for 
moderating treatments. Experiments with moderating treatment conditions (for example forced 
justification, resource depletion, or decision time restrictions) were coded, but those scenarios 
were excluded from the overall analysis. Control conditions that were free from moderating 
influences were, however, included in the analysis.  
Dependent Variable Coding 
The dependent variable for each experiment was coded as choice, preference rating, point 
allocation, or other. Scenarios which used preference rating and point allocation measures were 
coded, but excluded from the analysis. Choice information was extracted as share counts for all 
scenario options in both control and treatment conditions. In instances where share percentages 
were reported (but not choice counts), choice counts were calculated based on scenario sample 
size and share percentages. Scenarios were excluded when choice counts were not reported or 
could not be calculated from reported information. Results that were aggregated across more 
than one choice scenario were disaggregated if possible, or excluded from the analysis.   
Definition of Effect Size 
The attraction effect is generally described as a market share shift to a target option in the 
presence of an asymmetrically dominated decoy. For the purposes of this study, market share is 
defined as choice share of a Target (T) option from a two-option choice set, and then from a 
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three-option, decoyed choice set excluding share captured by the decoy. The effect size was then 
expressed as the relative Target share ratio between the two- and three-option conditions: 
 ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐ	ܵ݅ݖ݁	ܴܽݐ݅݋	݋݂	ܵܿ݁݊ܽݎ݅݋	݅ ൌ ܧܴܵ݅ ൌ 	
೟்೐ೞ೟ ሺ ೟்೐ೞ೟ା஼೟೐ೞ೟ሻൗ்೎೟ೝ೗ ሺ்೎೟ೝ೗ା஼೎೟ೝ೗ሻൗ
	 (12a) 
And the variance for the single scenario effect size is:  
 ܸܽݎ݅ܽ݊ܿ݁	݋݂	ܧܴܵ௜ ൌ ௜ܸ ൌ ቆ
஼೟೐ೞ೟
೟்೐ೞ೟ൗ
஼೟೐ೞ೟ା ೟்೐ೞ೟ ൅
஼೎೟ೝ೗ ்೎೟ೝ೗ൗ
஼೎೟ೝ೗ା்೎೟ೝ೗ቇ (12b) 
The magnitude of the effect size is measured relative to the Target’s share in the control 
condition. An attraction effect is said to exist when Equation 12a is statistically greater than one, 
and a repulsion effect exists when the measure is statistically less than one. Several nuances are 
worth noting with this set of definitions: 
1. Target share, in control and treatment instances, is calculated relative to 
the share of a single competitor option. In scenarios where the decoy garners 
share in the {T,C,DT} condition, share counts for the decoy are excluded from 
the analysis. In addition, scenarios that offer more than two options in the 
control condition, or more than three options in the treatment/decoy condition, 
were excluded. 
 
2. The share change comparison is made based on a two-option control 
condition. Choice scenarios in the literature that did not provide a two-option 
control condition with which to base a share change on, were excluded.  
 
3. ‘Shift’ may refer to choice changes either within or between subjects. 
Though the term ‘shift’ may imply a within-subject preference change, limiting 
the operational definition in this way would preclude the inclusion of many 
relevant studies.  
Independent Variables 
The independent variables incorporated into the current meta-analysis reflect aspects of 
experimental design and stimulus development that may affect the size and existence the 
attraction effect. Figure 17 defines and details the 15 independent variables coded for the meta-
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analysis; Figure 18 summarizes the composition of the data set based on categorical groupings of 
major independent variables; and Appendix 9 graphs the distribution of scenarios by experiment 
year. 
Figure 17. Summary of Independent Variables 
 
Variable (Code) 
Stimulus: Characteristics 
1. Product/Service Type (PROD) 
2. Hedonic Rating (HED) 
3. Utilitarian Rating (UT) 
4. CPI Classification(CPI) 
5. Durable Product (DUR) 
6. Target Control Condition Share (CTRLSHR) 
Stimulus: Dominant Attribute 
7. Visual (DVIS) 
8. Qualitative (DQUAL) 
9. Quality-Based (DQB) 
10. Price-Based (DPB) 
11. Premium to Competitor (DP2C) 
12. Premium to Decoy (DP2D) 
Experiment Design &Background 
13. Within Subjects(WIN) 
14. Student Sample(STUD) 
15. Publication Year (YR) 
 
 
Example / Detail 
 
1. Six-packs of beer, vacation packages, cars, restaurants 
2. Composite rating based on Voss, et al. (2003) 
3. Composite rating based on Voss, et al. (2003) 
4. Two-letter code. 1st =Major group, 2nd=Item Strata 
5. 1=Durable; 0=Non-durable. Based on Statistics (1997) 
6. Percent share captured by the Target in the control condition 
 
7. 1=Visual; 0=Written representation of attribute 
8. 1=Qualitative value; 0=Quantitative value represented 
9. 1(0)=Attribute is(not) a measure of quality 
10. 1(0)=Attribute is(not) a measure of price 
11. Target’s attribute superiority relative to Competitor (%) 
12. Target’s attribute superiority relative to Decoy (%) 
 
13. 1=Within subjects; 0 = Between Subjects 
14. 1=Student participants; 0=Non-student participants 
15. Indexed to (HPP, 1982) t=0 
 
 
 Of note, the scenarios included in this study were generally tested on American (78%), 
student populations (65.8%) using a paper/pen format (63.4%), between-subjects (85.4%) format. 
Sixty-six percent of all scenarios were retrieved from published journal articles (28.7% from the 
Journal of Consumer Research alone). Ninety-one of 129 total unpublished scenarios were 
coded from experiments conducted by the author.  
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Figure 18. Descriptive Summary of Studies & Coded Variables 
 
 
  
Survey Format n % CPI Major Groups & Item Strata n %
Paper 222 63.8% Food & Beverage (F)
Online 114 32.8% FWAlcoholic Beverages at Home (FW) 62
Not Disclosed 12 3.4% FVFood Away From Home (FV) 42
Total 348 100% FNJuices & Nonalcoholic Drinks (FN) 15
FCBeef & Veal (FC) 8
Article Publication n % FRSugar & Sweets (FR) 5
Not published in a journal 119 34% FMProcessed Fruits & Vegetables (FM) 3
Journal of Consumer Research 106 30% FBBakery Products (FB) 2
Journal of Consumer Psychology 35 10% FKFresh Fruits (FK) 2
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 26 7% FTOther Foods (FT) 2
Journal of Marketing Research 18 5% 141 40.5%
Psychology & Marketing 11 3% Recreation (R)
Unpublished? 7 2% RAVideo & Audio (RA) 32
Cognition 6 2% RFRecreational Services (RF) 16
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 4 1% RDPhotography (RD) 15
Psychological Science 4 1% REOther Recreational Goods (RE) 9
Marketing Letters 3 1% RCSporting Goods (RC) 3
Advances in Consumer Research 3 1% RGRecreational Reading Materials (RG) 2
Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking 2 1% 77 22.1%
Journal of Travel Research 2 1% Transportation (T)
Land Economics 1 0% TANew & Used Motor Vehicles (TA) 33
Journal of Applied Psychology 1 0% TGPublic Transportation (TG) 7
Total 348 100% 40 11.5%
Housing (H)
Subject Design n % HARent of Primary Residence (HA) 10
Between 298 85.6% HKAppliances (HK) 8
Within 50 14.4% HMTools, Harware, Outdoor Equipment & Supplies (HM) 7
Total 348 100% HBLoding Away From Home (HB) 4
HNHousekeeping Supplies (HN) 2
HLOther Household Equipment & Furnishings (HL) 2
Country of Experiment n % HJFurniture & Bedding (HJ) 1
USA 275 79.0% 34 9.8%
USA/Asia 25 7.2% Education & Communication (E)
USA/Canada 4 1.1% EDTelephone Serivce (ED) 5
Canada 6 1.7% EEInformation Technology, Hardware & Services (EE) 9
Taiwan 2 0.6% 14 4.0%
UK 12 3.4%
Australia 8 2.3% Other Goods & Services - Personal Care Products 5 5 1.4%
Not Disclosed 8 2.3%
Italy 4 1.1% Apparel - Women's Apparel 2 2 0.6%
China/Australia 3 0.9%
Netherlands 1 0.3% Not CPI Classified 35 35 10.1%
Grand Total 348 100%
TOTAL 348 348 100.0%
Subject Pool n %
Student 223 64.1%
Online 89 25.6%
Adults 32 9.2%
Not Disclosed 3 0.9%
Convenience 1 0.3%
Total 348 100%
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STATISTICAL METHODS 
The use of choice scenario as the unit of analysis, coupled with the wide variety of 
experimental methods and moderators employed in the literature, carries with it several 
methodological issues. This section details the statistical issues encountered, and methods chosen 
to resolve those issues.  
Inter-Study Scenario Correlations 
Two potential sources of misspecification with the current data set is that multiple effect 
size ratios may come from a single experiment, and multiple experiments may have been sourced 
from a single study. The current data set includes several instances where multiple choice 
scenarios were extracted from a single ‘parent’ study or experiment. For example, HPP (1982) 
reported results for 24 different product choice scenarios in one study. All of the scenarios from 
that study were the result of the same experimental procedures, conducted on the same 
participant pool. Combining multiple dependent variables from a single source (such as a single 
experiment or study) violates the statistical assumption of independence of observations because 
inter-study observations may be correlated to one-another. Thus, to check for possible within-
study correlations, Ljung-Box tests were conducted on studies with more than three scenarios. 
The resultant Q-statistics do not indicate statistically significant within-study scenario 
correlations (p’s>0.20). From this standpoint, the meta-regressions conducted did not actively 
seek to correct for auto-correlation within studies.  
Data Heterogeneity & Sample Heteroscedasticity 
 Given the wide range of experimental methods, designs, and stimulus found in the 
literature, as well as previously reported findings on group-wise moderation of the attraction 
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effect, the data were pre-tested for signs of heterogeneity and heteroscedasticity. Overall results 
on scenario effect size ratios suggest significant heterogeneity between studies (Cochran’s 
Qdf=382= 1275; p=0.00). Approximately 70% of the overall observed variation in effect size ratio 
was attributable to heterogeneity between studies (I2 = 70.1%). The remaining 30% of variation 
is attributable to between-scenario differences observed within studies. These results suggest a 
random-effects model is more appropriate than a fixed-effects model for explaining contributing 
factors to the effect, and that mean effect size estimates would be more accurately reported by 
subgroups, and not on the entire dataset as a whole.    
To ensure equality of variances across analysis groups, Levene (1960) and Brown & 
Forsythe (1974) tests were conducted using Stata’s robvar command. Group-wise tests were 
conducted and the resultant W0, W50, and p-values are summarized in Figure 19. Statistically 
significant W-statistics suggest rejection of the null hypothesis that the groups have the same 
variance. The data exhibits general equality of variance when grouped across publication year, 
CPI major group, and between/within subject design. However, the data exhibited significant 
heteroscedastic tendencies when grouped by CPI item strata, primary author, and subject 
population type (e.g. Students versus Online versus Adult populations). However, the Levene 
and Brown-Forsythe 18  statistics resulted in conflicting assessments of heteroscedasticity for 
groupings by study, primary-author and CPI item strata. The conflicting results suggest that the 
underlying distribution of effect sizes between these groups is skewed or otherwise influenced by 
outliers in the data. A sub-analysis was conducted and a determination was made to keep all 
observation in the dataset (see Appendix 8 for the discussion to this decision). However, to 
                                                 
18 The Levene statistic (W0) measure equality of variance about the mean, and the Brown-Forsythe statistic (W50) measures about 
the median. The null hypothesis under each test is of homoscedasticity, that variances are equal across groups.  
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compensate for the heterogeneity and heteroscedasticity in the data, the meta-regressions in this 
study:  
 Used robust standard errors to calculate all summary mean effect sizes,  
 Covariates were included to account for subgroups that exhibited significant and 
marginally significant heteroscedasticity, and 
 The effect size variable was regressed under log transformation.  
 
Figure 19.  Tests of Homoscedasticity by Groupings  
 
NOTE:  These effect size ratios were not computed with robust standard errors, and as such their means are higher than those 
reported in the meta-regression discussed later. 
 
Estimation of Overall Effect Size 
The overall effect size (ܧܵതതതത) is calculated as a weighted average of the scenario-level 
effect sizes defined in Equation 12a. The weights in the weighted average take into account 
possible intra-study correlation between scenarios. Equations 13a, 13b, and 13c formally define 
the overall mean effect size, robust variance estimate, and the weights assigned to each scenario 
effect size (Hedges, Tipton, & Johnson, 2010): 
 ܧܵതതതത ൌ 	 ∑ ∑ ௪೔ೕாௌோ೔ೕ
ೖೕ
೔సభ
೘ೕసభ
∑ ∑ ௪೔ೕ
ೖೕ
೔సభ
೘ೕసభ
 (13a) 
 ܸோ ൌ 	∑ ௪ೕ
మሺாௌோണതതതതതതതିாௌതതതതሻమ೘ೕసభ
ሺ∑ ௪ೕሻ೘ೕసభ మ
 (13b) 
 ݓ௜௝ ൌ 	 ଵ൫௏∙ೕାఛమ൯∗ሾଵା൫௞ೕିଵ൯ఘሿ (13c) 
Equality of Variance by Grouping Mean StDev df W0 p>F W50 p>F
Subject Population Type 1.261    0.546    (4, 343) 3.522    0.008    * 3.182    0.014    *
Study Number 1.252    0.551    (47, 300) 1.572    0.014    * 1.078    0.347    
Author 1.252    0.551    (33, 314) 1.618    0.020    * 1.093    0.339    
CPI Item Strata 1.233    0.542    (28, 319) 1.581    0.034    * 1.016    0.446    
Year 1.275    0.563    (19, 328) 1.572    0.061    † 1.348    0.151    
CPI Major Group 1.233    0.542    (7, 340) 1.721    0.103    1.294    0.252    
Between/Within Subject Design 1.252    0.551    (2, 345) 1.515    0.221    1.162    0.314    
Country of Study 1.246    0.553    (10, 337) 0.656    0.765    0.524    0.873    
Levene Brown-ForsytheESR
 93 
Where ܧܵതതതത  is the overall weighted average effect size and VR is the overall robust variance 
estimate of m number of studies which contain k number of scenarios and: 
 ESRij is the ith scenario effect size of study j;  
 ܧܵ ఫܴതതതതതത is the mean effect size for study j 
 wj is the sum of all wij for a study j (i.e. the total weight of study j) 
 wij is the weight assigned to each choice scenario i belonging to study j 
 V•j is the average variance of all scenarios in study j 
 τ2 is a measure of unexplained between-study variance, and  
 ρ is an unconditional correlation multiplier between estimates.  
Models were run as log-transformed, random-effects meta-regressions with robust standard 
errors as implemented by the robumeta command in Stata 12.0 (Hedberg, 2011). As intra-
study scenario correlations (ρ’s) are unknown, and are generally unreported in the literature, a 
range of correlations from zero to 0.9 were tested with each model to check for effect size 
sensitivity to a changes in ρ. No significant coefficient or standard error sensitivity was detected 
across the range of ρ’s.  
 All regressions were conducted under log transformation for two reasons. First, changes 
in ܧܵതതതത are not linear in nature. As a ratio of probabilities, when the Target share is small, changes 
in the effect size ratio are also small; however, as Target share increases, the effect size ratio 
increases at an increasing rate. Application of a log transformation enables ܧܵതതതത  to be modeled 
with liner covariates despite its non-linear distribution. Second, because ܧܵതതതത  is a probability ratio, 
a valid regression model must predict a non-negative effect size ratio. A log transformation 
ensures the range of predicted ratios is bounded between zero and positive infinity. Taking the 
log transformation into consideration, the general structure of the meta-regressions tested take on 
the following form: 
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 lnሺܧܵതതതതሻ ൌ 	ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܥ݋ݒܽݎ݅ܽݐ݁ଵ ൅ ⋯൅ ߚ௫ܥ݋ݒܽݎ݅ܽݐ݁௫ ൅ ߝ (14) 
The model began with a null meta-regression whose β0 represents the overall weighted mean 
effect size. Covariates were then added to the null model to test for moderating experimental 
design and stimulus features.  
RESULTS 
Null and multivariate meta-regressions were conducted, and a summary of the results is 
provided in Figure 20. Results indicate evidence of a general attraction effect. Based on the null 
model (Null Model in Figure 20), the average effect size observed in the literature is a 14.7%. 
That is, on average, the Target’s share in the presence of an asymmetrically dominated decoy is 
14.7% greater than when no decoy is present (β0 = 0.137; t348=3.48; p=0.001). Of the covariate 
models tested, the Target’s relative share strength in the control condition was found to be a 
significant predictor of attraction effect size (Model 8) (βrelstrengthctrlcond = -0.120; t46=-5.68; 
p=0.000). That the coefficient βrelstrengthctrlcond is negative indicates that as the Target garners 
greater share over the Competitor in the control condition, the weaker the attraction effect 
becomes.  For example at a 60.5% choice share (the mean control condition share observed in 
the meta-analysis, which corresponds to a 1.528x control-share ratio relative to the Competitor), 
the expected Target decoy-condition share gain predicted under the model is 16.97%: 
lnሺܧ݂݂݁ܿݐܵ݅ݖܴ݁ܽݐ݅݋ሻ ൌ 0.34 െ 0.12ߚ௥௘௟௦௧௥௘௡௚௧௛௖௧௥௟௖௢௡ௗ  (15) 
             ൌ 0.34 െ 0.12 ∗ 1.528 ൌ 0.1566 
Effect Size Ratio          ൌ ݁଴.ଵହ଺଺ ൌ 1.1697 
Attraction Effect          ൌ 1.1697 െ 1 ൌ 0.1697 ൌ 16.97% 
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Because effect size was modeled under a log-transformation, the expected effect size has a non-
linear relationship to changes in the Target’s share in the control condition. As such, expected 
attraction effect sizes are graphed as a function of Target share in the control condition (dotted 
line) and relative share ratio (x-axis) in Figure 21. The difference between the expected/modeled 
Target share (solid black line) and the control-condition share indicates the Target share change 
when an asymmetrically dominated decoy is added. Above a 2.83x Target control-share ratio 
(corresponding to a 73.9% Target control condition share), the model predicts a repulsion effect 
where the presence of an asymmetrically dominated decoy repels share away from the Target.  
The relative position between the Target and Competitor options appears moderately 
related to the size and existence of the attraction effect in two very specific ways. Targets that 
dominate their Competitor and Decoy on a price attribute are marginally more likely to exhibit 
an attraction effect. Price-dominating Targets exhibited an average 14.8% share increase in the 
decoy condition (βpricedomination= 0.138; t43=1.70; p<0.10). Targets that dominate by maximizing a 
desirable attribute (as opposed to minimizing an undesirable attribute) were also marginally more 
likely to exhibit an attraction effect of a 15.5% share gain (βmaximizeattribute= 0.144; t43=1.87; 
p<0.07).   
 No other aspects of experiment design or item characteristics were significantly related 
to differences in the overall effect size. Students were no more likely than other populations to 
exhibit the effect (βstudent= 0.056; t46>0.71; p=0.48), and between-subject designs were no more 
likely to exhibit the effect than within-study designs (βbetween= 0.060; t46=1.14; p=0.26). The 
effect appears unrelated to whether the choice stimulus is a durable or non-durable good (βdurable= 
0.046; t46=0.61; p>0.54); what general monetary value the choice scenario addresses (βpriceamount= 
0.000; t45=1.36; p=0.179); or whether the choice was for options hedonic (βhedonic= 0.000; 
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t46=0.01; p=0.991) or utilitarian in nature (βutilitarian= -0.007; t46=-0.27; p=0.791). Furthermore, 
Targets that dominated on objective (as opposed to subjective or ratings-based) attributes, did not 
reveal any other significant relationships. When hedonic and utilitarian measures were tested as 
interactions with whether the Target dominated on a quality or price attribute, none of the 
interactions were significant (p’s >0.10). Attraction effect size does not depend on the joint 
influence of the hedonic or utilitarian nature of the product and whether the product dominates 
on quality or price attributes. 
Figure 20. Meta-Regression Models 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: n is the number of scenarios, not studies. 
** Significant at the p<0.01 level; * significant at the p<0.05 level; † significant at the p<0.10 level 
  
Model Specification β SE t df p n
Null Model
Intercept - All Data 0.137 0.039        3.480 47 0.001 ** 348
Experiment Design
Model 1: Student Population
Intercept 0.108 0.041        2.600 46 0.012 *
Student Population (v.Non-Students) 0.056 0.078        0.710 0.478 223
Model 2: Between-Subjects Design
Intercept 0.080 0.053        1.490 46 0.143
Between Subjects (v. within) 0.060 0.053        1.140 0.258 297
Primary Author
Model 3: Primary Author
Intercept 0.156 0.066        2.380 40 0.022 *
Yang, Sybil -0.099 0.079        -1.260 0.216 91
Huber, Joel 0.048 0.086        0.560 0.575 48
Dhar, Ravi 0.036 0.082        0.440 0.663 28
Heath, Tim 0.115 0.108        1.070 0.292 27
Frederick, Shane -0.221 0.066        -3.350 0.002 ** 25
Malkoc, Selin 0.055 0.066        0.830 0.411 18
Ratneshwar, Srinivasan 0.018 0.066        -0.280 0.782 14
Nature of Domination
Model 4: Nature of Decoy Domination
Intercept 0.045 0.074        0.600 43 0.550
Maximizes Attribute (v.Minimizes) 0.144 0.077        1.870 0.069 † 155
Objective Attribute (v.Subjective) 0.031 0.078        0.490 0.629 115
Quality Attribute (v.Other) -0.117 0.088        -1.330 0.192 37
Price Attribute (v.Other) 0.138 0.081        1.700 0.097 † 53
log Effect Size Ratio
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Figure 20 Continued.    Meta-Regression Models 
 
 
 
 
Note: n is the number of scenarios, not studies. 
** Significant at the p<0.01 level; * significant at the p<0.05 level; † significant at the p<0.10 level.  
Model Specification β SE t df p n
Item Characteristics
Model 5: Durable Product
Intercept 0.125 0.047        2.690 46 0.010 **
Durable (v.Non-Durable Item) 0.046 0.076        0.610 0.545 88
Hedonic / Utilitarian
Intercept 0.172 0.217        0.790 43 0.432
Hedonic Score 0.000 0.031        -0.010 0.991 334
Utilitarian Score -0.007 0.027        -0.270 0.791 334
Model 6: CPI Item Strata
Intercept 0.143 0.063        2.270 42 0.028 *
Alcoholic Bevearge (FW) -0.039 0.093        -0.420 0.677 62
Food Away From Home (FV) 0.024 0.098        0.240 0.808 42
Video & Audio (RA) -0.066 0.122        -0.540 0.591 32
Recreationsl Services (RF) -0.476 0.069        -0.690 0.494 16
Photography (RD) 0.953 0.083        1.150 0.257 15
Juice & Non Alcoholic Beverage (FN) -0.010 0.083        -0.120 0.905 15
Model 7: Most Prevelant Items
Intercept 0.136 0.047        2.900 42 0.006 **
Beer 0.023 0.096        0.240 0.811 44
Cars -0.025 0.168        -0.150 0.883 33
Resaturants 0.091 0.117        0.780 0.44 23
Televisions -0.283 0.365        -0.770 0.443 13
Apartments -0.065 0.435        -0.150 0.883 10
Model 8: Strength of Target
Intercept 0.340 0.041        8.310 46 0.000 **
Relative Strength in Ctrl Condition -0.120 0.021        -5.680 0.000 ** 348
Model 9: Price Related Item Characteristics
Intercept 0.128 0.044        2.920 46 0.005 **
Price Amount 0.000 0.000        1.340 0.185 156
Interactions
Model 10: Quality Domination / Utilitarian / Hedonic
Intercept 0.190 0.258        0.740 40 0.466
Hedonic Score 0.002 0.034        0.060 0.953
Utilitarian Score -0.011 0.032        -0.350 0.728
Quality Domination 0.240 0.459        0.520 0.604
Quality Domination x Utilitarian 0.038 0.052        0.740 0.466
Quality Domination x Hedonic -0.089 0.083        1.060 0.293
Model 11: Price Domination / Utilitarian / Hedonic
Intercept 0.207 0.251        0.820 40 0.415
Hedonic Score 0.004 0.034        0.110 0.913
Utilitarian Score 0.019 0.031        -0.600 0.550
Price Domination 0.131 0.362        0.360 0.720
Price Domination x Utilitarian 0.068 0.040        1.680 0.100 †
Price Domination x Hedonic -0.087 0.058        -1.510 0.139
log Effect Size Ratio
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Figure 21. Target Control-Condition Share & Modeled Attraction Effect Size 
 
 
 
 
 
Group-wise tests were also conducted for the seven most prolific primary authors, six 
most frequently tested CPI item stratus, and five most common product choice scenarios. 
Though earlier Levene and Brown & Forsythe tests suggested heterogeneity between CPI item 
stratus, none of the six most prevalent strata was statistically different than the others (p’s>0.25). 
Between primary author groups however, only results from the group of 25 scenarios reported by 
one author (Shane Frederick) were significantly different than the rest of the literature (βFrederick= 
-0.221; t40=-3.35; p<0.01). When models were tested without the 25 Frederick scenarios, the 
results did not significantly differ from when the scenarios were included. As such, the Frederick 
studies were not excluded. 
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 In general, across all models tested, the τ2 was negligible, meaning the models were not 
able to account for the unexplained variances observed between studies, and suggests that there 
are other, yet-to-be-examined between-study factors that influence the magnitude of attraction 
effect sizes observed.    
Figure 22. Begg’s Funnel Plot for Meta-Bias Detection  
 
 
Note: That several studies exist outside of the 95% confidence limits speaks to the heterogeneity of the data set and is not an 
indication of publication bias. 
 
Test of Sample Bias 
Readily available empirical findings can be skewed by reporting bias, where non-statistically 
significant results are less prevalent in published the literature. Non-significant results are simply 
less likely to be published or widely reported – a phenomenon referred to as the file drawer 
problem (Sterling, Rosenbaum & Weinkam, 1995).  The current meta-analysis addresses the 
potential bias in two ways. First, the literature search included successful retrieval of non-journal 
published and unpublished experimental results - including results from a series of experiments 
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conducted by the author. Second, effect size data were subjected to an analysis of publication 
bias with a Begg’s funnel plot (Figure 22) (Begg & Mazumdar, 1994). The distribution of 
scenario effect sizes was relatively symmetrical about the mean which implies the estimated 
effect sizes were relatively normally distributed, with few missing ‘file-drawer’ studies. Overall, 
the scenarios included in the meta-analysis appear to be a fair representation of the attraction 
effect literature. 
 
DISCUSSION 
The purpose of this study was to systematically analyze the conditions under which the 
attraction effect has been most commonly observed. The aim was to provide insight to the 
necessary and sufficient conditions to create the effect so that scholars may reliably reproduce 
the effect for future research purposes. Findings from a series of random-effects models support 
the existence of an overall attraction effect, and also yield an estimate of the overall attraction 
effect size. The results also reveal that more inherently market-share-dominant Targets benefit 
less from the addition of an asymmetrically dominated decoy than weaker, lower market-share 
Targets.  This means the attraction effect is more likely to exist in situations where neither the 
Target nor Competitor is strongly preferred over the other.  
Meta-analyses are only as comprehensive as the literature that they included and the data 
that are coded. That being said, the current meta-analysis is limited in several ways. First, many 
studies were excluded because scenario-level choice shares and stimulus could not be 
disaggregated from the reported data. Specifically, aggregated findings rarely reported the actual 
stimulus used or the scenario-level results obtained. The lack of scenario-level specificity 
resulted in the exclusion of over a dozen studies, and over a hundred scenarios. Second, from a 
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methodological standpoint, it is easy for researchers to test multiple scenarios in each experiment, 
but the resultant lack of independence between scenarios requires the use of robust standard 
errors which makes detecting small effect sizes more difficult. Even after excluding aggregated 
data, the current study still had to analyze a highly heterogeneous sample of scenarios. As such, 
the statistical methods used made study-level variance adjustments which changed the degrees of 
freedom from the scenario-level (300+ observations) to the study-level (48 observations). This 
loss in degrees of freedom precluded the ability to test for more intricate interactions in the data. 
Similarly, the use of robust standard errors made it more difficult to detect smaller effect sizes. 
To prevent such losses in statistical power and precision, future research into the attraction effect 
would do well to set more rigorous testing and reporting standards. For example, participants 
should be randomly assigned to treatment conditions for each choice scenario, as opposed to 
each participant being randomly assigned a single treatment condition to be applied across all 
choice scenarios. Full scenario attributes should also be disclosed, and all choice share counts 
reported. 
Despite the limitations of the current study, the findings of this meta-analysis leave future 
researchers of the attraction effect with some useful information and cautionary guidance. First, 
the attraction effect does exist, and the average effect size can range from 14.7% - 17%, 
depending on the models tested, is not trivial if the effect is translatable to real-world application. 
The methods used to create a real, 14.7%-17% market share gain would be highly desirable 
tactics for marketers. Thus, research interest in this phenomenon is fully justified. However, the 
effect may not be large enough to find using sample sizes that are typical of studies in this 
domain. A post-hoc statistical power analysis was conducted based on Model 8 (Figure 20), 
which produces a slightly larger average effect size than the baseline model. Using Model 8’s 
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average effect size of a 17.0% share gain (from 60.4% to 77.4% Target share), and the average 
observed Target to Competitor share ratio (1.528 times) reveals that a sample size of 217 
observations would be necessary to detect the average observed effect size at a one-tailed alpha 
of 0.05 and power-level of 0.80. A minimum of 299 total observations would be needed to 
achieve a 0.90 power level19. Given these criteria, less than 10% of the scenarios included in the 
current meta-analysis would achieve a power of 0.80.  Finding reliable, externally valid 
moderators and mediators of attraction effects will require even larger samples, so future 
researchers should use substantially larger sample sizes when studying this phenomenon.     
Second, though the attraction effect exists, repulsion (negative attraction) effects have 
also been reported. In fact, Frederick, Lee & Baskin (n.d.) were able to produce a significantly 
different, reverse-attraction effect (a repulsion effect) across a reported 25 scenarios. The 
stimulus used in their experiments was designed to exhibit domination relationships without 
quantitative measure. For example, an ear-wax flavored jellybean was used as a decoy for a 
similar looking pineapple jellybean. Such subjective choice attributes were not unlike those 
found scattered throughout other studies, but the Frederick, Lee & Baskin study was unique in 
that all its scenarios were designed with more ecologically realistic choice options. Future 
researchers should test this and other unique attributes of the Fredrick, et al. stimuli in an effort 
to determine what conditions are responsible for repulsion effects.  
Third, that neither strong preference for the Target nor Competitor should exist in order to 
create an attraction effect is consistent with moderating relationships reported by Pocheptsova, et 
al. (2009) and Mao & Oppenwal (2012). Pocheptsova and colleagues reason that resource 
                                                 
19  The full regression model used for the power analysis is:  
lnሺܧ݂݂݁ܿݐܵ݅ݖܴ݁ܽݐ݅݋ሻ ൌ 0.34 െ 0.12 ∗ ܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅ݒ݁ܵݐݎ݁݊݃ݐ݄ܫ݊ܥݐݎ݈ܥ݋݊݀݅ݐ݅݋݊. The power analysis was conducted using STATA 
12.0’s powerlog command which adjusts sample size requirements to reflect effect size difference across a logarithmic 
distribution. 
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depleted decision makers, when faced with a difficult decision, are more likely to utilize the 
asymmetrically dominating cue as information, and choose the Target. Similarly, Mao & 
Oppenwal reason that intuitive decision makers are more likely to rely on the asymmetrically 
dominating relationship to resolve difficult decisions as well. Both lines of reasoning suggest that 
difficult decisions – such as those not obviously skewed or preferred for the Target or 
Competitor – enhance the attraction effect because they increase the decision makers’ reliance on 
intuitive, associational thinking. The meta-analytic finding that aggressive target dominance 
moderates the attraction effect supports this reasoning and suggests that researchers should 
further explore the role of intuitive and associational thinking in producing the effect. It also 
suggests that researchers should carefully design the Target and Competitor choice scenario to 
ensure neither option is overtly more desirable than the other because skewed desirability 
between the base options decreases the potential size of the effect and with it the power to detect 
reliable mediators and moderators of the effect.  
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APPENDIX 1: STIMULUS & ANNOTATIONS 
1a – Experiment One 
Stimulus Comments 
Q 
A 
B 
Da 
Db 
In a restaurant, I am looking at the wine list: 
Bottle of White, Bordeaux Wine: $25.00 
Bottle of Red, Bordeaux Wine: $45.00 
Bottle of White, Llano, TX Wine: $25.00 
Bottle of Red, Llano, TX  Wine: $45.00 
 
The presumption is that wine region 
is realistic, qualitative cue for 
quality.  Choice sets from prior 
research have used subject, 
numerical scales as quality metrics. 
Q 
A 
B 
Da 
Db 
While visiting a famous deli for lunch, I would order: 
Classic Philly Cheesesteak Sandwich: 750 calories, $7.95 
Traditional Rueben Sandwich: 650 calories, $8.25 
The Works Philly Cheesesteak Sandwich: 975 calories, $8.25 
The Super Rueben Sandwich: 675 calories, $8.95 
 
Sandwich type (Philly Cheesesteak 
or Rueben) was used to signal 
similarities to encourage comparison 
and discovery of the asymmetrically 
dominating relationship.  
Q 
A 
B 
Db 
Da 
In a wine shop, I'm going to pick up a bottle for tonight's dinner: 
Red Wine X: Wine Spectator Score: 95, Price: $55 
Red Wine Y: Wine Spectator Score: 90, Price: $37 
Red Wine W: Wine Spectator Score: 90, Price: $42 
Red Wine Z: Wine Spectator Score: 94, Price: $56 
 
Wine Spectator scores were used as 
a more realistic operationalization of 
quantitative quality ratings.  
Q 
A 
B 
Da 
Db 
In an upscale casual restaurant, I'm going to order a beverage with dinner: 
Napa Valley Cabernet Sauvignon: Wine by the Glass: $7.00 
Microbrew Beer: On tap, 1 pint: $6.00 
Coors: Bottle, 12 oz: $5.00 
House Red: Wine by the Glass: $6.50 
 
Two cues on product value are used. 
For beers, size (pint vs 12oz) and 
quality (microbrew vs big brand). 
For wines, only one qualitative 
quality (house wine vs region-
specific Napa Valley) was used. 
Q 
A 
B 
Da 
Db 
In the local American Bistro restaurant, you're about to order lunch: 
Grilled Chicken Caesar Salad: 450 calories, $9.50 
Grilled Steak Caesar Salad: 450 calories, $10.75 
Crispy Chicken Caesar Salad: 775 calories, $9.50 
Flat Iron Steak Frites: 925 calories, $16.75 
 
Use of calorie counts assumes 
subjects have an idea of what is a 
reasonable range of daily caloric 
intake.   
Q 
A 
B 
Da 
Db 
Your friends are coming over and you're going to order pizza for everyone: 
Pizza Place P: Delivery Time: 45 minutes, Pizza Quality : High 
Pizza Place Q: Delivery Time: 25 minutes, Pizza Quality : Medium 
Pizza Place R: Delivery Time: 55 minutes, Pizza Quality : High 
Pizza Place S: Delivery Time: 30 minutes, Pizza Quality : Medium 
 
Replication of prior research 
stimulus. Subsequent research also 
produced statistically significant 
results with the same stimulus.  
Q 
A 
B 
Db 
Da 
You're at a nice steakhouse and hungry. You plan on eating steak tonight: 
Porterhouse: $42 
Filet Mignon: $37 
Sirloin: $36 
T-Bone: $41 
 
Qualitative measures of quality are 
inferred by the different cuts of 
meat. T-Bone is an inferior cut of the 
Porterhouse, and Sirloin is typically 
regarded as a tougher cut than a Filet 
Mignon. 
1b – Experiment Two 
Stimulus Comments 
Q 
A 
B 
Da 
Db 
In a restaurant, you're looking at the wine list. Which would you choose? 
Bottle of Red, Bordeaux, France: $35.00 
Bottle of White, Bordeaux, France: $35.00 
Bottle of Red, Llano, TX: $35.00 
Bottle of White, Llano, TX: $35.00 
 
This scenario builds upon that in 
Experiment One, but controls for 
price differences. Only one attribute 
dimension is varied (qualitative 
evaluation of quality by region). 
 
Q 
In a wine shop, you're going to pick up a bottle of red wine for tonight's 
dinner party. Which would you choose?
This scenario builds upon that in 
Experiment One, by more clearly 
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A 
B 
Da 
Db 
#1 Wine Spectator Score: 97, Price: $43 
#2 Wine Spectator Score: 89, Price: $37 
#3 Wine Spectator Score: 93, Price: $43 
#4 Wine Spectator Score: 85, Price: $37 
 
emphasizing the quality score 
difference and eliminating the price 
difference between decoy and target. 
Q 
A 
B 
Da 
Db 
You're at an upscale restaurant and hungry. Which entree would you order? 
Whole Steamed Lobster: $42 
Filet Mignon: $37 
Whole Steamed Blue Crabs: $41 
Sirloin: $36 
 
Designed to elicit a shift in entrée 
type based of protein quality. Price 
differentials were relatively small to 
promote comparison by protein 
type. 
 
Q 
A 
B 
Da 
Db 
You're looking to book a cruise and found the following vacation packages. 
Which would you choose? 
7 Days, All Inclusive with Flights: $1200 
3 Days, All Inclusive with Flights : $550 
6 Days, All Inclusive, Flights NOT Included: $1100 
3 Days, All inclusive, Flights NOT Included: $475 
 
Dominating relationship presumes 
longer vacation durations are 
desirable, and flights are necessary 
and cost more than $100. 
 
 
Q 
A 
B 
Da 
Db 
You're going to have a job interview out of town and will need to book a hotel 
room for the trip. You will not be reimbursed for the hotel room. You found 
the following deals online. Which would you choose? 
Hotel X: 5 minutes away from interview site. $179/nt 
Hotel Y: 15 minutes away from interview site. $129/nt 
Hotel Z: 3 minutes away from interview site. $259/nt 
Hotel W: 35 minutes away from interview site. $119/nt 
 
The choice scenario is the same as 
that used in prior research, but room 
prices were increased to better 
reflect current day prices. 
 
Q 
A 
B 
Da 
Db 
You stop off at a local corner cafe for a caffeinated beverage. 
Which beverage would you order? 
Cappuccino: $3.00, 250 calories 
Latte: $2.20, 550 calories 
Cappuccino: $3.00, 325 calories 
Latte: $2.50, 550 calories 
 
Beverage type was used to signal 
product similarity. Between each 
target and decoy pair, only one 
attribute differs. A presumption is 
made that higher calorie counts are 
undesirable. 
 
Q 
A 
B 
Da 
Db 
At the supermarket, you're about to buy a frozen entree for dinner. 
Which dinner would you choose? 
Kraft Entree: $10.00, 20% Daily Calories 
Stouffer's Entree: $8.50, 55% Daily Calories 
Kraft Entree: $16.00, 20% Daily Calories 
Stouffer's Entree: $8.50, 70% Daily Calories 
 
Brands were used to signal product 
similarity, and to encourage 
comparison between target and 
decoy. A presumption is made that 
higher calorie counts are 
undesirable.  
 
Q 
A 
B 
Da 
Db 
You're about to book a cross country flight. Regardless of the frequent flyer 
account(s) you might have, which flight ticket would you book? 
Virgin America: $575, Non-Stop 
United Airlines: $375, 2 Stops 
Virgin America: $650, Non-Stop 
United Airlines: $425, 2 Stops 
 
Brands were used to signal product 
similarity, and to encourage 
comparison on the single differing 
attribute between target and decoy. 
 
Q 
A 
B 
Da 
Db 
You're about to order some Chinese take-out. 
You choose to get the lunch combo with soup, egg roll, rice and: 
Stir-fry Shrimp: $6.75, 3g fat 
Stir-fry Chicken: $5.75, 7g fat 
Shrimp Stir-fry : $7.00, 3g fat 
Chicken Stir-fry : $6.25, 7g fat 
 
Product names are presented in a 
reverse order on decoy options, 
otherwise, only price varies between 
decoy and target options.  
 
Q 
A 
B 
Da 
Db 
You're about to book a cruise ticket for you and a few friends. 
You would choose: 
Princess Cruise lines: $1500, 15 days 
Norwegian Cruise lines: $500, 7 days 
Princess Cruise lines: $1700, 15 days 
Norwegian Cruise lines: $700, 7 days 
 
Price is the only attribute to vary 
between target and decoy options. 
Repetition of brands was used to 
emphasize similarity between target 
and decoy options. 
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1c – Experiment Three 
Stimulus Comments 
 
Q 
A 
B 
Da 
If you had to order one of the options from a restaurant menu (listed below),  
which would you choose? 
Filet Mignon, Price: $30 
Porterhouse Steak, Price:   $42 
Flank Steak, Price: $28 
 
A reproduction of previous steak 
choice scenarios in the study. Flank 
steak was used as a more obvious 
quality decoy to Filet Mignon.  
 
Q 
A 
B 
Da 
If you had to buy a bottle of wine to take over to a friend's house warming 
which of the following bottles would you choose?  
Wine A: Price: $27, Wine Spectator score: 93 out of 100 
Wine B: Price: $13, Wine Spectator score: Not Scored 
Wine C: Price: $25, Wine Spectator score: 87 out of 100 
 
A variation on previous wine 
price/quality score manipulations. 
Scoring and price differences were 
exaggerated in this scenario to more 
fully highlight the quality dominance 
of Wine A. 
 
Q 
A 
B 
Da 
If you had to order a pizza, which establishment would you order from?           
Place A:   Average Delivery Time: 45 minutes; Quality:  10/10 
Place B:   Average Delivery Time: 20 minutes; Quality:    6/10 
Place B:   Average Delivery Time: 55 minutes; Quality:    9/10 
 
A variation on the original pizza 
delivery scenario with quantitative 
measures of quality (previous 
scenarios used qualitative High, 
Medium, and Low quality ratings). 
1d – Experiment Four 
Stimulus Comments 
 
Q 
A 
B 
Da 
Which trans-ocean flight would you book? 
 Price  Meals Check Luggage 
Flight  A $529 Included  Included 
Flight  B $479 For Purchase + Fee 
Flight  C $519 Included  + Fee 
 
This scenarios is newly created for 
this study, but its format 
 
Q 
A 
B 
Da 
You would order pizza from which establishment? 
 Delivery Time  Pizza Quality 
Place A 45 Minutes HIGH 
Place B 20 Minutes MEDIUM 
Place C 55 Minutes HIGH 
 
Another variation on a previous 
pizza delivery scenario. Here, 
qualitative quality ratings were given 
as opposed to quantitative ratings 
out of 10 points.  
 
Q 
A 
B 
Db 
You would choose which lunch entrée? 
 Calories  Price 
Chicken Salad 550 cal $ 6.25 
Chicken Sandwich 400 cal $ 7.50 
Chicken Wrap 450 cal $ 7.75 
 
Calorie counts were chosen as a 
quantitative attribute due to its 
introduction as required consumer 
menu information on in many states. 
 
Q 
A 
B 
Db 
Which beverage would you choose with dinner? 
 Size  Price 
Napa Valley Cabernet 5 oz glass $ 8.00 
Microbrew Beer, on Tap 1 pint $ 6.00 
Bottle of Bud Lite 12 oz $ 5.50 
 
Value between option was 
differentiated by price, quality of 
beer and size. The decoy was 
designed to be of a lesser brand, and 
smaller in size, but slightly cheaper. 
 
Q 
A 
B 
Da 
Which bottle would you choose to give as a gift? 
 Price  Wine Spectator Score 
Wine A $ 27 93 
Wine B $ 15   Not Scored 
Wine C $ 25 88 
 
A reproduction of previous wine 
price and score scenarios. Measured 
quality dominance was emphasized. 
 
Q 
A 
B 
Da 
Which Chinese take-out would you choose? 
 Protein  Price 
Lo Mien Chicken $ 6.29 
Chow Mien Beef $ 7.79 
Lo Mien Tofu $ 6.29 
Ostensibly, the three items are 
identical preparations of different 
protein types at different prices. 
Tofu is assumed to be a less 
desirable protein to chicken. 
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 If you had to buy one of the following, it would be: 
 
            
 $ 1.00  $ 1.00 $ 1.00 
 A B Da 
 
 
The soda choice scenario is based on 
experimental results described by 
Ariely (2008). The actual stimulus 
used in the original study was not 
provided, thus this products used for 
this study are an approximation 
based solely on Ariely’s written 
descriptions. 
 
Q 
A 
B 
Da 
Which flight would you book? 
 Number of Stops  Ticket Price 
Carrier A Non-Stop $ 550 
Carrier B 2 Stops $ 450 
Carrier C Non-Stop $ 539 
 
This scenarios is newly created for 
this study, and was designed to test 
an attribute other than just price.  
 
Q 
A 
B 
Db 
Which cell phone plan would you choose? 
 Anytime Minutes  Price/Mo 
Telecom A 1,200 $ 79.95 
Telecom B  700 $ 35.95 
Telecom C  500 $ 34.99 
 
A non-food or beverage related 
scenario where with a very poor 
attribute trade-off for the decoy.  
 
Q 
A 
B 
Da 
Which hotel would you book for a business trip? 
 Distance from 
  Desired Destination Price/nt 
Hotel  A   0 minutes $ 159 
Hotel  B 25 minutes $   99 
Hotel  C 10 minutes $ 179 
 
The choice scenario is the same as 
that used in prior research (and 
previously in this study, but room 
prices and distances were 
exaggerated to make tradeoffs 
between the two attributes. 
 
Q 
A 
B 
Da 
Which entrée would you choose? 
  Price 
Grilled Flounder  $ 15.25 
Pan Seared Salmon  $ 19.55 
Deep Fried Tilapia $ 14.95 
 
This question was designed to see if 
quality can be subtly conveyed 
through product type. Tilapia is 
unqualified inferior quality fish to 
both flounder and salmon. The 
tilapia is thus a low-quality, slightly 
lower price decoy. 
Q 
 
A 
B 
Db 
If you had to order one of the following, it would be: 
 
Skirt Steak: $28 
Filet Mignon: $35 
Sirloin: $34 
 
This question is a reproduction of 
the questions used in Experiment 3, 
though the decoy price was changed 
to make the similarity to option B 
more noticeable.  
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1e – Experiment Five 
Stimulus Comments 
 
 
Q 
A 
B 
Da 
Db 
 
If you had to choose one of the following brands of beer to purchase,  
which one  would it be?  Average Quality Rating Scale: (100=Best; 0=Worst) 
Price/sixpack : $7.80 Average Quality Rating: 50 
Price/sixpack : $8.60 Average Quality Rating: 70 
Price/sixpack : $9.00 Average Quality Rating: 70 
Price/sixpack : $7.80 Average Quality Rating: 30 
 
 
Another reproduction of HPP’s 
original beer 6-pack scenario, with 
prices updated for current market 
prices.  
Q 
A 
B 
Da 
Db 
Wine Spectator Rating Scale: (100=Best; 0=Worst) 
Bottle Price: $43 Score: 97 
Bottle Price: $37 Score: 89 
Bottle Price: $37 Score: 85 
Bottle Price: $65 Score: 97 
 
This scenario builds upon previous 
experiments, and more clearly 
emphasizes the quality price 
difference and eliminating the price 
difference between decoy and target. 
 
Q 
A 
B 
Da 
Db 
If you had to choose one of the following restaurants to dine at, which one 
would it be?  Rating Stars: (5=Excellent; 0=Horrible) 
Driving Distance: 25 minutes Number of Stars: 5 
Driving Distance: 5 minutes Number of Stars: 3 
Driving Distance: 35 minutes Number of Stars: 5 
Driving Distance: 5 minutes Number of Stars: 1 
 
An exact replication of the restaurant 
scenario in HPP’s original study, 
which has since been replicated in 
numerous other studies. 
 If you had to choose one of the following breakfasts to purchase,  
which one would it be? 
     
 320cal 330cal 480cal 500cal 
 Fat: 14g Fat: 15g Fat: 21g Fat: 28g 
 A B Da Db
Fat and calorie differences were 
used as the primary attribute 
differentiators to see if consumers 
would switch between breakfast 
sandwich types. Pictures are of 
actual breakfast sandwich options 
from Starbucks.  
 
 
 
If you had to choose one of the following pastries to purchase, 
which one would it be? 
   
 340cal 350cal 490cal 440cal 
 Fat: 9g Fat: 9g Fat: 18g Fat: 19g 
 A B Db Da
Fat and calorie differences were 
used as the primary attribute 
differentiators to see if consumers 
would switch between breakfast 
sandwich types. Pictures are of 
actual breakfast pastry options from 
Starbucks. 
 If you had to choose one of the following sodas to purchase, 
which one would it be? 
     
 120cal/serving 165cal/serving 140cal/serving 170cal/serving 
 Sugars: 39g Sugars: 45g Sugars: 41g Sugars: 50g 
 A B Da Db
The soda choice scenario is based on 
experimental results described by 
Ariely (2008). In addition to 
brand/flavor information, decoys 
were made even more inferior with 
higher sugar and calorie counts. 
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1f – Experiment Six 
Stimulus Comments 
 
 
 
 
           A                       B                        Da                     Db
 
Pictures are exact reproductions of 
stimulus described by Ariely (2008), 
and reported as having produced an 
attraction effect. Da and Db were 
digitally mis-shapened versions of A 
and B, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Q 
 
A 
 
 
 Db 
 
 
B 
 
 
 
 
The Economist’s pricing structure 
(posted on its website) was used by 
Kivets, Netzer, & Srunivasan (2004) 
Ariely (2008) to test the attraction 
effect. Both studies reported the 
presence of the $125 print 
subscription decoy shifted 
significant share to the similarly 
priced “Print & Web” subscription.  
 
The layout and copy used in the 
stimulus for this study is an exact 
replication of that shown by Ariely – 
except the color scheme was that of 
the actual The Economist’s website 
(Ariely’s book was printed in black 
and white). 
 
1g – Experiment Seven 
Stimulus Annotations 
 
Q 
A 
B 
Db 
Da 
If you had to choose one of the following brands of beer to purchase, which 
one would it be? Average Quality Rating Scale: (100=Best;  0=Worst) 
Price/sixpack : $7.80          Average Quality Rating:   50 
Price/sixpack : $8.60          Average Quality Rating:   70 
Price/sixpack : $9.00          Average Quality Rating:   70 
Price/sixpack : $7.80          Average Quality Rating:   30 
 
Another reproduction of HPP’s 
original beer 6-pack scenario, with 
prices updated for current market 
prices. Also tested in Experiments 
Five and Eight 
 
Q 
A 
B 
Da 
Db 
You need a new laptop computer. All other things being equal about the 
options, which laptop would you choose? 
4 GB RAM     14 Hours    Average Battery Life 
2 GB RAM     24 Hours    Average Battery Life 
4 GB RAM     12 Hours    Average Battery Life 
2 GB RAM     20 Hours    Average Battery Life 
 
This is an updated version of a 
personal computer question used by 
(Ariely & Wallsten, 1995; Simonson 
& Tversky, 1992). The original 
versions used RAM/memory and 
memory/price, respectively. 
 
Q 
A 
B 
Db 
Da 
If you had to choose one of the following bottles of wine to purchase, which 
one would it be? Wine Spectator Rating Scale: (100=Best;  0=Worst) 
Bottle Price: $43         Score:   97 
Bottle Price: $37         Score:   89 
Bottle Price: $37         Score:   85 
Bottle Price: $65         Score:   97 
 
This scenario builds upon previous 
experiments, and is replicated in 
Experiments Five and Eight. 
 
Q 
A 
If you had to choose one of the following restaurants to dine at, which one 
would it be? Rating Stars: (5=Excellent; 0=Horrible) 
Driving Distance:   25 minutes          Number of Stars:   5 
An exact replication of the 
restaurant scenario in HPP’s original 
study, which has since been 
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B 
Da 
Db 
Driving Distance:     5 minutes          Number of Stars:   3 
Driving Distance:   35 minutes          Number of Stars:   5 
Driving Distance:     5 minutes          Number of Stars:   1 
 
replicated in numerous other studies. 
Q 
A 
B 
Db 
Da 
If you were to order a steak, which steak would it be? 
$42.00 - Porterhouse 
$35.00 - Filet Mignon 
$33.00 - Sirloin 
$41.00 – Sirloin 
 
This is a variation of the questions 
used in Experiment 5, but also tests 
a decoy for the Porterhouse.  
 
1h – Experiment Eight 
Stimulus Annotations 
 
Q 
A 
B 
Db 
Da 
If you had to choose one of the following brands of beer to purchase, which 
one would it be? Average Quality Rating Scale: (100=Best;  0=Worst) 
Price/sixpack : $7.80          Average Quality Rating:   50 
Price/sixpack : $8.60          Average Quality Rating:   70 
Price/sixpack : $9.00          Average Quality Rating:   70 
Price/sixpack : $7.80          Average Quality Rating:   30 
 
 
These questions are all replications 
of the stimulus in Experiment 7, and 
several have also been used in 
Experiment 5 and other experiments 
in this study. 
 
Q 
A 
B 
Da 
Db 
You need a new laptop computer. All other things being equal about the 
options, which laptop would you choose? 
4 GB RAM     14 Hours    Average Battery Life 
2 GB RAM     24 Hours    Average Battery Life 
4 GB RAM     12 Hours    Average Battery Life 
2 GB RAM     20 Hours    Average Battery Life 
 
 
Q 
A 
B 
Db 
Da 
If you had to choose one of the following bottles of wine to purchase, which 
one would it be? Wine Spectator Rating Scale: (100=Best;  0=Worst) 
Bottle Price: $43         Score:   97 
Bottle Price: $37         Score:   89 
Bottle Price: $37         Score:   85 
Bottle Price: $65         Score:   97 
 
 
Q 
A 
B 
Da 
Db 
If you had to choose one of the following restaurants to dine at, which one 
would it be? Zagat Rating Score: (30=Excellent; 0=Horrible) 
Driving Distance:   25 minutes          Zagat Score:   29 
Driving Distance:     5 minutes          Zagat Score:   21 
Driving Distance:   35 minutes          Zagat Score:   29 
Driving Distance:     5 minutes          Zagat Score:   17 
 
Q 
A 
B 
Db 
Da 
If you were to order a steak, which steak would it be? 
$42.00 - Porterhouse 
$35.00 - Filet Mignon 
$33.00 - Sirloin 
$41.00 – Sirloin 
 
 Given that all the following sodas HAVE THE SAME PRICE. 
If you had to choose one of the following sodas to purchase, 
 which would it be? 
     
 A B Da Db 
The soda choice scenario is based on 
experimental results described by 
Ariely (2008). The scenario is 
similar to that presented in 
Experiment 5, however no 
information, other than brand and 
flavor (implied by the picture and 
brand) were given. The lack of 
nutritional content or other attribute 
was designed to simplify the 
scenario. 
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1i – Experiment Nine 
Stimulus Annotations 
 
Q 
 
 
 
If you had to choose one of the following bottles of wine to purchase, 
which one would it be? 
 
                        
 A B Db 
 
Wine labels were pretested and 
chosen so their perceived quality 
scores were reflective of those in 
the text-based condition listed 
below. Wine labels were modified 
to identify only wine type, and 
removed mention of a specific 
grape varietal. 
 
 
Q 
A 
B 
Da 
Db 
 
If you had to choose one of the following bottles of wine to purchase, which one 
would it be? Wine Spectator Rating Scale: (100=Best;  0=Worst) 
Bottle Price: $43         Score:   97 
Bottle Price: $37         Score:   89 
Bottle Price: $37         Score:   85 
Bottle Price: $65         Score:   97 
 
The questions is a replications of 
the stimulus in Experiments 5,7, 
and 8. 
 
1j – Experiment Ten 
Stimulus Annotations 
 
 
Q 
 
 
 
A 
 
 
 
B 
 
 
Db 
 
LOW FLUENCY CONDITION 
Based on the information provided about the following refrigerators,  
please select the one you would be most likely to purchase. 
 
 
 
 
 
The font and presentation were 
generally found to be more difficult 
to read, though it can still be read 
with some effort (Epley & 
Norwick, 2004; Novemsky, et al. 
2007). A pretest of 226 participants 
confirmed that, on an ten-point 
scale ranging from “very easy to 
read,” to “very difficult to read,” 
the gray-scripted front was 
significantly more difficult to read 
than the same material presented in 
a standard black, and unscripted 
font (μ’s=3.52 and 7.17; t(224) = 
11.84, p<0.0001). 
 
The choice scenario is a replication 
of the stimulus described by Park & 
Kim (2005). 
 
 
Q 
 
 
A 
 
 
 
B 
 
 
Da 
HIGH FLUENCY CONDITION 
Based on the information provided about the following refrigerators,  
please select the one you would be most likely to purchase. 
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1k – Experiment Eleven 
Stimulus Annotations 
 
 
Q 
 
 
 
A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Db 
 
LOW FLUENCY CONDITION 
Based on the information provided about the following binoculars,  
please select the one you would be most likely to purchase. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The choice options in this scenario 
are replications of the stimulus 
described by Park & Kim (2005). 
The font-readability, fluency 
manipulation was based on the 
findings of (Epley & Norwick, 
2004; Novemsky, et al. 2007), and 
replicated the manipulation used in 
experiment 10. 
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Da 
HIGH FLUENCY CONDITION 
Based on the information provided about the following binoculars,  
please select the one you would be most likely to purchase. 
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APPENDIX 2: DECOY SHARE GAINS 
Overall, decoys garnered choice share in 78.6% of the scenarios tested. To determine 
whether choice scenario characteristics influenced the likelihood a decoy would be chosen, a 
regression was conducted where decoy share (DShare) was regressed against experimental 
design features that might have encouraged decoy choice: 
 DLoPrice – Whether the decoy was the lowest price option available. 
 Quality – Whether one of the attribute dimensions was a quality feature. 
 Price – Whether one of the variable attribute dimension was item price. 
 CtrlShrGap – The share difference between the Target and Competitor in the control 
condition  
 QualMeasure – Whether an attribute was defined in a qualitative, non-ordinal manner  
The regression equation used can be expressed as: 
ܦ݄ܵܽݎ݁ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܳݑ݈ܽ݅ݐݕ ൅ ߚଶܲݎ݅ܿ݁ ൅ ߚଷܦܮ݋ܲݎ݅ܿ݁ ൅ ߚସܥݐݎ݈݄ܵݎܩܽ݌ ൅ ߚହܳݑ݈ܽܯ݁ܽݏݑݎ݁൅∈ (16) 
A sample of 82 choice scenarios20 spread across eight experiments points to two factors that 
coincide with decoy market share. The regression data are summarized in Figure 23. First, there 
is a significant effect on QualMeasure (t=3.25, p<0.01), which suggests the decoy is more likely 
to be chosen if one of the attribute dimensions is presented qualitatively (and not quantitatively). 
Second, the regression constant is statistically significant and positive (t=2.34, p<0.03), which 
suggests a portion of the population will likely choose the decoy option regardless of its 
attributes, or the attributes of the Target.  
No other variables were statistically significant, which suggests the substantive type of 
attribute dimension (price or quality) used for the stimuli did not necessarily encourage subjects 
                                                 
20 The two choice scenarios from Experiment Six where subjects chose from pictures of date prospects was excluded because the 
options did not have explicitly comparable attribute dimensions, and of the female subjects used for the overall data set (date 
prospects were of males), the decoy option was never selected. 
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to choose the decoy. Of particular note, the coefficient on whether the decoy was the lowest price 
option (DLoPrice), was not significant (t<-0.02; p=0.52), and the coefficient direction is counter 
to expectations if subjects were more likely to choose the cheapest option. The lack of 
significance, and negative coefficient on DLoPrice suggests that subjects did not choose the 
decoy option simply to minimize the price paid.  
Figure 23.  Regression Results: Decoy Share Across Choice Scenarios 
 
 
 
 
Model Adjusted R2 = 0.186; F(5,81) = 3.47; p<0.01 
 
*     Significant at the p<0.05 level. 
**   Significant at the p<0.01 level.  
  
Variable  SE t-Stat p-Value
Constant 0.046 0.020 2.338 0.022 *
Quality -0.001 0.021 -0.025 0.980
Price 0.030 0.022 1.391 0.168
DLoPrice -0.015 0.023 -0.641 0.523
QualMeasure 0.075 0.023 3.250 0.002 **
CtrlShrGap 0.036 0.022 1.591 0.116
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APPENDIX 3: STUDIES COMBINING TARGET & DECOY SHARES 
Kim, S. & Hasher, L. (2005). The Attraction Effect in Decision Making: Superior Performance 
by Older Adults, Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 58(1), 120-133. 
Tentori, K., Osherson, D., Hasher, L., & May, C. (2001). Wisdom and aging: Irrational 
preferences in college students but not older adults. Cognition, 81(3), B87-B96. 
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APPENDIX 4: STUDIES REPORTING {T,C,DT} VS. {T,C,DC} DIFFERENCES 
Fifty-three attraction effect studies were found to have reported participant choice share 
differences between two treatment conditions. Seventeen of the 53 studies reported target share 
change differences between a target-decoyed {T,C,DT} and a competitor-decoyed {T,C,DC} 
condition. These sixteen studies are: 
Amaldoss, W., Bettman, J.R., & Payne, J.W. (2008). Biased but efficient: An investigation of 
coordination facilitated by asymmetric dominance. Marketing Science, 27(5), 903-921.   
 
Ariely, D., & Wallsten, T.S., (1995). Seeking subjective dominance in multidimensional space: 
An explanation of the asymmetric dominance effect. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Making. 63(3). 223-232. 
 
Chatterjee, S., Roy, R., & Malshe, A.V., (2010). The role of regulatory fit on the attraction effect. 
The Journal of Consumer Psychology. 21. 473-481. 
Dhar, R., & Glazer, R. (1996). Similarity in context: Cognitive representation and violation of 
preference and perceptual invariance in consumer choice. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, 67, 280–293. 
Fasolo, B. Misuraca, R., McClelland, G.H., & Maurisio, C. (2006). Animation attracts: The 
attraction effect in an on-line shopping environment. Psychology & Marketing. 23(10). 299-811. 
Hedcock, W., & Rao, A.R. (2009). Trade-Off Aversion as an Explanation for the Attraction 
Effect: A Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Study. Journal of Marketing Research, 46(1), 
1-13. 
Huber, J., & Puto, C. (1983). Market boundaries and product choice: Illustrating attraction and 
substitution effects. Journal of Consumer Research, 10(June) 31-44. 
Khan, U., Zhu, M., & Kalra, A., (2011). When trade-offs matter: The effect of choice construal 
on context effects. Journal of Marketing Research. 48(1), 62-71. 
Lin, C.H., Sun, Y.C., Chuang, S.C., & Su, H.J., (2008). Time pressure and the compromise and 
attraction effects on choice. Advances in Consumer Research. 35. 348-352. 
McDonald, M.K. (2009). The influence of need for cognition on the asymmetric dominance 
effect. Creating Knowledge: The LA&S Student Research Journal. Vol.2, DePaul University. 27-
29. 
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Pan, Y., O’Curry, S., & Pitts, R. (1995). The attraction effect and political choice in two 
elections. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 4(1), 85-101. 
Pettibone, J. C., & Wedell, D. H. (2000). Examining models of nondominated decoy effects 
across judgment and choice. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 81, 300–
328. 
Pocheptsova, A., Amir, O., Dhar, R., & Baumeister R.F. (2009) Deciding without resources: 
Resource depletion and choice in context.  Journal of Marketing Research, 46(3), 344-355. 
Ratneshwar, S., Shocker, A.D., & Stewart, D.W. (1987). Toward understanding the attraction 
effect: The implications of product stimulus meaningfulness and familiarity.  Journal of 
Consumer Research. 13(4), 520-533. 
Sedikides, C., Ariely, D., Olsen, N., (1999). Contextual and procedural determinants of partner 
selection: Of asymmetric dominance and prominence. Social Cognition. 17(2). 118-139. 
Slaughter, J.E., Sinar, E.F., & Highhouse, S., (1999). Decoy effects and attribute-level 
inferences. Journal of Applied Psychology. 84(5), 823-828. 
Wedell, D.H. (1991). Distinguishing among models of contextually induced preference reversals, 
Journal of Experimental Psychology Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 12(July), 767-778. 
 
Wedell, D.H., & Pettibone, J.C. (1996). Using judgments to understand decoy effects in choice.  
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Making. 67(3). 326-344. 
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APPENDIX 5: STUDIES REPORTING AGGREGATION ACROSS TWO OR MORE SCENARIOS 
Twenty-one attraction effect studies reported share shifts based on data which was aggregated 
across at least two different scenarios for each participant. These studies are: 
Amaldoss, W., Bettman, J. R., & Payne, J. W. (2008). Findings—Biased but Efficient: An 
Investigation of Coordination Facilitated by Asymmetric Dominance. Marketing Science, 27(5), 
903-921. 
 
Bhargava, M., Kim, J., & Srivastava, R. K. (2000). Explaining context effects on choice using a 
model of comparative judgment. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 9(3), 167-177. 
 
Chuang, S. C., & Yen, H. R. (2007). The impact of a product’s country-of-origin on compromise 
and attraction effects. Marketing Letters, 18(4), 279-291. 
 
Dhar, R., & Glazer, R. (1996). Similarity in context: Cognitive representation and violation of 
preference and perceptual invariance in consumer choice. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, 67(3), 280-293. 
 
Fasolo, B., Misuraca, R., McClelland, G. H., & Cardaci, M. (2006). Animation attracts: The 
attraction effect in an on‐line shopping environment. Psychology & Marketing, 23(10), 799-811. 
 
Hedgcock, W., & Rao, A. R. (2009). Trade-off aversion as an explanation for the attraction 
effect: A functional magnetic resonance imaging study. Journal of Marketing Research, 46(1), 1-
13. 
 
Hamilton, R., Hong, J., & Chernev, A. (2007). Perceptual focus effects in choice. Journal of 
Consumer Research, 34(2), 187-199. 
Herne, K. (1997). Decoy alternatives in policy choices: Asymmetric domination and compromise 
effects. European Journal of Political Economy, 13(3), 575-589. 
Highhouse, S. (1996). Context-dependent selection: The effects of decoy and phantom job 
candidates. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 65(1), 68-76. 
Huber, J. & Puto, C. (1983). Marketing boundaries and product choice: Illustrating attraction and 
substitution effects. Journal of Consumer Research, 10(1), 31-44. 
Kardes, F. R., Herr, P. M., & Marlino, D. (1989). Some new light on substitution and attraction 
effects. Advances in Consumer Research, 16, 203-208. 
 
Lehmann, D. R., & Pan, Y. (1994). Context effects, new brand entry, and consideration sets. 
Journal of Marketing Research, 31(3), 364-374. 
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Lin, C. H., Sun, Y. C., Chuang, S. C., & Su, H. J. (2008). Time pressure and the compromise and 
attraction effects in choice. Advances in Consumer Research, 35(3), 348-352. 
 
Malaviya, P., & Sivakumar, K. (1998). The moderating effect of product category knowledge 
and attribute importance on the attraction effect. Marketing Letters, 9(1), 93-106. 
 
Malaviya, P., & Sivakumar, K. (2002). The influence of choice justification and stimulus 
meaningfulness on the attraction effect. Journal of Marketing Theory and Practice, 20-29. 
 
Mao, W., & Oppewal, H. (2012). The attraction effect is more pronounced for consumers who 
rely on intuitive reasoning. Marketing Letters, 23, 339-351. 
 
Pan, Y., & Lehmann, D. R. (1993). The influence of new brand entry on subjective brand 
judgments. Journal of Consumer Research, 76-86. 
 
Pechtl, H. (2009). Value structures in a decoy and compromise effect experiment. Psychology 
and Marketing, 26(8), 736-759. 
 
Sedikides, C., Ariely, D., & Olsen, N. (1999). Contextual and procedural determinants of partner 
selection: Of asymmetric dominance and prominence. Social Cognition, 17(2), 118-139. 
 
Van de Hoef, J.J. (2011). Bundle choice and the asymmetric dominance effect. (Unpublished 
masters thesis). Erasmus University – School of Economics, Rotterdam.  
 
Wedell, D. H. (1991). Distinguishing among models of contextually induced preference reversals. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 17(4), 767. 
 
Yoon, S. O., & Simonson, I. (2008). Choice set configuration as a determinant of preference 
attribution and strength. Journal of Consumer Research, 35(2), 324-336. 
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APPENDIX 6: LITERATURE SEARCH RESULTS 
A total of 76 academic articles were reviewed and evaluated for the purposes of this meta-
analysis. The following are review comments pertaining to the classification, and pertinent 
attributes of each journal article. 
1. Zenger, T. R., & Lawrence, B. S. (1989). Organizational demography: The differential 
effects of age and tenure distributions on technical communication. Academy of Management 
Journal, 32(2), 353-376. 
Scenarios describe each option on three attributes.  
2. Chuang, S. C., & Yen, H. R. (2007). The impact of a product’s country-of-origin on 
compromise and attraction effects. Marketing Letters, 18(4), 279-291. 
Country of origin (Study 1) and manufacturing country of origin (Study 2) (high quality and 
low quality) is used as a moderator condition under the presence of high quality target. 
Studies 3 and 4 test low-quality decoy. . No decoy shares reported, or exact n’s for each 
condition. Share counts are based on reported share percentages and Total n’s and number 
of randomized treatment conditions.  
 
3. Highhouse, S. (1996). Context-dependent selection: The effects of decoy and phantom job 
candidates. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 65(1), 68-76. 
Study 1: Asymmetrically dominated decoy was also a phantom decoy. Study 2: Aggregated 
results for the control and attribute weighting conditions.  
 
4. Malaviya, P., & Sivakumar, K. (2002). The influence of choice justification and stimulus 
meaningfulness on the attraction effect. Journal of Marketing Theory and Practice, 20-29. 
Choices are aggregated across three products/scenarios. Individual results also available. 
Control is a no-choice-justification condition. Within subjects. 
 
5. Kim, S., & Hasher, L. (2005). The attraction effect in decision making: Superior performance 
by older adults. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section A, 58(1), 120-
133. 
Separates out older and college-aged subjects. 
 
6. Bhargava, M., Kim, J., & Srivastava, R. K. (2000). Explaining context effects on choice 
using a model of comparative judgment. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 9(3), 167-177. 
Aggregated across different choice scenarios. No share numbers reported. 
 
7. Wedell, D. H. (1991). Distinguishing among models of contextually induced preference 
reversals. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition. 17(4), 
767. 
Three-option control condition. Aggregated across multiple scenarios.  
 
 A -19 
8. Pechtl, H. (2009). Value structures in a decoy and compromise effect experiment. 
Psychology and Marketing, 26(8), 736-759. 
Aggregated over eleven types of decoyed placements. 
 
9. Dhar, R., & Glazer, R. (1996). Similarity in context: Cognitive representation and violation 
of preference and perceptual invariance in consumer choice. Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes, 67(3), 280-293. Three-option control condition, preference 
ratings. No observation count reported for scenarios. Observation count was estimated 
based on number of treatment conditions (Exp1: four;Exp2: three), 190 subjects. Aggregated 
and disaggregated information were reported. Exp 1 also included a neutral 3rd or 4th option 
in the control and treatment conditions, respectively. Exp2: excluded decoy condition C4 as it 
was not asymmetrically dominated. 
 
10. Amaldoss, W., Bettman, J. R., & Payne, J. W. (2008). Findings—Biased but Efficient: An 
Investigation of Coordination Facilitated by Asymmetric Dominance. Marketing Science, 
27(5), 903-921. 
Aggregated and individual scenarios presented. Use Study 1 only. Study two has many 
moderating features and a three-option control condition. Non-traditional choice options – 
expected payouts for self and opponent used as attributes. 
 
11. Sedikides, C., Ariely, D., & Olsen, N. (1999). Contextual and procedural determinants of 
partner selection: Of asymmetric dominance and prominence. Social Cognition, 17(2), 118-
139. 
Aggregated and individual scenarios. Three-attributes given for each product. Three-option 
and two-option control conditions. Study 2 did not report two-option versus three-option 
shares.  
 
12. Amir, O., & Levav, J. (2007). Choice construction versus preference construction: The 
instability of preferences learned in context. Journal of Marketing, 45(2), 145-158. 
Moderating condition manipulated the effect of learned preference for an option. No choice 
share data reported for choice scenarios. 
 
13. Mao, W., & Oppewal, H. (2012). The attraction effect is more pronounced for consumers 
who rely on intuitive reasoning. Marketing Letters, 1-13. 
Has both aggregated and individual scenario data. Reports results by need for cognition and 
faith in intuition scales for decision makers. 
 
14. Lin, C. H., Sun, Y. C., Chuang, S. C., & Su, H. J. (2008). Time pressure and the compromise 
and attraction effects in choice. Advances in Consumer Research, 35(3), 348-352. 
Study 1 is only about compromise decoys. Study 2 is relevant to the attraction effect, but 
aggregates data across three product scenarios. 
 
15. Schley, D. (2005). Minimized Regret is Sufficient to Model the Asymmetrically Dominated 
Decoy Effect. Marketing Bulletin, 16, 1. 
Quantitative model only. Not experimental results. 
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16. Pettibone, J. C., & Wedell, D. H. (2007). Testing alternative explanations of phantom decoy 
effects. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 20(3), 323-341. 
Quantitative models, tests only phantom decoys. 
 
17. De Clippel, G., & Eliaz, K. (2012). Reason‐based choice: A bargaining rationale for the 
attraction and compromise effects. Theoretical Economics, 7(1), 125-162. 
Quantitative model only. Not experimental results. 
 
18. Bateson, M., Healy, S. D., & Hurly, T. A. (2002). Irrational choices in hummingbird foraging 
behaviour. Animal Behaviour, 63(3), 587-596. 
Animal behavior – not human choice. 
 
19. Royle, N. J., Lindström, J., & Metcalfe, N. B. (2008). Context-dependent mate choice in 
relation to social composition in green swordtails Xiphophorus helleri. Behavioral Ecology, 
19(5), 998-1005. 
Animal behavior – not human choice. 
 
20. McDonald, M. K. The Influence of Need for Cognition on the Asymmetric Dominance 
Effect. CREATING, 27. 
The control condition has three options. Do not include – the treatment condition was 
compared against 50/50 chance of choosing the target. There was no empirically-based 
control condition.  
 
21. Masicampo, E. J., & Baumeister, R. F. (2008). Toward a physiology of dual-process 
reasoning and judgment: Lemonade, willpower, and expensive rule-based analysis. 
Psychological Science, 19(3), 255-260. 
Physiological manipulation - control condition is neutral, without physiological change. 
Control  condition also has three options. 
 
22. Hedgcock, W., & Rao, A. R. (2009). Trade-off aversion as an explanation for the attraction 
effect: A functional magnetic resonance imaging study. Journal of Marketing Research, 
46(1), 1-13. 
Within-subject study with three-option control condition and choices aggregated across 
product conditions. 
 
23. Huber, J., Payne, J. W., & Puto, C. (1982). Adding asymmetrically dominated alternatives: 
Violations of regularity and the similarity hypothesis. Journal of Consumer Research, 90-98. 
Individual and aggregated results reported. Within-subject design. Multiple decoy positions 
and products tested. 
 
24. Simonson, I., & Tversky, A. (1992). Choice in context: tradeoff contrast and extremeness 
aversion. Journal of Marketing Research. 
Microwave oven and pen scenarios are un-moderated attraction effect scenarios. Paper 
towel and tissue scenario were sensory-based. 
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25. Heath, T. B., & Chatterjee, S. (1995). Asymmetric decoy effects on lower-quality versus 
higher-quality brands: Meta-analytic and experimental evidence. Journal of Consumer 
Research, 22(3), 268-284. 
Two populations of subjects: MBA students and blue collar workers tested on high versus 
low quality items. 
 
26. Huber, J., & Puto, C. (1983). Market boundaries and product choice: Illustrating attraction 
and substitution effects. Journal of Consumer Research, 31-44. 
Only Study 1 is relevant to the attraction effect. Disaggregated information is extractable 
from the data. 
 
27. Slaughter, J. E., Kausel, E. E., & Quiñones, M. A. (2010). The decoy effect as a covert 
influence tactic. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 24(3), 249-266. 
No choices were made. Subjects were asked to create a sample set to make the Target look 
desirable. 
 
28. Hedgcock, W., Rao, A. R., & Chen, H. (2009). Could Ralph Nader's entrance and exit have 
helped Al Gore? The impact of decoy dynamics on consumer choice. Journal of Marketing 
Research, 46(3), 330-343. 
Study 1 is relevant. Study 2 is on Phantoms. All have three-option control conditions. 
 
29. Park, J., & Kim, J. (2005). The effects of decoys on preference shifts: The role of 
attractiveness and providing justification. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 15(2), 94-107. 
“First Choice” conditions in experiments 1 and 2 are relevant.  
 
30. Sen, S. (1998). Knowledge, information mode, and the attraction effect. Journal of Consumer 
Research, 25(1), 64-77. 
Study 1 is relevant. Study two aggregates across American and Italian restaurants. Rating 
scales are used, and is within subjects. Study three uses choice and preference ratings.  
 
31. Mishra, S., Umesh, U. N., & Stem Jr, D. E. (1993). Antecedents of the attraction effect: An 
information-processing approach. Journal of Marketing Research, 331-349. 
No subject counts are reported. Attraction effect is defined against a baseline of expectations 
under Luce and similarity. 
 
32. Kardes, F. R., Herr, P. M., & Marlino, D. (1989). Some new light on substitution and 
attraction effects. Advances in Consumer Research, 16, 203-208. 
Judgment and choice are recorded. Results are aggregated across four scenarios.  
 
33. Aaker, J. (1991). The negative attraction effect? A study of the attraction effect under 
judgment and choice. Advances in Consumer Research, 18(1), 462-469. 
Between subject study on undergraduate students. Choice and judgment were dependent 
variables. Justification was the manipulation and a control without justification is reported.  
 
34. Herne, K. (1997). Decoy alternatives in policy choices: Asymmetric domination and 
compromise effects. European Journal of Political Economy, 13(3), 575-589. 
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Student population, scenarios aggregated before reporting. Outside knowledge and 
information considered in decision making process.  
 
35. Ha, Y. W., Park, S., & Ahn, H. K. (2009). The influence of categorical attributes on choice 
context effects. Journal of Consumer Research, 36(3), 463-477.  
Within subjects. Aggregated and separated data available. The moderating condition 
manipulated whether a third attribute/feature was the same or different between the Target 
and Decoy. The manipulation created comparisons across three attribute dimensions, and 
was thus excluded.  
 
36. Lehmann, D. R., & Pan, Y. (1994). Context effects, new brand entry, and consideration sets. 
Journal of Marketing Research, 364-374. 
Study 1, decoys 1 and 1’ are about the attraction effect. Study 2 uses a six-option control 
condition . Choices are aggregated. No moderators. 
 
37. Pan, Y., O’Curry, S., & Pitts, R. (1995). The attraction effect and political choice in two 
elections. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 4(1), 85-101. 
Study 1:choices described on three attributes. No aggregation. Between subjects design. 
Study 2 excluded because attribute ratings were defined by each subject.  
 
38. Stewart, D. W. (1989). On the meaningfulness of sensory attributes: Further evidence on the 
attraction effect. Advances in Consumer Research, 16, 197-202. 
Study 2 is poorly designed and excluded. Actual taste is used as a physiological attribute. 
Study 1 uses flat, dilute beer as a decoy for a nationally distributed pilsner. But the Target 
and Competitor beers were very different styles. Exclude. 
 
39. Burton, S., & Zinkhan, G. M. (1987). Changes in consumer choice: Further investigation of 
similarity and attraction effects. Psychology and Marketing, 4(3), 255-266. 
Case 3 is the only usable attraction effect study scenario. No attribute rating information is 
given. No specific observation count given per treatment condition. Observation count 
assumption made based on participant count.  
 
40. Pettibone, J. C. (2012). Testing the effect of time pressure on asymmetric dominance and 
compromise decoys in choice. Judgment and Decision Making, 7(4), 513-523. 
Deliberation time is varied, the normal condition has liberal time and is a usable baseline, 
but no appropriate control condition against which an ADE increase is measured, was 
reported.  Aggregated results: across ten products.  
 
41. Frederick, S., Lee, L., & Baskin, E. The Rules of Attraction. Available at: 
http://faculty.som.yale.edu/ShaneFrederick/Rules_of_Attraction.pdf 
Moderating conditions include changes in numerical perception of the value attributes. Study 
1 was flavored Kool-Aid and presented aggregated and individual results. Study 2 moderates 
via visual presentation forms, does not aggregate across conditions. Choices were of 
gambles. Study 3 creates attribute difference through photo quality. 
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42. Dhar, R., & Simonson, I. (2003). The effect of forced choice on choice. Journal of Marketing 
Research, 146-160.  
The moderating condition gives subjects the option not to choose an option. Study 1 is not 
applicable to the attraction effect. Study 2 has a usable “forced choice condition,” along 
with the moderating ‘not to choose’ condition as well. 
 
43. Munro, A., & Popov, D. (2009). A Missing Link in Behavioural Economics? A Portmanteau 
Experiment on the Relevance of Individual Decision Anomalies for Households (No. 09/10). 
Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London. 
Attraction effect data is detailed in Table 4. 
 
44. van de Hoef, J. J. (2011). Bundle Choice and the Asymmetric Dominance Effect. Erasmus 
University. 
Results separated by cognitive thinking primes. Mode of thinking manipulation is weak. 
Bundled versus single product scenarios are another moderating condition. Individual and 
aggregated results are reported.  
 
45. Hamilton, R., Hong, J., & Chernev, A. (2007). Perceptual focus effects in choice. Journal of 
Consumer Research, 34(2), 187-199. 
Experiment 1 is relevant to the attraction effect. Others are not.  
 
46. Bateman, I. J., Munro, A., & Poe, G. L. (2008). Decoy effects in choice experiments and 
contingent valuation: asymmetric dominance. Land Economics, 84(1), 115-127. 
Relevant data is reported in Table 1.  
 
47. Kivetz, R., Netzer, O., & Srinivasan, V. (2004). Extending compromise effect models to 
complex buying situations and other context effects. Journal of Marketing Research, 262-
268. 
Test conditions reproduce Ariely’s Economist subscription scenario. Exclude the three-
attribute Xerox scenario. 
 
48. Doyle, J. R., O'Connor, D. J., Reynolds, G. M., & Bottomley, P. A. (1999). The robustness of 
the asymmetrically dominated effect: Buying frames, phantom alternatives, and in‐store 
purchases. Psychology and Marketing, 16(3), 225-243. 
Include only Experiment 1. Experiment 2 tested phantom decoys. Excluded results on “what 
most others would choose” conditions as they did not represent individuals’ choices.   
 
49. Tentori, K., Osherson, D., Hasher, L., & May, C. (2001). Wisdom and aging: Irrational 
preferences in college students but not older adults. Cognition, 81(3), B87-B96. 
Include Studies 1, 2, and 3. Results are separated by subject type: Students versus senior 
citizens. 
 
50. Josiam, B. M., & Hobson, J. P. (1995). Consumer choice in context: the decoy effect in travel 
and tourism. Journal of Travel Research, 34(1), 45-50. 
Choice sets are bundles of travel packages. Decoy and Target shared the same travel 
destination.  
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51. Khan, U., Zhu, M., & Kalra, A. (2011). When trade-offs matter: The effect of choice 
construal on context effects. Journal of Marketing Research, 48(1), 62-71.  
Experiments 3 and 4b were on the Attraction Effect, however, 4b did not report choice share 
data, so was not includede 
 
52. Sivakumar, K., & Raj, S. P. (1997). Quality tier competition: How price change influences 
brand choice and category choice. The Journal of Marketing, 71-84. 
Model back-testing on POS data. Was not experiment based. 
 
53. Mourali, M., Böckenholt, U., & Laroche, M. (2007). Compromise and attraction effects 
under prevention and promotion motivations. Journal of Consumer Research, 34(2), 234-
247. 
Include Study 1 only. Study 2 does not have an attraction effect control condition. Study 1 
uses a two-option control condition. Additional moderation through prevention and 
promotion motivations. Study 3 was excluded because the control condition was a three-
option set where the target was the compromise option. 
 
54. Herr, P.M., & Kardes, F.R. (1989). Context effects in consumer judgment and choice. 
Advances in Consumer Research, 16, 195-196. 
No experimental data reported – only a symposium discussion summary. 
 
55. Ratneshwar, S., Shocker, A. D., & Stewart, D. W. (1987). Toward understanding the 
attraction effect: The implications of product stimulus meaningfulness and familiarity. 
Journal of Consumer Research, 520-533. 
Attraction effect effectiveness is moderated with attribute and product familiarity and 
meaningfulness. Studies 1 and 2 included. Studies 3 and 4 only included ratings and verbal 
protocols and were excluded from the analysis. 
 
56. Simonson, I. (1989). Choice based on reasons: The case of attraction and compromise 
effects. Journal of Consumer Research, 158-174. 
Study 1: beer and car scenarios are suitable for attraction effect, other products test the 
compromise effect. Study 2: dependent variable is justifiability rating, no choice is made. 
Study 3: is verbal protocol. 
 
57. Yoon, S. O., & Simonson, I. (2008). Choice set configuration as a determinant of preference 
attribution and strength. Journal of Consumer Research, 35(2), 324-336. 
Results are pooled across three products. Preference ratings are used. Experiment is within 
subjects. Compromise decoy conditions from Experiment 1 were excluded. Experiments 2 
and 3 were excluded as they did not set out to report the share change associated with the 
attraction effect. Experiment 4 was excluded as its procedures include revealing the purpose 
of the decoy to participants to influence their choice.  
 
58. Malaviya, P., & Sivakumar, K. (1998). The moderating effect of product category knowledge 
and attribute importance on the attraction effect. Marketing Letters, 9(1), 93-106. 
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Aggregate multiple decoy types and products. Participants are parsed by knowledge 
preference. No choices made, just preferences.  
 
59. Sivakumar, K., & Cherian, J. (1995). Role of product entry and exit on the attraction effect. 
Marketing Letters, 6(1), 45-51. 
Preference scales are used. Moderating condition is if the decoy is simultaneous or delayed 
entry. Within-subject  design. 
 
60. Choplin, J. M., & Hummel, J. E. (2005). Comparison-induced decoy effects. Memory & 
Cognition, 33(2), 332-343. 
Choices only have a single attribute dimension. Choices are of shapes and lines. ADE is 
evaluated against expectations under chance. Experiment 3 used a similarity rating, not 
preference.  
 
61. Heath, T., & Chatterjee, S. (1991). How entrants affect multiple brands: A dual attraction 
mechanism. Advances in Consumer Research, 18, 768-772. 
The attraction effect decoy was said to be unavailable (phantom).  
 
62. Zhou, L., Kim, C., & Laroche, M. (1996). Decision Processes of the Attraction Effect: A 
Theoretical Analysis and Some Preliminary Evidence. Advances in Consumer Research, 23, 
218-224. 
No quantitative results are reported, just coding of verbal protocols. 
 
63. Pan, Y., & Lehmann, D. R. (1993). The influence of new brand entry on subjective brand 
judgments. Journal of Consumer Research, 76-86. 
Study 1: Scenarios are of three-base options with an entrant – not the traditional attraction 
effect set-up. Attribute values are defined by the participant. Study 1 excluded. 
Study 2: Choice and preferences are reported, aggregated scenarios across four products. 
Two types of decoy locations used.  
  
64. Hsu, H.C., & Liu, W.L. (2011). Using decoy effects to influence an online brand choice: The 
role of price-quality trade-offs. Cyberpyschology, Behavior, and Social Networking, 14(4), 
235-239. 
Include “choice first,” “decoy,” and control conditions only. Exclude “inferior decoy” and 
attribute ratings-first conditions. 
 
65.  Wedell, D. H., & Pettibone, J. C. (1996). Using judgments to understand decoy effects in 
choice. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 67(3), 326-344. 
Preference ratings of attributes and options are reported. No individual scenario data by 
product is reported. All data is aggregated across 20 products. Exclude all studies – 
preference ratings only. 
 
66. Slaughter, J. E., Sinar, E. F., & Highhouse, S. (1999). Decoy effects and attribute-level 
inferences. Journal of Applied Psychology, 84(5), 823. 
Candidate options presented visually (video) – subjects to infer hiring quality from video. 
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67. Fasolo, B., Misuraca, R., McClelland, G. H., & Cardaci, M. (2006). Animation attracts: The 
attraction effect in an on‐line shopping environment. Psychology & Marketing, 23(10), 799-
811. 
Includes moderating feature of animated stimulus. Experiments 1 and 2 aggregate across 
different animation conditions of T,C,D.  
 
68. Pocheptsova, A., Amir, O., Dhar, R., & Baumeister, R. F. (2009). Deciding without 
resources: Resource depletion and choice in context. Journal of Marketing Research, 46(3), 
344-355. 
Experiment 4 uses three-option control condition, overall the experiment moderates resource 
depletion. 
Experiment 5 uses the same moderation as experiment 4, but has a two-option control 
condition.  
Exclude Experiment 1 – only two-option conditions; Experiments 2&3 – Compromise decoy 
 
69. Chatterjee, S., Roy, R., & Malshe, A. V. (2011). The role of regulatory fit on the attraction 
effect. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 21(4), 473-481. 
Prevention and promotion disposition priming of subjects with no neutral-mood control 
condition. Four scenarios tested. 
 
70. Herne, K. (1998). Testing the reference-dependent model: an experiment on asymmetrically 
dominated reference points. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 11(3), 181-192. 
Methods force ownership/endowment of the decoy option as a reference point. And allows 
choice between T,C,D after ownership. Three-option control condition. Assigned decoy 
‘reference point’ values were manipulated. Design was not a traditional ADE choice option 
and was thus excluded from the analysis. 
 
71. Ariely, D., & Wallsten, T. S. (1995). Seeking subjective dominance in multidimensional 
space: An explanation of the asymmetric dominance effect. Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes, 63(3), 223-232. 
Experiment 1: Between subjects with a three-option control condition. Point allocations 
show preference.  
Experiment 2: Attribute preference through point assignment. Does not test option choice or 
preference.  
Experiment 3: Value setting on options, not directly relevant to attraction effect.  
 
72. Pettibone, J. C., & Wedell, D. H. (2000). Examining models of nondominated decoy effects 
across judgment and choice. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 
81(2), 300-328. 
Tests inferior, compromise and phantom decoys. Not directly relevant to the attraction effect. 
 
73. Yeung, C. W., & Soman, D. (2005). Attribute evaluability and the range effect. Journal of 
Consumer Research, 32(3), 363-369. 
Does not directly test the attraction effect. Only speculates on the attribute evaluability and 
its implication on range effect explanations of the attraction effect.  
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74. Malkoc, S.A., Hedgcock, W., & Hoeffler, S. (2012 In Press). Between a rock and a hard 
place: The failure among unattractive alternatives. Journal of Consumer Psychology. doi: 
10.1016/j.jcps.2012.10.008. 
Experiments 1-4 were included. Conditions which primed subjects with a vigilance 
manipulation were not included as the manipulation was designed to emphasize one attribute 
over the other.   
 
75. Levav, J., Kivetz, R., & Cho, C. K. (2010). Motivational compatibility and choice conflict. 
Journal of Consumer Research, 37(3), 429-442. 
Only Experiment 2 tests the attraction effect, but does not report choice share information. 
(Exp1&4 test the compromise effect; Exp3 moderates with choice deferral). 
 
76. Mishra, S.K., (1990). The Attraction Effect: Definition, Causes, and Consequences. 
(Doctoral Dissertation, Washington State University, 1990). 
{T,C,D} attribute values in the preliminary study did not represent a clear asymmetrically 
dominated decoy scenario. Choice share counts were not reported for the follow-up study. 
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APPENDIX 7: HEDONIC/UTILITARIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD PRODUCTS & SERVICE 
Four-hundred sixty five participants were recruited through Amazon.com’s Mechanical 
Turk Human Interaction Tasks (MTurk HIT) service. Participants were presented with a 
randomly generated list of 40 of the 79 test products/services, and asked to evaluate each 
product/service along Voss, Spangenberg, & Grohmann’s (2003) five hedonic and/or utilitarian 
adjective pair scales. Figure 24 lists the ten adjective pair scales, and Figure 25 plots summary 
HED/UT measures for each of the 79 products/services surveyed. Between the 465 participants, 
each product/service type was evaluated at least 150 times on each HED/UT adjective pair. 
Figure 24. HED/UT Scale: Adjective-Pair Detail  
 
Hedonic Adjective Pairs 
 Fun / Not Fun 
 Exciting / Dull 
 Delightful / Not Delightful 
 Thrilling / Not Thrilling 
 Enjoyable / Un-enjoyable 
 
 
Utilitarian Adjective Pairs 
 Effective / Ineffective 
 Helpful / Unhelpful 
 Functional / Not Functional 
 Necessary / Unnecessary 
 Practical / Impractical 
  
Figure 25. Products & Services: HED/UT Measurement Values 
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APPENDIX 8: HETEROSKEDASTICITY BY AUTHOR AND CPI ITEM STRATA GROUPINGS 
Figure 26. Mean and Standard Errors by CPI Item Strata 
 
CPI item strata groups with 95% confidence intervals beyond that of the average effect size ratio include: HA, HE, RA, 
and RD; representing ‘Rental of Primary Residence,’ ‘Other Household Equipment & Furnishings,’ ‘Video & Audio,’ 
and ‘Photography’ items.  
 
Figure 27. Mean and Standard Errors by Author 
 
 
Author 97 (Malkoc, Hedgcock, & Hoeffler, 2012) moderated effect size through positive/negative framing of 
attributes. The positive/negative frames used are not unrepresentative of how attributes have been presented across 
other scenarios in the current literature. 
Author 93 (Pocheptsova et al., 2009) observations included four scenarios, two of which were based on gift cards for 
two different retailers (WalMart and BuestBuy). The qualitative nature of the retail brands used in the scenarios was 
also no unrepresentative of other instances in the data where brands were used as an attribute differentiator. 
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APPENDIX 9: DATASET COMPOSITION BY YEAR 
Figure 28. Descriptive Summary of Studies & Coded Variables 
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